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xiPREFACE
This volume is a by-product of the work done by the two authors in Viet Nam
over the past 15 years. Over that period we have worked with many different
government agencies in Viet Nam and for a large number of donors. We have
had the opportunity to discuss developments in Viet Nam with many
knowledgeable observers—Vietnamese scholars and government officials,
domestic and foreign business people, foreign academics, NGO representatives,
the staff of donor agencies, diplomats and others. Given the help we have
received from so many, it is difficult and a little invidious to acknowledge only
a few. Nevertheless, there are a few people who have been particularly helpful
and particularly deserve our thanks.
Early in our work in Hanoi, we were both very lucky to work with Vu Tat
Boi, then with the office of the Council of Ministers, and the able team of
young Vietnamese he assembled to staff and advise the UN Management
Development Programme. Under that project, we both participated in a
program to select and train twenty-seven young Vietnamese for overseas
postgraduate training in subjects relevant to the economic reform process.
From those two groups of young people, we made many friends whom we
keep meeting in increasingly high-level positions in government, business,
academia and donor agencies.
Le Dang Doanh and his colleagues, national and international, at the Central
Institute of Economic Management also have provided us with valuable insights
and challenged our thinking and interpretations on numerous occasions. Pham
Chin Lan from the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry was an
important source of ideas on business issues.
Many individuals from the offices of government; ministries of planning
and investment, finance, agriculture and rural development, and foreign affairs;
and provincial peoples’ committees have assisted us, both professionally and
at a personal level, making Viet Nam a stimulating and productive work
environment. In particular, we gained valuable insights working on projects
headed by former planning ministers, Do Quoc Sam and Tranh Xuan Gia.
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We have also learnt much from discussions with the international community
during our work, sometimes learning most when we agreed least. The two
Adams—Adam Fforde and Adam McCarty—have been a continuing source of
stimulus. Among aid officials during the early 1990s, David Dollar of the
World Bank provided valuable insights to all those working on economic reform
in Viet Nam, while in more recent years, J.P. Verbiest, previously the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) resident representative, and Robert Glofcheski of
the UNDP office in Hanoi, have proved stimulating colleagues. Two successive
Swedish ambassadors, Borje Lljunggren and Gus Edgren, were also most helpful
in generating lively exchanges of ideas. A number of domestic and foreign
lawyers and business experts (too many to name) helped stimulate our thinking
about law and economic development.
We also thank the development agencies that have funded much of our
work in Viet Nam, including the Asian Development Bank, United Nations
Development Programme and World Bank, from the multilateral agencies,
and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), GTZ,
SIDA, DANIDA, NORAD, and the Netherlands DGIS amongst the bilateral
agencies. If in the text we have occasionally bitten the hands that have fed us,
we have no doubt it will be taken in good spirit.
In preparing the text for publication we received help from Richard Jones in
Hanoi, who volunteered his time and energy to check the manuscript, and
Matthew May, of Asia Pacific Press, who has taken on the daunting tasking of
preparing the manuscript for publication. We also thank those readers who
took the time to provide valuable comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
Ray Mallon would particularly like to offer his personal thanks to To Hanh
Trinh and her family for their insights into Viet Nam. Brian Van Arkadie
would like to offer personal thanks also to Ray and his family, and to Goran
Andersson, of the Swedish Institute of Public Administration (SIPU), for offering
encouragement and hospitality.
Needless to say, as this volume offers personal judgments and interpretations
on a number of complex and sometimes contentious issues, none of those
thanked should be held responsible for any of the contents, although they
surely can claim credit if our efforts prove useful.
Brian Van Arkadie and Raymond Mallon
March 2003
1VIET NAM’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
The two themes of this book are introduced: the first, a comprehensive review
of developments in the Vietnamese economy and the evolution of economic
policy since the mid 1980s; the second – more ambitiously – an effort to
interpret and explain some key factors driving economic growth.
Essentially, this chapter describes what Viet Nam has achieved in terms of
socio-economic development – especially the level and distribution of economic
growth during the period of transition. Viet Nam’s performance is compared
and contrasted with two main benchmarks – East Asian economies during their
period of accelerated growth, and other reforming centrally planned economies.
The timing of the revival of Viet Nam’s economic fortunes coincided with the
introduction of Doi Moi, Viet Nam’s own version of ‘economic renewal’. The
reversal of the relative decline of Viet Nam is the main subject of this book.
The authors argue that some important building blocks of later success
were laid in the pre-Doi Moi period. However, the policy regime of Viet Nam
has been criticised in the following areas: reform of state enterprises, regulatory
environment for foreign investment, issues of public administration, governance
and corruption. Even so, the predicted dire consequences of failure to reform
more vigorously have not yet materialised.
Keywords:
Cambodia, China, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Doi
Moi, East Asia, economic renewal, International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Marxist-Leninist state, per capita income, Washington consensus, World Bank
Viet Nam: a transition tiger
Viet Nam’s development experience
Abstract for chapter 1
Published by ANU E Press, 2003
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Since the late 1980s Viet Nam has been remarkably successful in achieving
rapid economic growth and reducing poverty. While per capita income levels
are still far behind most other East Asian economies, economic growth rates
and rates of poverty reduction during the 1990s were amongst the highest in
the world.
In addressing that experience this book is intended to make two
contributions. First, a comprehensive review of developments in the economy
and the evolution of economic policy since the mid 1980s is presented. Second,
and more ambitiously, an effort has been made to interpret and explain some
key factors driving Vietnamese economic growth.
The latter task is not easy. Viet Nam is a large, diverse and populous country,
with a turbulent modern history. During the period covered, Viet Nam has
implemented its own version of economic reform (Doi Moi, or ‘economic
renewal’) which has been profound enough in its effects to justify identifying
Viet Nam as an economy ‘in transition’. It has, however, retained a stated
commitment to developing a Marxist-Leninist state and has been criticised by
many international commentators for the slow pace of reform of an apparently
cumbersome administrative and regulatory apparatus.
The high growth rates and reductions in poverty achieved by Viet Nam
during the 1990s took the international community by surprise.1 Throughout
the 1990s, many international advisors warned that Vietnamese development
targets were overambitious. During the last 15 years, Viet Nam was repeatedly
1
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warned that it was at a critical turning point in the reform process, and that
concerted efforts were urgently needed to accelerate and ‘deepen’ its reforms to
avert economic stagnation. And yet the Vietnamese economy has performed
well, frequently exceeding ‘overambitious’ targets.2 In the face of many dire
warnings about the consequences of failure to implement all aspects of proposed
reform packages, Viet Nam continued with a selective (‘step-by-step’) approach
to reform, in some areas acting decisively, in others moving with a high degree
of caution.
During the period covered, the dominant paradigm informing international
policy advice was what has been called the ‘Washington consensus’, associated
with the Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The central themes of the ‘consensus’ are an emphasis
on the virtues of greatly extending the play of free markets, reducing the
economic intervention of the state, and maintaining macroeconomic stability.
Many of the components of this consensus would be accepted by most
economists. Opinions vary, however, about the role of the state, the institutional
requirements to make markets work for the common good, and the interventions
required to ensure that the benefits of growth are equitably distributed.
While advocates of the Washington consensus are quite ready to claim that
the Vietnamese experience validates their paradigm, this volume argues that
Viet Nam’s quite remarkable development progress is not so readily subsumed
within the more orthodox versions of that framework. Basically, according to
the tenets of orthodoxy that call for minimum state intervention, the Vietnamese
economy should not have performed as well as it has, given continuing extensive
state intervention in economic activity.
In seeking to understand the factors that have contributed to Viet Nam’s
success, the intention is to contribute to a broader literature on the economic
performance of East Asia in recent decades which has explored the wide range
of institutional and policy experience of the region.3
There have always been voices in the mainstream economic literature which
have resisted the more simplistic versions of the ‘Washington consensus’.
Interestingly, in recent years some vocal criticisms have come from economists
associated with the World Bank.4
The diversity of views reflects the international reality that the development
profession and development institutions have still much to learn about economic
development processes. Douglass North asks
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How do we account for the persistence of poverty in the midst of plenty? If we know the sources
of plenty, why don’t poor countries simply adopt policies that make for plenty? The answer is
straightforward. We just don’t know how to get there. We must create incentives for people to
invest in more efficient technology, increase their skills, and organize efficient markets. Such
incentives are embodied in institutions. Thus we must understand the nature of institutions and
how they evolve (2000:n.p.)
Attempts to understand the Vietnamese reality should reduce the dangers
of offering irrelevant or counterproductive advice. Lessons also may be derived
from this experience that could be useful for other developing and transitional
economies. There should, however, be no expectation that a blueprint for reform
will be provided, to be applied mechanically elsewhere, as a recurring theme of
this study is that successful policy is built on pragmatic responses to specific
national circumstances.
While the focus is on more recent developments, the book includes a
description of the Vietnamese economic reform (Doi Moi) processes from its
antecedents in the early 1980s, through to 2001. The authors discuss both
the impact of policies on economic performance, and the impact of economic
experience on policy formulation.
This introductory chapter introduces some of the questions that motivate
this study.
DOI MOI IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The book aims to describe what Viet Nam has achieved in terms of
socioeconomic development, especially in terms of the level and distribution
of economic growth, during the period of transition. The main narrative depicts
events in Viet Nam, but some attempts are also made to compare and contrast
Viet Nam’s performance with two main benchmarks: East Asian economies
during their periods of accelerated growth; and other reforming centrally
planned economies.
Viet Nam as a developing East Asian economy: falling behind and
catching up
An obvious point of comparison is with the remarkable success the East Asian
economies have had during recent decades in greatly increasing per capita
incomes and reducing poverty. In the final four decades of the twentieth century,
Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were transformed from poor
underdeveloped economies to modern and relatively affluent economies through
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growth rates that were among the highest recorded in the history of world
development. More recently, dramatic transformations have also been taking
place in Malaysia, Thailand and China. Figure 1.1 provides a historical
perspective of Viet Nam’s economic performance relative to selected Asian
economies.
Data from Maddison (2001) show that, at the end of the Second World
War, per capita income in Viet Nam was well above that of China, around 85
per cent that of South Korea, and 80 per cent that of Thailand and Indonesia,
but only 62 per cent that of the Philippines (see Figure 1.1). Military struggle
during most of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, meant that the economy
stagnated and Viet Nam’s relative position deteriorated. Of the countries listed
in Table 1.1, since 1950 Viet Nam’s per capita income has only increased
relative to that of the Philippines.
Figure 1.1 Viet Nam’s per capita income as a proportion of selected
Asian economies’ per capita income, 1950–98 (per cent)
Source: Maddison, A., 2001. The World Economy: a millennial perspective, Organisation for
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The relative level of Viet Nam’s per capita income declined sharply compared
to the successful East Asian economies during the four decades 1950–90, but
there was a reversal in this decline in relative position in the final decade of the
century (Table 1.2).
The protracted military struggle was the primary cause of decline until the
mid 1970s. Military conflicts in Cambodia and with China, and a dysfunctional
economic policy regime compounded the decline during the later 1970s and
early 1980s. The subsequent reversal of the relative decline is the main theme
of this volume.
The timing of the revival in Viet Nam’s economic fortunes coincided with
the introduction of Doi Moi. The central importance of Doi Moi is accepted by
all commentators on the Vietnamese economy.5 However, although the shift
Table 1.1 Per capita incomes in selected Asian countries, 1950–98
a
1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Viet Nam 658 799 735 710 758 929 1,040 1,403 1,677
Thailand 817 1,078 1,694 1,959 2,554 3,054 4,645 6,620 6,205
South Korea 770 1,105 1,954 3,162 4,114 5,670 8,704 11,873 12,152
Philippines 1,070 1,475 1,761 2,028 2,369 1,964 2,199 2,185 2,268
Malaysia 1,559 1,530 2,079 2,648 3,657 4,157 5,131 6,943 7,100
Indonesia 840 1,019 1,194 1,505 1,870 1,972 2,516 3,329 3,070
China 439 673 783 874 1,067 1,522 1,858 2,653 3,177
Note: a 1990 international Geary–Khamis dollars
Source: Maddison, A., 2001. The World Economy: a millennial perspective, Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris.
Table 1.2 Per capita income in Viet Nam, 1950–98
a
(per cent of incomes in selected Asian countries)
 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Thailand 80.5 74.1 43.4 36.2 29.7 30.4 22.4 21.2 27.0
South Korea 85.5 72.3 37.6 22.5 18.4 16.4 11.9 11.8 13.8
Philippines 61.5 54.2 41.7 35.0 32.0 47.3 47.3 64.2 73.9
Malaysia 42.2 52.2 35.4 26.8 20.7 22.3 20.3 20.2 23.6
Indonesia 78.3 78.4 61.6 47.2 40.5 47.1 41.3 42.1 54.6
China 149.9 118.7 93.9 81.2 71.0 61.0 56.0 52.9 52.8
Note: a 1990 international Geary–Khamis dollars.
Source: Derived from Maddison, A., 2001. The World Economy: a millennial perspective,
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris.
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in the policy regime explains the timing of the economic revival, it does not
explain the sustained strength of the subsequent growth performance.
How was it possible for Viet Nam to shift swiftly from being an inward-
looking stagnant economy to such a successful process of assimilation? The
answer to this question is partly a matter of policy reform, but also reflects
underlying institutional and human resource capabilities.
Viet Nam as a reforming centrally planned economy: a transition success
Comparisons with other transition economies are much more flattering for
Viet Nam. Viet Nam has outperformed other transition economies, except for
China (Figure 1.2). Moreover, it has done this while maintaining
macroeconomic and social stability, and while continuing to improve key human
development indicators such as life expectancy and educational and health
data. While Viet Nam halved its incidence of poverty, the incidence of poverty
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) increased from 1 in 25
persons to 1 in 5 persons in the decade to 1998 (World Bank 2002:xiii). For
most CIS countries, the economic decline in the early stages of reform was far
worse than the impact of the Great Depression on developed countries in the
1930s (see World Bank 2002:5).
Substantial changes in the economic system were implemented in Viet Nam
at the end of the 1980s without a decline in economic activity. The economy
grew despite the sudden collapse of Soviet aid and trade, a continuing US-led
boycott that blocked the provision of financial assistance from the multilateral
financial institutions. In contrast, deep economic contractions and social
dislocation generally accompanied reform in the European centrally planned
economies.
Why did Viet Nam perform so much better than other Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) economies?6 A theme developed in this study is
that the nature of the system subject to reform was in certain critical respects
different from other centrally planned CMEA economies.
Understanding the characteristics of the system subject to reform is critically
important to any interpretation of an economic reform process. In the
Vietnamese case this is not easy, as the working of the pre-reform system was
somewhat obscure.
A key argument of the study is that, despite the adoption of the vocabulary
of central planning, the Vietnamese economy was never effectively subjected
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to the same level of centralised control as in the former USSR and Eastern
European centrally planned economies. Indeed, it could be argued that success
during the prolonged military conflicts was largely built around effective
decentralisation of day-to-day management decisions and encouraging local
initiatives.
Other important features were the relative importance of the rural sector,
the dominant role of household units in agriculture production, and the limited
development of heavy industry at the beginning of the reform process. The
economy was technically less advanced than Eastern Europe and the CIS
economies, but demonstrated greater resilience in the face of change and
dislocation in the macroeconomy. Soviet-style industrialisation had been
limited, so there was not the same inheritance of large scale, inflexible industrial
dinosaurs, which has posed such difficult challenges to reform in the former
Soviet Union.
The degree of institutional stability maintained during the transition process
was also crucially important. Instead of the ‘root and branch’ destruction of
Figure 1.2 GDP growth in selected transition economies, 1980–2000
(per cent per annum)
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old institutions as a prelude to the installation of new mechanisms, many
reforms were directed at making existing institutions work better, while
gradually introducing new market institutions. The step-by-step approach to
reform was based on continuity in the political system, which operates through
building and maintaining consensus on economic and institutional reforms.
Of course, Viet Nam also had one fortuitous advantage: its geographical
location. Adjacent to the region which was in the midst of a sustained boom
(until the crisis of 1997), there was a spill-over of capital and entrepreneurial
energy from dynamic neighbours. This was aided by growing political stability
in Cambodia, and improving relations between China and Viet Nam.
Demographic transition also contributed positively to growth in this period.
LEARNING FROM THE VIETNAMESE EXPERIENCE
In surveying the Vietnamese experience of successful economic growth, it is
not easy to separate the influence of exogenous factors from the impact of
policy. Powerful exogenous factors that supported the expansion of the
Vietnamese economy have included Viet Nam’s regional location and the
trajectory of the regional economy, the timing of natural resource (oil)
exploitation, the entrepreneurial vitality of the Vietnamese, access to a sizeable
and dynamic emigrant community, and the onset of peace. Yet the acceleration
of growth also began with strongly negative exogenous factors, such as the
economic consequences of the demise of the Soviet Union and the CMEA and
the effects of the US embargo.
Part of the problem is sorting out the impact of the systemic reforms
introduced under the aegis of Doi Moi from such exogenous effects. The balance
of the argument will be that the Doi Moi reforms were a necessary, but not
sufficient, ingredient in the Vietnamese success story (that is, that the degree
of success may not be readily replicable in different environments). Nevertheless,
it can be reasonably argued that certain lessons can be drawn about effective
policymaking.
Another set of difficulties relates to the interpretation of the timing and
sequencing of policy impacts. The introduction of the Doi Moi reforms began
in the second half of the 1980s, and the acceleration in growth began in the
early 1990s, suggesting a strong causal relationship. However, that leaves open
the issue of how far the foundations of Viet Nam’s performance in the 1990s
were laid in the pre-reform period. Should aspects of policy in the pre-Doi Moi
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be interpreted as important inputs into the later successes, or should that
period be seen simply as an era of mistaken policy, which failed to realise
inherent potential and held back the achievement of growth? This account
argues that, despite many mistakes, some important building blocks of later
success were laid in the pre-Doi Moi period.
A further area for speculation relates to policies that have not been
implemented. In donor tutorials, euphemistically entitled ‘policy dialogue’,
there have been areas of persistent nagging, where donors have felt that the
Vietnamese policy regime has had failings. The most persistent areas of criticism
have related to the reform of state enterprises and the regulatory environment
for foreign investment. More recently, issues of public administration,
governance and corruption have received increased emphasis.
By and large, the record suggests that the often predicted dire consequences
of failure to reform more vigorously in such directions have not yet materialised.
Does this imply that donor advice has been misplaced, or that even greater
achievements would have resulted from more receptivity to donor tutorials, or
even that the negative consequences have been merely postponed? These
questions are considered in this book, although it is difficult to provide definitive
answers.
NOTES
1 A joint United Nations–Government of Viet Nam study of the economy, produced in
1989 by a team under the leadership of one author of this volume was quite optimistic
about the prospects for growth. The same was true for an Asian Development Bank (ADB)
report which the other author helped draft the same year. A 1990 World Bank economic
report concluded that ‘[i]f Viet Nam follows through on its reform program, its medium-
term prospects are excellent’. However, none of these reports included quantitative
projections and, if the attempt had been made, projected growth would undoubtedly
have been more modest than the actual achievement.
2 Dollar (2001:1) notes that ‘Viet Nam has been one of the fastest growing economies in the
world in the 1990s, and yet by many conventional measures it has poor economic policies’.
3 The literature on this is extensive. Examples include Amsden (1989), Ha-Joon Chang
(1999), Jomo K.S. (1997), Krugman (1994), Wade (1990) and World Bank (1993a).
4 The most distinguished of these critical voices has been that of Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate
and former Vice President of the World Bank. Another ex-World Bank economist, William
Easterly, has also mounted a strong challenge to World Bank orthodoxies.  And, in fairness
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to the World Bank, its own research programs frequently offer a nuanced view of the range
of appropriate policies, as in Nelson and Pack (1999).
5 But some have argued that it has not been positive. Kolko (1997) argues that market
reforms have resulted in peasants losing their land, the emergence of a class society through
increasing inequality, and the fact that Vietnamese ‘industrial workers are amongst the
most exploited in the world’. He argues that Communist efforts to merge a socialist world
with a market strategy have resulted in the worst of both worlds.
6 CMEA was the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which included the former USSR,
the Eastern European centrally planned countries and Viet Nam, but not China.
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Viet Nam is the twelfth most populous country in the world, but only 58th in
terms of land area – a little smaller than Germany. This chapter outlines the
geography of the region, looks at the population and demographic transition,
gives an overview of the regions, and outlines the regional distribution of
economic activity.
The discussion on geography and the natural resource base focuses on
agriculture, forestry and fishing resources and the environment, as well as the
issues of energy, minerals and water. The population and demographic transition
points to the fact that life expectancy has continued to increase during Doi
Moi while the declining population growth is reducing the burden on the
state. In terms of regional productivity, with 42 per cent of the population
concentrated in the two deltas, foreign investment is based in the Southeast
region and the Red River Delta.
Keywords:
Agriculture, Central Coast region, Central Highlands, Climate, Da Nang,
demographic transition, Dong Nai, Fishing, Hai Phong, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh
City, Mekong River Delta, natural resources, North Central region, Northeast
region, Northwest region, Red River Delta, shipping routes, smuggling,
Southeast region, tourism
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Viet Nam is the twelfth most populous country in the world, but only fifty-
eighth largest in terms of land area (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001b). In
terms of land area and population it is a little smaller than Germany. The
population density is high and cultivatable land per person is very low. The
population is heavily concentrated in the Red River and Mekong River Deltas.
There is a long, narrow coastal strip linking the deltas. The two substantial
highland areas (the Northern and Central Highlands) are more sparsely
populated that the deltas. Viet Nam’s population is better educated and has a
higher life expectancy than that of most countries with similar average per
capita incomes.
GEOGRAPHY AND THE NATURAL RESOURCE BASE
Viet Nam extends 1,650 kilometres from north to south. At its widest point
the country stretches 600 kilometres from west to east, and at its narrowest
point, only 50 kilometres. Viet Nam is located close to major shipping routes,
and relatively prosperous and rapidly expanding East Asian economies. It has
a very long coast line (about 3,000 kilometres) providing opportunities for
fishing and tourism (and smuggling), and also ensuring that most areas of the
country are not far from access to transport to foreign markets. While natural
resources have played an important role in recent economic development, the
country is not particularly well endowed with agricultural, forest, energy, or
mineral resources.
11
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Source: Adapted from World Bank, n.d. Map of Vietnam, World Bank, Hanoi. Available online
at http://www.worldbank.org.vn/wbivn/map/map001.htm.
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The country’s location and length results in great variations in climate,
ranging from tropical to temperate, and allows for a diversity of flora and
fauna. The southern and central areas are tropical and humid. The northern
areas are also humid, but temperatures are much more variable with average
temperatures ranging from around 30 degrees in July to 16–18 degrees in
January. Average temperatures in the south range from 26 to 28 degrees
throughout the year. Typhoons are experienced in most parts of the country,
but are most severe in the central provinces. Rainfall variability is very high in
the North and Central provinces, contributing to variability in agricultural
output and incomes. Rainfall is more reliable in the southern areas, but all
parts of the country suffer from frequent natural calamities.
Viet Nam has rich biological diversity in its forests, rivers and oceans. A
great variety of crops, cultivars and domesticated animals are used in its
agricultural systems. Some 275 different animal, 826 bird, and 180 reptile
species are found in Viet Nam. Wild animals include elephants, dapple deer,
leopards, tigers, bears, wild buffalo, samba deer, mountain goats, monkeys,
goats, bobcats, foxes and squirrels. Three out of the seven new species of wild
animals identified during the twentieth century were found in Viet Nam’s
forests. More than 1,000 medicinal plant species have already been identified.
An indication of the richness of Viet Nam’s biodiversity is shown in Table 2.1.
On the other hand, habitat loss and hunting have resulted in 16 different
primate species, 4 large mammals, and 25 bird species being threatened (World
Bank 2000:105). Five large water bird species have become extinct in the
Table 2.1 Biodiversity in Viet Nam
Number of species Number of species SV/SW
in Viet Nam (SV) in the world (SW)  (per cent)
Mammals 275 4,000 6.8
Birds 800 9,040 8.8
Reptiles 180 6,300 2.9
Amphibians 80 4,148 2.0
Fish 2,470 19,000 13.0
Plants 7,000a 220,000 3.2
Note: a It has been estimated that another 5,000 species have still not been formally identified.
Source: Biodiversity Information Management System On-Line, http://www.geoanalytics.com/
bims/vm.htm.
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Mekong Delta in the last 30 years. Wetlands in the two main deltas are under
threat because of high population pressures, and increased economic incentives
to exploit these areas.
Agriculture, forestry and fishery resources and the environment
The long north–south axis, and mix of coastal and upland areas, provides
scope for Viet Nam to grow a wide variety of tropical and temperate crops and
forests. The relatively small ratio of cultivatable land per person greatly influences
agricultural technology and the rural economy. The high variability in rainfall
and frequent typhoons are important influences on rural social and economic
systems. Poorly developed physical infrastructure constrains market access in
many locations, especially in the mountainous areas.
The most productive agricultural land is found in the Mekong and Red
River deltas, the two most densely populated rural areas. Cropped land per
capita is low by international and regional standards—0.09 hectares per person,
compared with 0.16 in India and 0.30 in Thailand—but is comparable with
Sri Lanka (0.10 hectares) and Bangladesh (0.07 hectares).
The Mekong River Delta accounted for 38 per cent of total value added in
the agricultural sector in 1999 (with 12 per cent of the land area), while the
Red River Delta accounted for 19 per cent (with only 4.5 per cent of the total
land area) (General Statistics Office 2000b). Most of the population (especially
the Kinh majority) is concentrated in the two main deltas and a narrow section
of the east and southeast coast. Only a small portion of the highland areas
bordering Laos and China are suitable for cropping, and population densities
Table 2.2 Key rural indicators in selected Asian economies
Country Rural population Agricultural output Arable land
(% of total in 2000) (% of GDP in 2000) (ha/capita in 1999)
Viet Nam 80.3 24.6 .09
Bangladesh 78.8 24.3 .07
China 65.7 15.9 .11
India 71.6 25.3 .16
Indonesia 58.8 16.9 .15
Malaysia 42.7 8.6 .35
Philippines 41.4 15.9 .13
Sri Lanka 76.4 19.4 .10
Thailand 78.4 9.1 .30
Source: Asian Development Bank,  2001. Key Indicators 2001, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
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in these areas are low, with higher proportions of ethnic minority groups.
Despite the low ratio of cultivable agriculture land, Viet Nam has emerged as
a leading agricultural exporter, and has also substantially diversified agriculture
exports in recent years.
Viet Nam’s forests are concentrated in the upland regions, with about 40 per
cent found in the central highlands. Forests are an important economic resource,
providing firewood, protein, income and materials for shelter. Until recently,
most of the population in mountainous areas lived near forests and earned part
of their livelihood through the harvest and sale of bamboo, firewood, medicine,
fruit, fodder and game from forests. Some 2,300 forest plant species are harvested
for food, medicine, construction, textiles and water proofing (World Bank 2000).
Forest resources are, however, being depleted. Population growth and
economic development are increasing pressures to clear forests and to expand
agriculture into highland areas and other environmentally fragile areas. Between
1943 and 1997, five million hectares of Vietnamese forests were converted to
other uses. Forest cover fell from 43 per cent of the country’s total land area in
1945, to just 28 per cent by 1997. Large areas were destroyed during the war
with the United States as a result of bombing and deliberate attempts to reduce
forest cover by spraying chemical poisons.
Underlying causes of continuing deforestation include poorly controlled
logging, rural poverty resulting in burning of forests for farming and foraging
for food for fuel, and inappropriate land tenure arrangements. While the
government has adopted programs to reduce poverty, better manage forests,
and reforest barren hill lands in an attempt to reverse the decline in forest
cover, the pursuit of other objectives (for example, promoting accelerated growth
of industrial crops for export) has placed increasing pressures on the natural
environment.
Inland fishing and marine products are important sources of protein and
income for many communities. Almost three million people are directly
employed in the sector; nearly 10 per cent of the population derives their
main income from fisheries, and fish consumption provides about half of
national protein consumption. Exports of aquatic products have been important
contributors to rapid export growth. The total area of natural inland water
bodies (lakes and rivers) is estimated to be about 4,200 km2, and there are
additional ponds and seasonal flooded areas of 6,000 km2. In addition, a number
of reservoirs are used for fishing. Concerns are growing, however, about over-
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fishing, unsustainable fishing practices, the impacts of industrial pollution,
and the sustainability of shrimp farming in former mangrove swamps. With
rising demand for water, deforestation and weaknesses in watershed
management, and poor irrigation and drainage infrastructure, there are concerns
that water quality is deteriorating in many areas.
Energy, minerals and water
Another important contributor to rapid export growth during the late 1980s
and 1990s was the development of the country’s oil resources. New oil and gas
resources continue to be found and developed (mostly offshore from Vung Tau
in the south), and will be significant contributors to economic growth and
budget revenue for at least the medium term. While many areas are still to be
explored, most experts estimate that reserves are substantially less than oil rich
Southeast Asian nations such as Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia on a per capita
basis. Coal and hydropower development (especially in the north) has also
contributed significantly to economic growth.
While the country is known to possess a wide range of other minerals,
commercial exploration is hampered by uncertainty about property rights. Lead,
zinc, antimony, pyrite, manganese, limestone, marble, salt and precious stones
are also currently being exploited. Studies suggest commercial potential to develop
bauxite, phosphates (mostly from apatite), lead, gold, tin, graphite, iron ore,
manganese, chrome and asbestos.
Viet Nam is endowed with river systems that have potential for hydro-power
development, estimated at about 18,000 megawatts. Some 3,700 megawatts’
capacity has already been developed.
POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
The population of Viet Nam was estimated at 78.7 million in 2001 (General
Statistics Office 2000a). The crude birth rate fell from 45 per thousand (1955–
59), to 38 (1970–74), to 31 (1985–89), and then to 19.9 per thousand in
the 1999 Census (General Statistics Office 2000a). Declining fertility reflects
widespread adoption of family planning practices. The government has
maintained a population policy that discouraging families of more than two
children, but without draconian controls. The decline in the birth rate must
also have been associated with success of health policies that increased life
expectancy at birth, and with the achievement of high educational enrolments.
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While distinct regional differences in fertility persist, with much higher
rates in the highland areas than in the delta and urban areas, a substantial
decline in fertility is recorded for all regions.1 The estimated rate of population
growth fell from 2.1 per cent per annum during 1979–89 to about 1.7 per
cent per annum from 1989 to 1999. The population growth rate has continued
to fall, and the General Statistics Office (2000a) now estimates the rate at
1.35 per cent in 2001, with a fertility rate of 2.3 children per woman. Life
expectancy has continued to increase during Doi Moi from an already relatively
high 67 years in 1992 to an estimated 68.6 years in 1999.
Thus, Viet Nam has experienced a rapid demographic transition (McNicholl
2002). Relatively low mortality rates and declining fertility rates have resulted
in a clear transition in the population’s age profile. At the time of the 1989
Census the profile was a pyramid, with each five year cohort larger than the
next older group.2 By 1999, this profile had changed in a crucial fashion, with
a 5–9 year old cohort smaller than the 10–14 group, and the 0–4 cohort
showing an even sharper drop in size. Viet Nam is now experiencing a
‘demographic bonus’,3 in which a declining population growth rate is reducing
the burdens on the education system, increasing the proportion of income
earners and making it easier to achieve increases in per capita income, which in
turn is associated with a further decline in birth rates.
The country is predominantly rural. Only 19.5 per cent of the population
resided in urban areas in 1990.4  At that time, Viet Nam’s economic structure
was characteristic of a low-income developing economy. In terms of the sources
of livelihood for the population, the country was (and is) still predominantly
agricultural. Of the total estimated active labour force in 1992 of 31.8 million,
23.0 million (72 per cent) were engaged in agriculture and little more than
one-tenth in industry. In 1990, agriculture and fisheries still accounted for
two-fifths (39 per cent) of GDP. Some 80 per cent of the population still live
in rural areas.5
OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONS
The Red River Delta, with a population of 17.2 million in 2001, is the most
densely populated region. It includes the national capital Hanoi and the port
city of Hai Phong (the second and third largest cities in Viet Nam). The
combined population of Hanoi and Hai Phong is less than half that of Ho Chi
Minh City.6 More than one in five Vietnamese live in the Red River Delta.
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Figure 2.1 Viet Nam population pyramid, 1989 and 1999
Source: General Statistics Office, 2000. Statistical Yearbook 2001, General Statistics Office, Hanoi.
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Table 2.3 Population distribution by region, 1995–2001
(per cent of total)
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Red River Delta 22.4 22.2 22.1 22.0 21.9 21.9
Northeast 11.7 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.5 11.5
Northwest 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
North Central Coast 13.3 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.0 12.9
South Central Coast 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.5
Central Highlands 4.7 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5
Southeast 14.9 15.1 15.2 15.4 15.5 15.7
Mekong River Delta 21.6 21.3 21.2 21.1 21.1 21.0
Source: General Statistics Office, 2001. Statistical Year Book 2001, General Statistics Office,
Hanoi.
Figure 2.2 Age dependency ratio in selected Asian countries,
1986–2000
Note: The age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependants (people younger than 15 and older
than 65) to the working-age population (those aged 15–64).
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With particularly high population densities and productive land, yields per
hectare are higher here than anywhere else in the country. This region is one of
the three focal economic zones identified as areas for concentrated development.
Hanoi, by virtue of its status as capital, attracts public and service sector
investment, but is also becoming an important industrial centre. The Hanoi/
Hai Phong industrial region is second most important location for foreign
invested projects after the Ho Chi Minh City/Dong Nai area.
The Northeast and Northwest regions (the Northern Uplands) have a
population of 11.3 million. It is one of the regions of concentrated poverty,
where weak infrastructure and limited agricultural land limit development
prospects. It has experienced a low rate of agricultural growth and lower than
average overall growth. Areas near Hanoi could, however, benefit from Hanoi’s
growth, particularly if investments are made to ensure good access. The area
could also benefit from increased tourism and economic links with Yunnan
province in China.
Another problematic region is North Central Coast. This region includes
some of the more inhospitable areas of Viet Nam, with frequent typhoons and
infertile land. As a result, the incidence of poverty is high. The region is
politically important as the link between the two more developed parts of
Viet Nam and has had an historical importance as the home area of key figures
in Viet Nam’s independence movement. The region has a population of about
10.2 million people. Like the Northern Uplands, it is a region of concentrated
poverty and has experienced the lowest growth rate of all the regions in the Doi
Moi period.
Further down the coast, the South Central Coast region (6.7 million people)
has higher income levels than its northern neighbour and a growth rate of
GDP and proportion of GDP generated from industry close to the national
average. This region includes Da Nang, the fourth largest city and third port
of Viet Nam, and a centre of one of the three focal economic zones. This area
has so far been the weakest of the three focal economic zones as a magnet for
foreign investment.
Inland from the South Central Coast region, where the land mass of
Viet Nam widens, are the Central Highlands. This is the least densely populated
of Viet Nam’s regions; with the second largest land mass of all the regions
(5,612 thousand hectares), it has only 4.3 million people (2001). While it
contains large mountain and forest areas which are either of low potential for
21GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES AND POPULATION
agricultural development or deserve protection on environmental grounds, and
remote areas whose location and poor access has been a barrier to development,
there are also considerable areas of high-potential underdeveloped land
adaptable, for example, to high value tree crop development. As a result, it has
attracted a high rate of migration and has been the centre of the dynamic
growth of coffee production. This region has experienced the highest rate of
rural growth and is an important host to rural–rural migrants. In 1989–99
the population of the Central Highlands grew at 4.87 per cent per annum,
compared with the national average of 1.70 per cent. The share of the Central
Highlands in agricultural value-added has increased sharply and, despite the
net migration to this area, agricultural value-added per person in this region
has also increased much faster than in the rest of the country.
The southern part of the country includes the Mekong River Delta region
and the Southeast region. The Mekong River Delta is the second most populous
of the regions, with over 16 million people, although it is less densely populated
than the Red River Delta. It has an unrealised potential for agricultural growth
both at the intensive margin (increasing productivity per hectare) and at the
extensive margin (bringing more land into irrigated cultivation). It is in the
Mekong that further expansion in staple food production can be most readily
achieved,7 and this could be associated with movement of labour into the
region. Social and economic infrastructure is not as developed as in the Red
River Delta, suggesting the need for substantial investment in rural
infrastructure to take advantage of the region’s potential. There is also a need
to invest in road improvements to link rural areas with regional growth centres
(notably the town of Can Tho) and with Ho Chi Minh City.
With a population almost as large as the Red River Delta, but a larger land
area, the Mekong Delta is the main producer of a marketable food surplus for
domestic consumption and export. The Red River Delta also produces a modest
surplus. The rest of the country produces close to or below food self-sufficiency.
Maize and cassava are the two main food staples after rice and are also mainly
grown in the deltas.
The Southeast region includes Ho Chi Minh City and Dong Nai, the most
dynamic centres of commercial and industrial development in Viet Nam, and
the most attractive to foreign investors. Ho Chi Minh City, with about 5.4
million people (in 2001), is almost twice as populous as Hanoi. In designating
the area as a focal economic zone, government is doing no more than recognising
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the reality of the strong growth of Ho Chi Minh City, which is spilling over
into neighbouring areas. Although already a large city, Ho Chi Minh City still
falls short of being an East Asian mega-city,8 but it is likely to become so
within the next twenty years, with all the attendant problems and investment
requirements that implies.
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Some 42 per cent of the population are concentrated in the two deltas. The
two main deltas account for more that 55 per cent of agricultural output. The
Southeast (including Ho Chi Minh City and Dong Nai) and the Red River
Delta dominate industrial output (60 per cent of total industrial output). By
Table 2.4 Gross regional product per capita by major region,
1995–2000 (ratio of national average)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Red River Delta 97 97 98 98 98 99
Northeast 55 54 55 55 55 57
Northwest 40 39 39 42 41 40
North Central Coast 58 56 57 56 55 55
South Central Coast 73 73 73 73 73 73
Central Highlands 61 59 57 58 58 57
Southeast 233 236 234 234 232 228
Mekong River Delta 84 83 83 82 83 83
Source: General Statistics Office, 2002. Viet Nam Economy in the Years of Reform, Statistical
Publishing House, Hanoi.
Table 2.5 Share of GDP by region, 1995–2000 (per cent of total)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Red River Delta 19.53 19.14 18.86 19.30 18.86 18.59
Northeast 8.09 7.95 7.88 7.91 7.75 7.78
Northwest 1.30 1.26 1.27 1.24 1.15 1.15
North Central Coast 8.02 7.69 7.53 7.38 7.16 7.04
South Central Coast 6.27 6.24 6.31 6.43 6.25 6.25
Central Highlands 2.26 2.30 2.18 2.44 2.43 1.98
Southeast 36.44 37.11 37.76 36.96 38.67 39.99
Mekong River Delta 18.08 18.30 18.21 18.33 17.73 17.22
Source: General Statistics Office, 2002. Viet Nam’s Economy in the Years of Reform, Statistical
Publishing House, Hanoi.
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Table 2.6 Agriculture value-added by region, 1995–2000
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000
Percentage of total
Red River Delta 20.1 19.6 19.6 19.0 18.6
Northeast 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.7
Northwest 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
North Central Coast 9.0 9.1 8.6 8.6 8.7
South Central Coast 6.1 5.9 5.9 5.7 5.5
Central Highlands 5.9 7.4 7.3 8.6 10.2
Southeast 11.1 11.3 10.8 11.1 11.2
Mekong River Delta 38.0 37.0 38.3 37.4 36.2
‘000 dong/person (constant 1994 prices)
Red River Delta 1,027 1,096 1,162 1,200 1,226
Northeast 780 847 884 920 961
Northwest 759 801 796 881 914
North Central Coast 772 855 857 916 967
South Central Coast 806 854 908 934 929
Central Highlands 1,425 1,818 1,840 2,240 2,702
Southeast 855 935 930 999 1,039
Mekong River Delta 2,012 2,161 2,369 2,457 2,485
Whole country 1,143 1,245 1,313 1,389 1,444
Source: General Statistics Office, 2000. Statistical Year Book 2000, General Statistics Office,
Hanoi; General Statistics Office, 2001. Statistical Year Book 2001, General Statistics Office,
Hanoi.
far the highest per capita incomes are in the Southeast, more than twice the
national average. Per capita incomes in the Red River Delta are the same as the
national average, but incomes in the Mekong Delta are about 83 per cent of
the national average. The poorest area is the Northwest (about 40 per cent of
the national average).
While the two deltas dominate agricultural output, the share of the deltas
in total agricultural output has recently declined. This reflects the more rapid
industrialisation and urbanisation of these areas, and the rapid development
of industrial crops in upland areas, especially in the Central Highlands. The
Central Highlands share of agricultural value-added increased from 5.9 to 10.2
per cent between 1995 and 2000 due to a rapid expansion in the output of
coffee and other industrial crops. The Central Highlands region has the highest
per capita value-added in agricultural output in Viet Nam followed by the
Mekong River Delta.
24 VIET NAM: A TRANSITION TIGER?
Table 2.7 Industrial value-added by domestic enterprises by region,
1995–2001 (per cent of total)
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Red River Delta 19.8 19.6 19.7 20.0 20.0 20.3
Northeast 7.4 7.6 7.3 7.0 7.0 7.1
Northwest 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
North Central Coast 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.2
South Central Coast 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.7
Central Highlands 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3
Southeast 38.9 38.9 38.7 39.0 39.3 39.5
Mekong River Delta 14.6 14.0 13.8 13.5 13.0 12.9
Not allocated to a province 6.9 7.6 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.7
Sources: General Statistics Office, 2000. Statistical Year Book 2000, General Statistics Office, Hanoi;
General Statistics Office, 2001. Statistical Year Book 2001, General Statistics Office, Hanoi.
Table 2.8 Total industrial value-added by region, 1995–2000
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Percentage of total
Red River Delta 17.7 18.4 19.1 19.6 20.4 20.2
Northeast 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.4
Northwest 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
North Central Coast 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.6 3.8
South Central Coast 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0
Central Highlands 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
Southeast 49.4 50.3 50.5 50.9 50.2 50.0
Mekong River Delta 11.8 10.6 10.2 9.7 9.3 9.5
Not allocated to a province 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0
‘000/person (constant 1994 prices)
Red River Delta 1,134 1,495 1,725 1,960 2,369 2,650
Northeast 736 906 963 1,027 1,192 1,357
Northwest 155 184 224 223 237 249
North Central Coast 387 449 489 526 709 837
South Central Coast 801 1,018 1,114 1,237 1,476 1,688
Central Highlands 362 390 390 409 452 458
Southeast 4,777 6,031 6,650 7,292 8,252 9,163
Mekong River Delta 788 901 962 1,016 1,131 1,305
Whole country 1,435 1,809 2,004 2,203 2,555 2,877
Sources: General Statistics Office, 2000. Statistical Year Book 2000, General Statistics Office,
Hanoi; General Statistics Office, 2001. Statistical Year Book 2001, General Statistics Office,
Hanoi.
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Some commentators, focusing on Ho Chi Minh City with its higher income
and more developed services, conclude that all the south of Viet Nam is more
developed economically than the north. The southeast (which includes the
major industrial centres of Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai and Vung Tau) does
have a considerably higher GDP per capita and accounts for nearly half the
country’s industrial output. On the other hand, per capita incomes in the
Mekong Delta in the south are lower than in the northern Red River Delta. It
is the gap between the larger urban centres (including Ho Chi Minh City,
Dong Nai, Hanoi and Hai Phong) and rural areas that is more pronounced.
Nearly 40 per cent of industrial output from domestic enterprises comes
from the southeast and 20 per cent from the Red River Delta. The Mekong
River Delta accounts for a further 13 per cent (Table 2.6).
Most foreign investment in industry has been concentrated in the southeast
and the Red River Delta. When industrial output from enterprises with foreign
investment is included, almost 50 per cent of total industrial output is from
the southeast and 20 per cent from the Red River Delta. The share of total
industrial output in the southeast has remained largely unchanged over the
last seven years. Output in the Red River Delta has increased marginally, while
that in the Mekong River Delta has fallen.
NOTES
1 Even a stable proportion of urban population in the total population would imply some
rural–urban migration, as fertility rates have fallen faster in urban areas than in the
countryside (in 1989 the crude birth rate in urban areas was 24.1 compared to 33.6 in
rural areas). The corresponding crude death rates were 5.1 and 7.9, suggesting a significant
difference in the urban and rural natural rates of population increase (General Statistics
Office 1994). A 1994 survey indicates that the differences in fertility persist (General
Statistics Office 1995).
2 Except for the male cohort of 45–54 at that time, which had been severely depleted by
war deaths.
3 A term used to denote ‘the radical declines in death and birth rates associated with societal
modernization’ (Boom and Williamson 1998:419–56). They argue that a demographic
bonus has contributed to the stellar economic performance in East Asia in recent decades.
4 Alternative definitions might result in a significantly higher figure. The Viet Nam Urban
Sector Strategy Study (Final Report November 1995) noted that the Vietnamese definition
of urban residence did not conform to international practice, as rural areas within cities and
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municipalities were excluded from the urban totals; the study team estimated that, using
the more inclusive definition about 8 per cent more of the population resided in urban
areas (resulting in a total of 28.1 per cent).
5 The estimate in the Table is from an ADB source that allows regional comparisons. The
GSO estimates that about 76 per  cent of the population were living in rural areas in 2000.
6 Based on the 1999 Census, the urban populations of the three provinces were Hanoi
1.552 million, Hai Phong 0.572 million and Ho Chi Minh City 4.245 million. However,
as the urban–rural distinction is necessarily somewhat arbitrary and the peri-urban rural
areas are very much part of the urban economies, the total provincial populations may be
more revealing of relative size. The total provincial population in 1999 was estimated to be
Hanoi 2.685 million, Hai Phong 1.691 million and Ho Chi Minh City 5.222 million.
7 At least in terms of the eventual production possibilities. There are still difficult water
management and infrastructure constraints to be resolved.
8 In 2001, Tokyo had a population of about 26.4 million, Shanghai, 12.9 million; Jakarta,
11.0 million; Osaka, 11.0 million; Manila, 10.9 million; Beijing, 10.8 million; and Seoul,
9.9 million in 2000 (see McNicholl 2002:20).
1VIET NAM’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
From the late 1980s, Viet Nam experienced an economic turnaround in terms
of growth, food production, stability, resource mobilisation, and the opening
up of the economy to trade and foreign investment. This chapter addresses the
key issues that led to the improvement of economic growth performance.
After a historical overview of macroeconomic data, two questions are posed:
‘What determined the timing of the up-turn of the economy?’ and ‘Why did
the economy respond so energetically to the opportunities offered by the new
policy environment and why did that initial response set the economy on a
path of sustained growth?’
The answer to the first question is straightforward: the Doi Moi economic
reforms sparked the turn-around in the economy. The answer to the second
question is more complex: while the change in the economic policy regime
determined the timing and direction of the change in economic performance
this does not in itself explain the pace and sustained character of subsequent
growth. A good part of the explanation of the Vietnamese performance lies in
the role of institutions, and in human capital.
The chapter closes with a discussion on entrepreneurship and innovation in
development and the removal of barriers to entrepreneurship and innovation,
specifically by the Doi Moi reforms
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A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MACROECONOMIC DATA
Table 3.1 highlights Viet Nam’s economic turnaround from the late 1980s in
terms of growth, food production, stability, resource mobilisation, and opening
up of the economy to trade and foreign investment. This was achieved while
maintaining progress in social development. This strong performance took
place in an international context where median growth in per capita incomes
in developing countries fell to zero over 1980–98 (compared with 2.5 per cent
per year from 1960–79) (Easterly 2001).
Following an initial economic recovery immediately after formal reunification
in 1976, annual economic growth averaged only 0.4 per cent in the five years
to 1980. With population increasing by about 2.3 per cent each year, per
capita income declined. Prices increased by an average of more than 20 per
cent each year.
Economic growth performance improved during the early 1980s, but
macroeconomic imbalances increased and inflation accelerated. As the
government sought to stabilise the economy in the early years of reform, growth
rates declined. Average inflation remained high, but had been greatly reduced
by the end of the 1980s. The 1990s were marked by accelerating growth and
price stability.
When Doi Moi was introduced at the Sixth Party Congress at the end of
1986, Viet Nam was facing a major economic crisis. The annual rate of inflation
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Table 3.1 Average annual indicators of growth and inflation, 1976–80
to 1996–2001 (per cent)
Inflation GDP Agriculture Services  Industry
(CPI)
1976–80 21.2 0.4 1.9 -0.1 3.3
1981–85 74.2 6.4 5.3 4.7 9.3
1986–90 298.7 3.9 3.7 8.7 4.7
1991–95 23.5 8.2 4.3 9.5 12.6
1996–2001a 3.4 7.0 3.9 7.3 12.2
Note: a 2001 data is based on end-year government estimates. Services before 1986 only included
trade.
Sources: General Statistics Office, various issues. Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Publishing House,
Hanoi.
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was over 700 per cent, exports were less than half of imports, there was virtually
no foreign direct investment (FDI), and only limited official development
assistance. When the Seventh Party Congress met in 1991, economic growth
had begun to accelerate, the value of exports had quadrupled, and inflation
had been brought down to 67 per cent. From the early 1990s, the picture
improved markedly, with stable macroeconomic conditions and a dramatic
acceleration in growth of income and employment. Trends in economic growth
and changes in key indicators since Doi Moi are summarised in Table 3.2.
The transition has been accompanied by changes in the structure of major
components of GDP. The share of agriculture fell from 44 per cent of GDP
(current prices) in 1986 to 24 per cent in 2001, while the share of industry
increased from 26 to 38 per cent. The share of services also increased as indicated
in the Table 3.3.
More surprising, at least for most external observers of the Vietnamese
economy, was the fact that the share of the state in economic output increased
from 22 per cent in 1986 to 40 per cent in 1996, before declining marginally
in more recent years. Possible explanations for this trend are discussed
throughout this report.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE EXPLAINED?
At the end of the 1980s, the economy was stagnating, economic survival for
most segments of the population involved a difficult struggle, infrastructure
still showed the damage of the generation of warfare, and the nation’s economic
future seemed quite uncertain. By the turn of the century, there had been a
substantial reduction in poverty, a fast-growing middle class enjoyed levels of
consumption unimaginable a decade earlier, infrastructure had not only been
rehabilitated, but in critical respects had been expanded and, perhaps most
important, there was a widely held perception, both among Vietnamese and
external observers, that the economy was firmly set on the path of economic
development. This breakthrough is not only evident in the economic numbers,
but for observers of the economy was palpable in all aspects of economic life.
This dramatic change in economic fortunes raises two questions. The first,
and easiest to answer, is what determined the timing of the up-turn of the
economy? The answer to that question is straightforward—the Doi Moi
economic reforms described throughout this volume sparked the turn-around
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Table 3.3 Structural changes in the economy, 1986–2001
(per cent of GDP at current prices)
Sixth Party Seventh Party Eighth Party Ninth Party
Congress Congress Congress Congress
1986 1991 1996 2001
Agriculture 43.8 40.5 27.8 23.6
Industry and construction 25.7 23.8 29.7 37.8
Services 30.5 35.7 42.5 38.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
State 33.1 33.2 40.0 38.6
Non-state 66.9 66.8 60.0 61.4
Sources: General Statistics Office, various issues. Statistical Year Book, Statistical Publishing
House.
Table 3.2 Indicators of economic developments, 1986–2001
Indicator Sixth Party Seventh Party Eighth Party Ninth Party
Congress Congress Congress Congress
1986 1991 1996 2001a
Economic growth (%) 3.4 6.0 9.3 6.8
CPI (%, year to Dec.) 775 67 4.5 0.8
Illiteracy rate (% of population) 10.7 9.2 7.7 6.5
Income per capita (US$) 180 228 339 410
Food grain production
(kg of paddy/person) 301 323 385 433
Budget surplus (% of GDP) –6.2 –3.8 –0.7 –3.5
Budget revenue (% of GDP) 14.0 13.5 23.6 21.8
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) n.a. 13.2 16.7 24.0
Current account (% of GDP) –2.7 –2.0 –11.1 1.5
Gross domestic investment
(% of GDP) n.a. 15.1 27.9 26.1
FDI inflows—US$ million - 229 1,838 1,200
ODA inflows—US$ million 147 229 939 1,700
Exports—US$ million 494 2042 7,330 15,027
Imports—US$ million 1,121 2,105 10,481 16,162
Trade (% of GDP) 25.1 63.7 100.0 n.a.
Note: a Preliminary estimates.
Sources: General Statistics Office, various issues. Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Publishing House,
Hanoi. International Monetary Fund, various issues. Vietnam: recent economic developments,
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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in the economy. The implications of that process for the economic growth
performance are clear enough. From the point of view of conventional economic
interpretations, the easy part of the story to understand is the impact of market
liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisation. Viet Nam implemented ‘sound’
economic policies, and reaped the promised rewards. This could be seen as a
vindication of the ‘Washington consensus’ and, indeed, has been presented as
such.1
There is, however, a more difficult question to be addressed. While the
change in the economic policy regime determined the timing and direction of
the change in economic performance, it does not in itself explain the pace and
sustained character of the subsequent growth. While bad policies can result in
economic stagnation and good policies can encourage and accommodate growth,
policy is only part of the story. Many countries have implemented ambitious
reform programs without stimulating the same level of sustained response.
The other part of the story is to explain why, in this case, the economy responded
so energetically to the opportunities offered by the new policy environment
and why that initial response set the economy on a path of sustained growth.
INSTITUTIONS, HUMAN CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
This chapter does not claim to offer a definitive answer to the second question,
but on the basis of the authors’ observations, some clues are offered. Interestingly,
it is easier to eliminate some possible explanations than to provide all the
answers.
For example, the initial sharp acceleration in growth is not explained by any
sharp increase in capital formation. True, investment increased significantly,
but the increase in the productivity of given levels of investment was more
important than acceleration in the rate of capital formation.
Nor is Viet Nam’s performance to be explained by the flow of external aid
(although the flow of ideas and exchange of experience were important). The
story told here demonstrates that the crucial transformation and acceleration
in growth took place in a period when external assistance was declining, so
that, although it can be reasonably argued that the growth in foreign aid from
1994 on supported investments without which growth would have been
constrained in the late 1990s, it is difficult to make a plausible case that foreign
aid either initiated the process or determined the liveliness of the response.
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The main difficulty in teasing out a credible thesis is that a good part of the
explanation of the Vietnamese performance lies in two areas of analysis, which
are important, but where evidence is imprecise—the role of institutions and
human capital. The pragmatic willingness to adopt market-oriented reforms
was combined with an institutional framework and a population which was
able to respond to the opportunities provided by the market stimuli.
The description of the role of state institutions in various parts of this study
suggests that the effectiveness of the institutional framework is difficult to
explain within the orthodoxy of the Washington consensus. The semi-reformed
state economic apparatus has done much better than proponents of faster reform
predicted. Many state institutions have performed rather well in taking
advantage of competitive markets and adjusting to the new economic realities.
Of course, the proponents of accelerated market reform and pure models of
market institutions argue that if only reform were faster and more complete,
growth would have been even faster, and if further reforms are not implemented
with some urgency, growth will falter. Alternative judgements are always possible
about counter-historical options, although it should be noted that, given the
growth performance actually achieved, it would be surprising if alternative
arrangements would have achieved much more.
The actual strengths of existing institutions and the particular path to reform
chosen were demonstrated not only by the responsiveness of the ‘semi-reformed’
system to the possibilities of export-led growth in the period 1990–97, but
also in responding with speed and effectiveness to the East Asian crisis from
1998 onwards, when pro-active state economic management (reducing barriers
to domestic private investment and curtailing lower priority public investments)
allowed the government to manage the potential crisis rather well. Indeed, the
caution in implementing advice to reform and deregulate2 the banking and
financial system appear to have helped shield the economy from the full
consequences of the speculative financial bubble that shook neighbouring
economies.
The danger is that, if institutions are judged largely on their conformity to
a predetermined and somewhat dogmatic template, then there is likely to be a
failure to understand how they work in practice. It is particularly necessary to
make that effort of understanding when institutional behaviour and performance
does not conform to preconceptions.
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In turn, however, institutions performed well because of the use Vietnamese
have made of them. The high quality of human capital and its importance is
readily observable in Viet Nam in the facility with which so many actors in the
economy—from farmers, to businessmen and state officials—have demonstrated
entrepreneurial flair in grasping economic opportunities.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION IN DEVELOPMENT
There is a long tradition in the study of economic development that places
entrepreneurship in the centre of explanations of development. Schumpeter’s
The Theory of Economic Development (1936), published before the First World
War, argued that entrepreneurship was the critical factor in explaining how
economic systems raised themselves to new levels of performance. And nearly
fifty years ago, Hirschman (1958) returned to similar themes in his Strategy of
Economic Development. More recently, discussions of human and social capital
have laid new emphasis on those human factors that determine the capability
of societies to take advantage of economic opportunities.
The difficulty in using entrepreneurship as an explanatory variable arises
from the fact that, although economists are willing to recognise the crucial
importance of human capital in general and entrepreneurship in particular, it
is not easy to define what in practice that means, in terms either of making ex
ante predictions of performance, or in terms of any policy implications. Effective
entrepreneurship is recognisable when it occurs but it is not measurable and
its appearance is not easily predictable.
However, convincing evidence has been presented of the importance of
entrepreneurship and policies supporting it as a key explanatory variable in
explaining the ‘Asian economic miracle’. In an interesting analysis of the
experience of rapid economic growth in East Asia, Nelson and Pack have
distinguished two schools of thought in interpreting the performance. One
school (assimilation theories) ‘stresses the entrepreneurship, innovation and
learning, all encouraged by the policy regime, that these economies had to go
through...’. The other school (accumulation theories) ‘emphasizes physical
and human capital accumulation’ (Nelson and Pack 1999:418).
Nelson and Pack develop a strong case in support of the assimilation approach.
One point they make is that, even if these follower countries were able to
borrow techniques developed elsewhere, this did not simply involve importing
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an existing technology ‘off the shelf ’, but also involved an important element
of entrepreneurship in adapting and assimilating the new production
techniques.
Another recent study of the sources of economic growth by Parente and
Prescott argues in a similar vein that
[a] necessary precondition for a country to undergo a development miracle is that the country is
not exploiting a significant amount of stock of useable knowledge and therefore is poor relative
to the industrial leader. The stock of knowledge will be little exploited if barriers to the adoption
and efficient use of this stock are high and have been in place for an extended period. In 1965,
many countries besides South Korea met this precondition. Most of these countries remain
poor relative to the leader because unlike South Korea, they did not adopt new policies that
greatly reduced barriers to the efficient use of this knowledge (2000:4).
REMOVING BARRIERS TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
INNOVATION
While it is still early days to describe the Vietnamese achievement as an economic
miracle, the economic achievement of Viet Nam in the 1990s is consistent
with the views of these two sources. Prior to 1986, Viet Nam had gone through
an extended period where there were enormous barriers to the adoption and
efficient use of the stock of useable knowledge. During the 1970s and 1980s,
most of the population had no access to international media, books, education,
travel and research, and no contact with foreigners. The state barred most of
the population from investing in skills (for example, foreign language training)
and travel that may have opened up new opportunities.
The Doi Moi reforms removed barriers to the utilisation of the available and
potential stock of knowledge, not only in the narrowly technical sense, but
also in the broader sense of the possibilities of taking advantage of Vietnamese
comparative advantage, particularly in the regional context. A combination of
improved incentives, increased competition, and reductions in barriers to the
adoption of existing knowledge are crucial to explaining the rapid improvements
in economic performance over the last 20 years.
The other underlying institutional factor which must be addressed is that
of the energy, liveliness and entrepreneurial skills of the population A pervasive
and critical element in explaining the response to market reforms and the
success in making imperfect institutions work is undoubtedly the quality of
the Vietnamese workforce. It is, of course, characteristic of informal discussion
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of the economic performance of countries that, after allowance has been made
for policy and such quantitative factors as capital formation, most commentators
will offer a view about the characteristics of the national population, good or
bad.
This is dangerous ground, as such observations can often be little more than
ex post rationalisation of observed performance based on anecdotal evidence,
and is sometimes no more than ethnic prejudice. Indeed, it is striking that the
same institutions and national characteristics that are used to explain success
in one period can also be drawn on to explain subsequent stagnation (for
example, in the recent economic history of Japan and Germany).
Economists sometimes try to avoid such pitfalls by using the concept of
investment in human capital, and in turn relating that to an observable and to
a degree quantifiable phenomenon. And that is part of the story in Viet Nam.
The rapid exploitation of the possibilities of ‘catching up’ with neighbouring
economies through the adoption of existing knowledge was aided by past solid
performance in promoting literacy, numeracy and broader human development
in the pre-reform period. At the beginning of the reform period, Viet Nam
had much higher levels of mass literacy, life expectancy and middle and higher
education than most other countries with a similar level of per capita income.
And although the large numbers who had received higher education in the
former planned economies had received little business training relevant to
operating in a market economy, cadres had been well-trained in a number of
technical areas.
As Nelson and Pack (1999) argued in their interpretation of the Asian
economic miracle, however, formal investments in human capital are not a
sufficient explanation of performance—there was an additional element that
put the human capital to work effectively. Nelson and Pack accept that
investment in human capital played a role, but argue that it played a role in
the context of policies and institutions that supported assimilation of technology
and export-led growth. Their explanation stops short of explaining why factors
conducive to assimilation of technology were to be found more in East Asia
than other parts of the world. Interestingly, Nelson and Pack recognise that
the impressive performance across a number of Asian newly-industrialised
countries was not achieved through any one, homogeneous policy package,
but involved a variety of tactics and agile policy adjustments. Even if the answer
lies partly in effective policies, it is still intriguing why in East Asia such effective
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policy skills were exhibited by a number of differing political regimes. Perhaps
speculation in that area takes economists into terrain that they are ill-fitted to
navigate.
In Viet Nam, when policy changes opened up the possibilities of exporting,
the energy and ingenuity with which new exports were developed was striking,
despite the fact that for some years external contact had been limited by
government restrictions and the US-led aid boycott. Initial successes by pioneers
were quickly followed by others seeking to emulate their success. In Hanoi
itself this was evident in such areas as the development of silk clothing and
embroidery for sale to foreigners and in the rapid development of mini-hotels,
after the first private hotel was opened in 1992. In the agricultural sector,
change was equally rapid, with the explosive growth of coffee in the Central
Highlands and the spread of aquaculture in the Mekong Delta. Not only was
entrepreneurial spirit evident in the new private sector, but even within the
state-owned sector there were numerous examples of aggressive adaptation to
new market possibilities.
Various sorts of exposure produced an outward-looking stance that
contributed to the alacrity with which exporting possibilities were sought out
and exploited. For example, many families maintained contacts with the
Vietnamese Diaspora in Europe, North America and Australia, and these
contacts provided access to capital and information. There was also an awareness
of developments in neighbouring countries. Even in the pre-reform days, while
formal trading links were mostly with the CMEA countries, informal trade
across the porous borders, particularly with China and Thailand, was quite
active. Once restrictions were relaxed, entrepreneurs near the Chinese border,
for example, were able to read Chinese magazines and books, to meet buyers,
and later to travel to China to see production processes and customers.
Maximum use was made of the information and trading possibilities arising
from the formal trading links with the CMEA and the knowledge gained from
contacts with China before the Vietnam–China conflict of the late 1970s. A
good deal of effort was made to cater to the tastes of the few Westerners resident
in the pre-reform period (hence the appearance of Nordic folk themes in
embroidery to be purchased in Hanoi).
Vietnamese entrepreneurs have been willing to invest time and money to
acquire and study information, to study production techniques, and to travel
to learn about new markets and techniques. Rural entrepreneurs have made
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sizeable unrecorded investments in terms of foregone agricultural production
and/or wages. State enterprises and public agencies have made substantial
unrecorded, but critically important, investments in reorganising management
and business procedures, in adapting technologies and in providing on-the-
job training to workers. Personal investments of time and money have been
made by the aspiring middle class in upgrading skills, as evidenced by the
dramatic increase in English language and computer skills in the last decade.
Small manufacturers studied international design trends and later invested in
direct contact with international buyers, and then invested time in travelling
to see new designs and learn about new processes and markets. Some of the
key impacts of these developments on business are discussed in later chapters.
As a consequence, a good deal of growth was achieved despite relatively
modest but increasing levels of recorded capital investment.
NOTES
1 The World Bank report to the United Nations International Conference on Financing for
Development in Monterrey argued that progress made by Viet Nam, China, and other
strong performing economies as examples of official development assistance success stories
even though many of these countries (especially China) experienced significant economic
growth, while receiving relatively little assistance (Development Economics Vice Presidency
2002).
2 Some earlier attempts in Viet Nam to rapidly open up entry to new domestic banks led to
rapid increases in the number of credit unions and small private banks, most of which
subsequently collapsed.
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4
PRELUDE TO REFORM: THE ATTEMPTED
INTRODUCTION OF CENTRAL PLANNING
A good starting point for understanding the Vietnamese reform process is to
examine the history of the system that was the object of reform from the mid
1980s. For the authors of this book, that involves venturing into territory of
which they lack direct experience. Interpretations of developments since 1988
in this volume are strongly influenced by direct observations; for the earlier
period, the study depends on written sources and discussions with Vietnamese
officials involved in the reform process, bolstered by a certain amount of
speculation extrapolating from later observation.
PRE-REUNIFICATION
The North
Between 1954 and 1965, North Viet Nam had sought to implement a Soviet
approach to industrialisation and planning. During the war with the United
States, that basic approach was maintained. Private economic activity was largely
forbidden. Most medium and large-scale enterprises were nationalised as the
French departed following their defeat in 1954. Remaining non-state enterprises
were engaged in handicraft and other household industries that were
subsequently organised as cooperatives after 1957. Nationalised enterprises
were owned either centrally or through local governments. Agriculture had
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been collectivised by the end of the 1950s, and was managed through producer
cooperatives, with the exception of private plots of land within agricultural
cooperatives.
The Vietnamese economy was, on paper, a classic ‘command economy’.
Nevertheless, even in principle a fully-fledged Soviet command system was
never fully operative. For example, the list of commodities allocated under
plans was always very limited as compared to the Soviet material balance system.
Many central command mechanisms were not implemented in practice.
Indeed, from 1945 until formal reunification of the country in 1976, the
North had to concentrate most of its energies on military struggle. There was
a heavy commitment of resources directed to military activity initially to fight
the war for independence from France (1945–54), and then the war against
the United States and the regime it backed in South Viet Nam. During the US
war in particular, attention was focused more on the needs of the war economy
than the implementation of economic plans.
A period of relative peace during the late 1950s and early 1960s provided
some opportunity for development. The initial policy focus (1955–57) was
on land reform, and collectivising the agricultural sector and village and
handicraft industries. The radical changes during that period resulted in
profound social upheaval, one response to which was migration from some
northern areas to the south. The Party has since recognised that ‘serious mistakes
were committed’ under the land reform program (Communist Party of Vietnam
1986a:140). Nevertheless, external commentators have noted that ‘the period
1954–60 was on of rapid growth for North Vietnamese agriculture and saw a
mushrooming of industry as well’ (Beresford 1988:130).
Views on economic strategy were strongly influenced by Soviet orthodoxy
in that period. The Third Party Congress held in September 19601 focused on
the building of socialism and the struggle for reunification. That Congress
passed resolutions on the main priorities for the First Five-Year Plan (1961 to
1965), which emphasised the development of heavy industry. External
commentators have noted that ‘rapid industrialisation was also a feature of the
period 1959 to 1964’ (Beresford 1988:132).2 Investment in industry has been
estimated to have grown at a rate three times that of the agricultural sector
from 1960 to 1975 (Vo Dai Luoc 1994:9).
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The share of industrial production in national income increased from 18.2
per cent in 1960 to 24.2 per cent in 1974, with most growth occurring prior to
1965 (de Vylder and Fforde 1988:28). This was ‘mainly the result of an increase
in external assistance for equipment, raw materials and fuel for industry, coupled
with a decline in agriculture production’ (Vo Dai Luoc 1994:10). That is, the
pattern of growth was strongly influenced by aid coming from the Soviet bloc.
State enterprises were to be the main vehicle for state-led growth. The Party
and government were directly involved in the management of enterprises
producing high priority goods. These enterprises received preferential access
to inputs, had to produce regardless of cost, and were heavily subsidised by
the state. State enterprises engaged in lower priority activities were set targets,
but had less access to official resources. Significant managerial, political and
entrepreneurial skills were required to meet targets in such an environment.
During the war period, there were contradictions between the stated
objectives of the Party and the realities of war-time economy. In 1970, Party
Secretary-General Le Duan published a reportedly influential book where he
stressed the need to ‘struggle to take small-scale production to large-scale socialist
production’.3 A Party Plenum in January 1971 stressed the need to develop
heavy industry and to lay the foundations for large-scale socialist production.
The next Party Plenum in early 1972 went further—arguing for trade to be
controlled by socialist enterprises, abolishing artisanal and small-scale
production organisations, and replacing these with large-scale state
organisations.4
In practice, however, from 1965 investment priorities were those of a war
economy. Emphasis was given to industries directly supporting the war,
especially mechanical engineering, iron and steel, coal and electricity. Many
centrally managed enterprises were destroyed through bombing or had to
operate well below capacity because of the difficulty in obtaining inputs. Scarce
resources were directed to either protecting centrally managed state enterprises
or moving them to safer areas, resulting in greater deconcentration of production
than the commitment to large-scale production implied. Working under
difficult war conditions, pragmatic solutions to keep production going over-
rode economic planning concepts.
External assistance was required just to sustain output in centrally managed
enterprises. Dependence on external assistance increased, rising from about
one-quarter of total government budget revenue in the in the early 1960s to
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almost 70 per cent in the late 1960s according to one source.5 Under the stress
of the war effort, the economy suffered. Paddy production fell from 7.1 million
tonnes in 1972 to 5.3 million tonnes in 1975, while labour productivity fell
by 11 per cent during the same period (Beresford 1988).
The government’s dependence on external financing to cover fiscal and trade
deficits, the bureaucratic nature of decision making and dysfunctional economic
incentives facing both the agricultural and industrial sectors led external analysts
to conclude that, at the time of reunification, the northern economy was facing
chronic economic imbalances (Beresford 1988; de Vylder and Ffforde 1988).
It should be noted, however, that under conditions of total war such concepts
as ‘economic incentives’ and ‘economic balance’ are not particularly meaningful.
War economy in any system typically involves inflation, suppressed or open,
scarcities, introduction of non-market allocation systems and such like. The
fact that the war was won suggests that the system delivered economically in
some sense.
One difficulty in interpreting that period and subsequent developments is
to judge how far apparent weaknesses were also hidden strengths. De Vylder
and Fforde have argued that North Viet Nam ‘in 1975 was a “weak state”;
despite its proven ability to mobilise the Vietnamese people for the bloody
struggle to liberate the South’ (1998:33). Evidently it was (and remained)
true that there was a large gap between the state’s pretensions to manage the
economy through central planning and implement a Soviet-style
industrialisation strategy and the degree to which a logic of autonomous action
and initiative operated, even within the state-‘controlled’ sector.
Subsequent Party documents agreed that there were serious imbalances and
distortions with only limited effective planning, but that this was necessary to
achieve victory during the war. In criticising the continuation of such distortions
after the war, the Party noted that
the national economy was disrupted by the US aggression after 1964…the Vietnamese State
depended on increased aid from the USSR and other socialist countries...the only means of
developing production was by supplying the production units—in the first place industry—with
all the means of production  (equipment, capital, raw materials, foodstuffs, consumer goods).
The factories had to produce the goods whatever the cost. Planning only existed for form’s sake.
The State assigned tasks to production units, gave them the means and was handed over the
finished goods. All the enterprises had to do was to balance the State allowances and their own
expenses in the way as the administrative organs do. Thus economic management through
administrative subsidies came into being (Communist Party of Vietnam 1986b:17).
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The development of locally managed state enterprises became an important
priority because of the ongoing military conflict, the limited resources available
to the government, and the need for regional self-sufficiency. The amount of
investment directed to locally managed enterprises increased four-fold during
the war years (Vo Dai Luoc 1994). As a consequence ‘[i]ndustrial production
was maintained in the main, while locally-run industry vigorously
developed…[and]…regional economies began to take shape’ (Communist Party
of Vietnam 1986a:194).
The impact of the war thus had a critical impact on the organisation of the
economy. The net result was that the state enterprise sector was more
decentralised—both geographically and in terms of decision making—than
was the case in most centrally planned economies. While the struggle to move
to a socialist system remained on the policy agenda, the central government
never achieved the same degree of control over economic activity as was achieved
in most East European centrally planned economies.6
In addition to responding to the immediate requirements of the war-time
economy, the acceptance of decentralised decision making was also consistent
with a long tradition of relative autonomy of village and local communities in
managing their local economies.7
Although the outcome may have implied a ‘weak state’, in the sense that
the state was unable to control economic activity to the degree that it claimed,
it also implied that the foundations of a ‘strong economy’ were being laid
unintentionally, both in that the gigantism of Soviet-style industrialisation
was avoided and that there was a high degree of practical autonomy within
local economic units.
The South
In South Viet Nam, post-1954 industrial policies focused on development of
agriculture and light industry. The influx of foreign forces during the 1960s
stimulated the demand for food processing as well as demand for other light
industries such as garments, construction materials and wood products. The
service sector recorded very strong growth during this period. Efforts to shift
the burden of the war to the government of the Republic of Viet Nam in the
later part of the 1960s and early 1970s were associated with increased
investment in the assembly of electronic equipment, machinery and motor
vehicles. Facilities were also developed for repairing and maintaining military
equipment, ships and aircraft (Vo Dai Luoc 1994).
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However, as in the North the pattern of economic growth was determined by
the peculiar conditions of war. Strong economic growth during the late 1960s
and early 1970s was largely the result of externally financed expenditure on
consumption goods, and created an imbalance between sectors catering to the
demands of the US operation and the indigenous economy.8 Exports were only
sufficient to finance a very small percentage of imports in 1969–70.9 High
levels of public expenditure affected the balance of the economy. The level of
economic activity would not have been sustainable under peace-time conditions.
Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accord in January 1973, external
financing to Viet Nam fell sharply. This contributed to economic stagnation
and increasing unemployment, particularly in urban areas. Social problems,
including dislocation of families, the growth of urban slums resulted from
rapid urbanisation, the large number of war invalids, drug abuse and
prostitution, were prevalent. In rural areas, agricultural output was badly affected
by the damage to infrastructure and the environment caused by bombing and
chemical spraying (Beresford 1988).
Difficulties were compounded after reunification because, in addition to
the departure of segments of the upper and middle classes, the human capacity
in the south of Viet Nam was underutilised due to resistance to the post-war
changes from some members of the business community, and suspicion from
the new administration about the loyalty of important segments of the
intellectual, administrative, and skilled worker communities in the south.
On the positive side, the industry and service sectors were much more
developed in the south than in the north. Basic economic infrastructure was
also much better developed in parts of the south, especially in the commercial
centres. Most importantly, there was an established entrepreneurial class with
business, managerial and administrative skills that had the potential to play
an important role in economic development.
POST-REUNIFICATION
Following reunification, the government initially relied mainly on ad hoc measures
to direct the economy, concentrating initially on the formidable tasks of
reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure, the resettlement of wartime
refugees, raising the level of rice output and building administrative capacity.
The integration of two very different economic systems following the defeat
of the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam (South Viet Nam) in 1975,
and formal reunification of the country in 1976, presented a formidable
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challenge.10 This was because institutions differed considerably, and also because
both the North and South, previously heavily dependent on external funding,
were faced with much reduced access to foreign exchange at the very moment
they needed such funds to drive post-war reconstruction and the transition
away from the war economy.
The Fourth Party Congress, held in December 1976, acknowledged the
limitations of the industrialisation policies in the North prior to 1975, and
calls were made in this forum for a greater share of investment resources to be
allocated to the agricultural sector. This, however, did not appear to have been
reflected in the strategic objectives for economic development identified by
the Congress, namely to
• create the material and technical basis for socialism rapidly
• take the economy from small-scale production to large-scale socialist
production with a modern industrial and agricultural structure
• give priority to the rational development of heavy industry on the basis of
developing agriculture and light industry; the intensification of agricultural
production being regarded as the main task of the 1976–80 Five-Year
Plan
• redistribute the social workforce to make productive use of unused land,
found mostly in the hilly and mountainous regions
• organise the district as an economic agro-industrial unit
• build the national economy taking account of the needs of national defence
• develop simultaneously a flexible central economy and regional economies
• promote rapid technical and scientific development
• transform the South gradually in order to establish an integrated socialist
nation
• resolve economic management problems (Communist Party of Vietnam
1986b:10–11).
The 1976–80 Five-Year Plan included ambitious growth targets, which
reflected, in part, the euphoria following the reunification of Viet Nam and an
assumption that the strict social and economic discipline that had been exercised
during the war could be sustained during peace. It was also assumed that the
war would be followed by a rapid build-up in foreign aid flows.11 Inadequate
attention was given to past failures and the difficulties of rapid economic
integration given the differences in economic systems and resource endowments
between the North and South (Asian Development Bank 1989).12
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In the period immediately following reunification the approach to socialist
transformation had been fairly cautious. However, dissatisfaction with the pace
of socialist transformation and the rapid growth in private trade, combined
with concerns about internal political opposition to socialist transformation in
the southern business community, dominated by ethnic Chinese, led to
attempts to accelerate the process of transformation to socialism.
In early 1978, many private enterprises in the south, particularly in Cho
Lon, where ethnic Chinese dominated trade, were nationalised or closed. This
was followed by an increase in the exodus of ‘boat people’ from Vietnam
(Beresford 1988).
The policy of subsidising state enterprises regardless of cost continued after
reunification. Indeed, increased subsidies were allocated for these policies to
be applied nationwide, covering new enterprises and newly nationalised
enterprises in the south of the country (Vo Dai Luoc 1994). The maintenance
of this system after reunification has also been recognised by the Party to have
been a mistake.
This system was necessary in war conditions when the State was receiving a large amount of
foreign aid. It should have been abandoned when the war was over, when the country, now
reunified, was embarking on the stage of socialist construction. But conservative ideas and the
tendency to rely on foreign aid delayed the reorganisation of economic management. Effective
for the years of war, the old system, became a hindrance to all economic activities (Communist
Party of Vietnam 1986b:17).
The emphasis on a rapid transformation to socialism provided Party and
government officials with a mandate to interfere in the day-to-day management
of enterprises and household businesses. Delineation of responsibility and
accountability became increasingly unclear. The lack of accountability included
a perception that the state would financially support the enterprise in the
event of financial losses.13 At the same time, commitment to the war effort as
an incentive to produce diminished following reunification. These factors
contributed to growing ineffectiveness in the state enterprise sector. Despite
the increasing number of state enterprises, and the large share of public
expenditure allocated to the state enterprise sector, the share of state enterprises
in national output actually declined from 27.7 to 19.7 per cent between 1976
and 1980.
A decision was taken by the Second Party Plenum in July 1977 to accelerate
the development of state farms throughout the country and to implement
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agricultural collectivisation in the south (Communist Party of Vietnam 1986a).
Ambitious targets were established to transform individual farming enterprises
in the south into production cooperatives. It has been argued that local cadres,
who were under great pressure to meet these targets, used force rather than
persuasion to establish cooperatives and were more interested in reaching the
target number of cooperatives than in how successful the cooperatives were in
promoting increased production (Vo Nhan Tri 1990).
Despite the stated priority to be given to agricultural development (as a
necessary step towards the ultimate objective of developing heavy industry) most
development expenditure continued to be directed to the industrial sector.14
A policy biased towards industrial development and the concentration of public
investment in industry, particularly large-scale heavy industry, meant that the
sectors where Viet Nam could be expected to have a comparative advantage were
neglected. Pricing policies favouring the industrial sector was effectively a tax to
subsidise inefficient industries. The emphasis given to rapidly creating the material
and technical basis for socialism and similar targets put pressure on officials to
realise targets such as increasing the scale of collectives and state enterprises at
the expense of efficiency (and the stated aim of large-scale production).15 Party
cadres were under considerable formal and informal pressure to conform to the
perceived requirements for rapid socialist transformation.
The end of the 1970s saw the peak of attempts to create an orthodox Soviet
style of centrally planned economy in Vietnam. The failure of those attempts
and the willingness of the Vietnamese system to learn the painful lessons of
that failure created the conditions for the subsequent period of reform and
accelerated growth.
Formal regulations governing state enterprise were promulgated in 1977
and regulations on enterprise unions promulgated in 1978.16 The regulations
recognised state enterprises as independent legal entities, but they had little
independence in operations.
The enterprise was obliged to fulfil the compulsory targets ordered by the State. The State also
worked out plans for production, marketing, and pricing as well as salaries and bonuses,
distribution and utilisation of its funds. Hence the scope for initiative at the enterprise level was
very limited. Industrial cooperative units in general had a greater autonomy in production and
marketing than State Enterprises (Le Trang 1989:156).
Control of state enterprises by line ministries and provincial authorities was
organised through unions of state enterprises. Most enterprises were required
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to be members of these unions. Trang defined unions of state enterprises as
‘production-business organisations that organise state enterprises in the same
business area, manufacturing similar products, using similar technologies or
technologies which are related to each other’ (1989:157).
The power entrusted to unions of state enterprises was considerable, including
the preparation of sector plans and allocation of responsibility to enterprises
under the union to realise specific targets within the overall plan. State
enterprises were obliged to fulfil quotas and other targets as directed by the
unions. Unions were ‘also responsible for supplying technical materials to its
members and for marketing their products, monitoring their fulfilment of the
techno-economic norms and criteria of the branch, and training or re-training
managing cadre and technical workers for its members’. This additional
administrative layer caused considerable conflict and confusion and ‘a few such
unions became intermediaries obstructing their member enterprises’ operations’
(Le Trang 1989:157).
The problems of inappropriate economic policies, distorted incentive
structures, and passive resistance to socialist transition were compounded by
the cancellation of external assistance, and increased demands for military
expenditure following the invasion of Cambodia in late 1978. After strong
growth in 1976, economic output stagnated in 1977 and 1978 and actually
declined in 1979 and 1980. There was a particularly pronounced decline in
output from state-owned industrial enterprises, with production declining by
an average 2 per cent per year between 1977 and 1980.
By the late 1970s, Viet Nam was facing a ‘major economic crisis, with acute
shortages of food, basic consumer goods, and inputs to agriculture and industry,
and a growing external debt’ (Asian Development Bank 1989:6). The
impending economic crisis was recognised in August 1979 at the Sixth Plenum
of the Fourth Party Congress. The Party has since bluntly criticised the policies
of this period, noting that these policies
…underlined the weakness and inadequacies in economic and social leadership over the previous
years, which showed themselves in manifestations of subjectivism, impatience, conservatism,
inertia, bureaucracy, lack of realism, irresponsibility (Communist Party of Vietnam 1986b:15).
and that
the decrease in production in the late 1970s and the mistakes made in laying out the economic
structure, especially in allocating investments and capital construction in the preceding five
years (1976–80), have left us heavy consequences (Communist Party of Vietnam 1987a:10).
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The efforts to develop the economy of the unified nation were in principle
guided by a system of central planning. The Interim Three-Year Plan (1978),
drawn up with assistance from Soviet advisers, was the first formal attempt at
planning for the unified nation. It was intended to lay the foundations for a
more complete socialist transformation under the First Five-Year Plan, to start
in 1981.
The First Five-Year Plan (1981–85) set out to construct a strict central-
planning system with state allocations of capital and inputs and even labour
being allocated centrally. There were plans for large-scale investment in cement
factories, steel mills and hydroelectric power plants. Virtually all consumer
goods were strictly rationed. Money and prices did not play a determining
role in the allocation of resources; official prices were low and had little influence
on production decisions.
The mechanisms of central planning were never properly established. The
setting of plan targets in great detail at the centre, without any instruments
for effective enforcement, meant that despite the apparent high degree of
centralised decision making there was little effective discipline and a high degree
of autonomy at the provincial and enterprise level in practice.
Emphasis on quantitative production targets encouraged enterprises to
maximise their allocations of capital and inputs and hoard machines, raw
materials and labour, thus amplifying imbalances caused by the overambitious
aggregate targets.
In fact, the period in which there was a serious effort to introduce orthodox
central planning throughout the country was quite brief, which meant that in
the south in particular there was too little time for central planning to be
institutionalised. The poor performance of the economy in that period set the
conditions for the birth of the reform process.
FIRST STEPS TO REFORM: LIMITED DECENTRALISATION,
1979–86
Early intimations of reform can be seen already at the end of the 1970s, when
economic difficulties prevented the consolidation of the centralised planning
system.
Economic stagnation led to pressures for change. As early as 1979,
socioeconomic targets were revised downwards and agreement was reached on
the need to decentralise some decision making and to provide improved
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incentives for increased production. The debate initiated at the Sixth Party
Plenum in August 1979 was an important turning point. The Communist
Party and society began to question, in a systematic way, fundamental issues
about how society and the economy system should operate. The difficult process
of experimentation with reform since then has contributed to a transformation
of the beliefs within broad sections of society, the Party and government. This,
in turn, has substantially changed the informal constraints that play such an
important role in influencing economic performance. Consequently, the options
available to alter the formal framework for economic and social activity also
changed.17
De Vylder and Fforde (1988) have described the reform process as being
initiated through partial, unofficial relaxation of constraints on private activity
and spontaneous moves towards production and trade outside of official channels
(‘fence-breaking’), leading to eventual Party recognition of the role of the
household sector in agriculture, handicrafts, and retail trading. For example,
the Council of Ministers issued a decree providing scope for local state enterprises
to operate outside the central plan once central plan targets had been realised.18
The system of ‘full allocation and full delivery’, the system where the state
provided all the inputs to state enterprises and recovered all profits, was replaced
by a system whereby state enterprises could supplement state allocations with
loans from the banking system, and some experimentation with alternative
approaches to increasing production was allowed.
In January 1981, a contract system was introduced in the agricultural sector,19
and the government issued a decision providing limited autonomy to state
enterprises.20 The decision reduced the number of mandatory targets that
enterprises had to meet, and introduced the ‘three plan’ system, which gave
enterprises rights to operate outside the plan, but only after centrally planned
targets had been met. Up to 85 per cent of the profits from activities outside
these targets could be retained by the enterprises, and some of this could be
allocated to workers as bonuses. A related decision included provisions for
salary payments to state enterprise employees to be related to output.21
Other reforms included moves to shift official prices closer to market rates
in October 1981, and decentralise trade to local enterprises. These reforms
were followed by decisions taken at the Fifth Party Congress in 1982 to reorient
previous policies that focused on heavy industry and an inward-oriented
economy to give greater attention to agriculture, light industry and export-
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oriented production. While the concept of central planning continued to be
defended, more modest targets were established by the Fifth Party Congress.
• Meet the most pressing and essential requirements of everyday life,
gradually stabilising and eventually improving the people’s material and
cultural life. First of all we must solve the problem of food supplies, and
make efforts to meet the requirements in clothing, study, medical care,
housing transport, child care, and other essential consumer needs.
• Continue building the material and technological infrastructure of
socialism, with the emphasis on boosting agriculture, consumer goods
production and exports, while at the same time improving the technical
basis of the other economic branches, and making preparations for a more
vigorous growth of heavy industry in the next stage.
• Complete the socialist transformation in the southern provinces; continue
improving the socialist relations of production in the North; and
consolidate the socialist relations of production in the whole country.
• Meet national defence requirements and maintain security and order
(Communist Party of Vietnam 1986b).
Despite improved economic growth performance, considerable internal policy
debate continued during this period and there was considerable uncertainty
about future policy directions. Grassroots initiatives towards economic
liberalisation interacted with oscillations between policy concessions and
periodic clamp-downs on the free (or unofficial) market (de Vylder and Fforde
1988). Considerable uncertainty about what was legal remained. Such an
uncertain environment checked the growth of non-state economic activity as
it discouraged long-term investments.
While the authorities showed some flexibility in decentralising decisions
and accommodating spontaneous changes, there were differing views about
the desirability of such pragmatism. Strong private sector growth, sometimes
at the expense of state enterprises, combined with inflationary pressures, led
to internal pressures for reversal of earlier reforms. In 1983, administrative
changes were made to control ‘anarchy’ in the market. Private enterprise
registration procedures, tax policies, and bureaucratic interference discouraged
private sector initiatives, particularly in trading. The freedom of state enterprises
to trade outside of official channels was reduced and controls were imposed on
foreign trade (Asian Development Bank 1989).
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While the partial reforms introduced from 1979 to 1982 had an important
impact in improving production incentives, the reforms did not adequately
address key issues of pricing, financial discipline and reform of the bureaucratic
administrative structures. Public sector and trade deficits increased alarmingly.
Inflation accelerated rapidly and growth began to slow from 1985.
Government attempts to reduce these imbalances through currency, price and
wage reforms were poorly coordinated, and fiscal imbalances and inflation
became acute. By 1986, inflation had soared to an annual rate of more than
500 per cent, growth was slowing, and external deficits had increased sharply.
This instability led to social pressures for reforms to promote macroeconomic
stability. Partial reform had left the economy in a difficult halfway house, with
neither the constraints of a tight planning system, nor the policy instruments
for managing a decentralised economy, in place.
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PRE-REFORM PERIOD
The account above emphasises the many weaknesses of the pre-reform economic
system, which necessitated the initiation of economic reforms (Doi Moi). It
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the pre-reform period was
without significant social achievements, which have contributed to the
subsequent economic success.
Contributions from the earlier period are largely ignored in much of the
writing on recent economic developments in Viet Nam, which identify Doi
Moi as the primary explanation of Vietnam’s recent economic success. That is
quite correct in the sense that the economic boom could not have happened
without the Doi Moi reforms and the official sanctioning of the market economy
that this implied. One can still ask, though, whether programs in the pre-
reform period contributed to the subsequent achievement.
There are three main areas in which programs in pre-reform period helped
create the conditions for accelerated growth. The first relates to human resource
development. In the period before reform, Viet Nam made substantial
investments in human capital. The commitment to provision of basic education
and health meant that at the beginning of the reform period the country
enjoyed much higher levels of basic literacy and health than most countries at
a similar income level.22 Thus, in 1990, Vietnamese per capita income levels
(on a purchasing power parity basis) placed Viet Nam on the same income
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level as the ‘low human development’ group of countries, but adult literacy
rates were 88 per cent compared to an average 48 per cent for the low human
development group. At that time, Viet Nam’s indicators of basic education
were in line with those of much richer countries in the region—in average
years of schooling, Viet Nam was ahead of Thailand and Indonesia, and literacy
rates were on a par with other countries in the region.
There had also been a substantial investment in higher education, in
Vietnamese institutions, similar to that in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
and in an earlier period in China. The number of students graduating from
colleges and universities in the country averaged over 20,000 per annum
through the 1980s.23 While this training was notably weak in areas such as
economics, business skills and law (all important in the subsequent reform
process), well trained cadres were produced in a number of technical subjects.
Viet Nam also made use in the 1980s of support from the UN system to
provide postgraduate training in the region in subjects such as agriculture,
and had cooperative programs with the International Rice Research Institute
and other research institutions. Also, the OECD countries which maintained
support programs (particularly Sweden) provided opportunities for higher level
training.
While it is not possible to separate out and measure the returns to the
investment in human resources, there can be no question that the high level of
literacy and the trained technical cadres were critical inputs into the success of
the Vietnamese economic reforms.
Table 4.1 Comparative indicators of human development, 1990
Mean years Child
a
Real Average life schooling Adult mortality
GDP/capita expectancy for 25+ literacy (per 1,000
(USD, PPP) (years) years (per cent) children)
Viet Nam 1,100 62.7 4.6 88 65
Thailand 3,986 66.1 3.8 93 34
Philippines 2,303 64.2 7.4 90 69
Indonesia 2,181 61.5 3.9 82 97
Low human development 1,110 56.5 2.3 49 n.a.
All developing countries 2,170 62.8 3.7 65 104
Note: a Child here refers to children under five years old
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 1993. Human Development Report, Oxford
University Press, New York.
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It should also be noted that, somewhat perversely, the disruptions and
emigration associated with the war and unification, while having immediate
costs with the departure of qualified people, also had strong positive
consequences, as the Vietnamese Diaspora has become a source of international
business connections, transfer of know-how and remittances.24
A second area in which foundations were laid for future growth was in relation
to rural institutions. Communist reforms in the rural sector increased the
equality of access to land, which meant that, when the reforms were
implemented, there was a basis for a positive production response and a wide
diffusion of the benefits of growth.
The consequence of these egalitarian developments can be seen if a
comparison is made, for example, with Pakistan. Pakistan has enjoyed periods
of robust growth in GNP, but the impact of that growth was limited both in
terms of poverty alleviation and sustainability by the rigid rural social structure
and related poor performance in human resource development.
Also, in fairness, Soviet supported investments in infrastructure provided
needed capacity (for example, electric power generation). In the South,
considerable investments had been made during the US war in transport,
agricultural research, extension and development, which contributed to the
later expansion in production.
NOTES
1 The unified Indochina Communist Party officially met for the first time in Hong Kong in
February 1930. The First Party Congress (of the Indochina Communist Party) was held in
Macau in March 1935 and focused on building up the Party and the struggle against
imperialism. The Second Party Congress was held in the Tuyen Quang jungle during the
resistance against the French in 1951. At this Congress the Indochina Communist Party
was dissolved and replaced by three national parties. Discussion focused on the struggle
against imperial rule.
2 De Vylder and Fforde (1988:28) also noted that from 1961–65 the industrial sector
‘showed impressive rates of growth’.
3 Le Duan quoted in Communist Party of Vietnam (1986a:215).
4 Le Duan quoted in Communist Party of Vietnam (1986a:216–17).
5 Vo Nhan Tri (1990), quoting official government statistics.
6 See, for example, de Vylder and Fforde (1988), who argue that North Viet Nam was a
‘weak state’, and Van Arkadie and Vu Tat Boi (1992).
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7 Neil Jamieson’s book Understanding Vietnam (1993) explores the interplay between
individualism, and commitment to family, village and nation in Vietnamese history. The
author offers an interpretation of the differences in social structure at the village level in
North, Central and South Viet Nam and an interesting interpretation of the paradoxical
combination of a tradition of strong local autonomy and individual initiative, with
acceptance of a high degree of discipline with respect to the larger social unit at each level of
Vietnamese society. However, while the study provides interesting insights into the historical
and philosophical origins of modern Viet Nam it is not so insightful about post-unification
developments, and stops short of any treatment of the Doi Moi period.
8 See Jamieson (1993) for a telling account of the tensions that emerged as a result of the
lucrative returns from serving the needs of the US community and the squeeze on other
activities under war-time inflationary conditions.
9 Beresford (1988) cites an ADB study (ADB 1971) which estimated that imports financed
by US aid amounted to about one-third of the total GDP of South Viet Nam in the late
1960s.
10 One could make some comparisons with the reunification of Germany, but the problems
caused by the protracted war, the low level of economic development and the very limited
fiscal resources in both the south and the north compounded the difficulties facing the
Vietnamese authorities.
11 A UN report published in June 1976 recommended that US$400 million be raised for
immediate rehabilitation and reconstruction needs. In November 1976, however, the US
government vetoed Vietnam’s application to join the United Nations, despite support for
Vietnam’s application by the other 14 members of the Security Council. Viet Nam was
finally admitted to the United Nations in September 1977.
12 Vo Dai Luoc (1994:14–15) noted that documents prepared for the Fourth Congress of
the Party included ‘an indirect acknowledgment of the limitations of the industrial policy
conducted from 1961 in North Viet Nam…[but that]…this policy was taken up again by
the following Party congress almost without a single alteration…Only after 1980 when all
these targets failed to materialize did the 5th National Congress of the Party decide to
readjust the industrial policy’.
13 Often referred to as the ‘soft budget constraint’, this is a major contributing factor to
inefficiency in state enterprises, especially in centrally planned economies (Kornai 1980).
14 Vo Nhan Tri (1990:76) reports that the share of state investment directed to the agriculture
sector increased from 20.0 per cent in 1976 to 23.7 per cent in 1977, and then gradually
declined to 19.0 per cent in 1980. Total state investment increased by about one-third in real
terms between 1976 and 1978, but then fell by about 9 per cent over the next two years.
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15 See, for example, Communist Party of Vietnam (1987a).
16 Decree 93-CP (8/4/77) ‘Articles on Industrial State Enterprises’, and Resolution 302-CP
(1/12/88) ‘Articles on Unions of State Enterprises’.
17 The commitment to a form of socialism, however, has continued through this period.
18 Decree 279-CP (2/8/1979) ‘On Work to Promote the Production and Circulation of
Commodities not under State Management and the Supply of Inputs or Raw Materials
and Waste and Low Quality Materials at the Provincial Level’.
19 Directive No. 100 of the Party Central Committee, 13 January 1981, ‘On Piece-work
Contracts to Employee Groups and Individual Employees Working in Agricultural
Cooperatives’.
20 Decision No. 25-CP (21/1/1981) on ‘Several Directions and Measures to Enhance the
Rights of Industrial State Enterprises to take Initiative in Production and Business and in
Self-Financing’.
21 Decision No. 26-CP (21/1/1981) on ‘Wage and Bonus Policies for State Enterprises’.
22 One of the costs of reform has been the weakening of some of the institutions of social
service provision. For example, the cooperatives had served both an economic and social
function and their decline resulted in a weakening in the provision of education (particularly
pre-primary) and of basic health care. An alarming piece of evidence of this decline comes
from an analysis of infant mortality, partly based on the results of the 1997–98 Vietnam
Living Standards Survey, which suggests that, despite a general improvement, there has
been an actual deterioration of provision of some services to the bottom quintile of the
population and, as a result, an increasing gap between the survival chances of those born
into families in that quintile and higher income groups (Nguyen Nguyet Nga and Wagstaff
2002).
23 Official statistics show the number of students studying in colleges and universities peaked
at 154,000 in 1980, and numbers graduating peaked at 34,000 in 1983. In 1990, there
were 93,000 students in colleges and universities and 19,000 graduating. Subsequently,
from 1994, there was a sharp rise in tertiary education, so that by 1998 there were 492,000
students studying and 62,000 graduating (General Statistics Office 2000a).
24 It is an ironic result of migrations resulting from political upheaval that the unusual
opportunities provided for migration as borders are opened for refugees, albeit often
grudgingly, have so frequently worked to the economic benefit of the migrants, the host
country and, in some cases, the country of origin. Examples amongst many include the
positive impacts of refugees from Germany in the 1930s, and Asians and Africans who left
Uganda in the 1970s.
1VIET NAM’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
This chapter briefly describes some of the salient characteristics of the
Vietnamese political and administrative system.
The general structure of the government covers provinces, districts and
communes and is charged with the supervision of public sector agencies at all
levels, and the overall management of the economy. Viet Nam remains a one-
party state, governed by the Communist Party of Viet Nam which has a
paramount role: the most important economic strategies are outlined in the
resolutions of the Party Congress. The 1992 Constitution defines the National
Assembly as the highest organ of the state. In recent years the legislative role of
the National Assembly has grown in importance and it is expected that the
role of the National Assembly will continue to expand.
The national-provincial relationship is considered an important characteristic
of the reform process, as has been the regional diversity in response to the new
opportunities opened up by Doi Moi. The ongoing Doi Moi process has brought
reforms both in terms of economic strategy and government.
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A key characteristic of the Vietnamese reform process has been political
continuity. The political and administrative system has adjusted, but not
through abrupt change and frequently not through processes which are very
transparent and easy to understand, either by foreigners or even most
Vietnamese. This chapter briefly describes some of the salient characteristics
of the Vietnamese political and administrative system.
The institutional arrangements for economic management, planning and
implementation are complex. Unambiguous statements of policy directions
are rarely made. This reflects both the transitional nature of the economic
system, and the challenges in reconciling commitments to a Marxist-Leninist
state with the market-oriented reforms being implemented. The broad thrusts
of Viet Nam’s long-term development strategy and five-year plans are outlined
in the resolutions of the (Communist) Party Congress. The government is
responsible for formulating more detailed five-year and longer-term plans
(including drafts for the Party Congress),1 and for preparing detailed annual
expenditure plans for submission to the National Assembly. The National
Assembly is playing an increasingly active role in reviewing government plans
and in monitoring government performance.
56
57POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
Since the beginning of the Doi Moi process, Viet Nam has implemented a
number of significant changes in its administrative structure. Under the 1992
Constitution, the government is charged with the supervision of public sector
agencies at all levels and the overall management of the economy. In the
alignment of power and authority among the ‘troika’ (that is, the party secretary,
the president and the prime minister) the prime minister is vested with the
power to appoint deputy prime ministers, ministers and leaders of provincial
people’s committees (that is, the local provincial level administrations). The
prime minister also has the power to establish, dissolve, or restructure public
agencies. The president, in principle, has the power to recommend to the
National Assembly the dismissal of the prime minister and to act as the
Commander-in Chief of the armed forces. The president and the prime minister
are elected by the National Assembly from among its members. The Party
remains the dominant political force in the country despite some modification
of its role in the 1992 Constitution.
The government of Viet Nam operates at three local levels: provinces, districts,
and communes.2 There are 61 provincial-level administrative units. Formally
there is a unitary system of government, with centralised state authority exercised
over local administrations.
Each level of local administration has an executive arm (the People’s
Committee), and a legislative arm (the People’s Council). Although separate
bodies, the People’s Committees and the People’s Councils have overlapping
memberships. The People’s Committees have both budgetary and administrative
responsibilities. They are charged with the mandate to maintain law and order
within their jurisdictions, review and approve plans for socioeconomic
development within their delegated authority, execute the budget, and
undertake duties as assigned by higher levels of administration.
Decision making at all levels is characterised by consensus-seeking as a strong
guiding principle, engaging a wide range of actors before decisions are finalised,
thus sharing responsibility and reducing the political risks involved in making
difficult decisions. This involves ‘opinion collecting’ (that is, the required
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reference to concerned parties made in almost every decison making process at
different levels). The emphasis on collective leadership and consensus has the
merit of maintaining stability and involving many elements of society in
decisions, but it is also the root cause of many problems in relation to the slow
government response  to critical issues.
In implementing decisions, ‘coordination’ by relevant state bodies is required
before action is taken by a designated authority. This is most obvious with
respect to the handling of economic issues. For example, fiscal and monetary
management in Viet Nam is shared by the State Bank of Vietnam, the Ministry
of Finance, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment. Consensus among
the three is expected to prevail, but the prime minister has deciding authority
in the event of a difference of view. In the management of official development
assistance, the same principle applies.
PARTY AND STATE
Viet Nam remains a one-party state, governed by the Communist Party of
Viet Nam. Support for the Party, and its legitimacy, stems from its role in
defeating the French and the United States and its allies, to establish the modern
Vietnamese nation. Until recently, the Party was led by the generation that
founded the Party and led the resistance movement. Close personal and family
ties helped ensure Party solidarity.3 Economic difficulties and declining living
standards following re-unification began to undermine support for the Party.4
Reforms introduced under Doi Moi, including measures such as providing
land use rights to rural households, and relaxing control on private sector, and
the resulting improvements in living standards have helped revive public support
for the Party.5
Official documents are unequivocal about the paramount role of the Party.
Official policy is to preserve the political status quo, while moving to a market
economy with a socialist orientation. Article 2 of the Constitution states that
‘the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is a state of the people, from the people,
for the people. All state power belongs to the people, and is based on an
alliance between the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia’
(Government of Viet Nam 1995). Article 4 defines the Party in language
reminiscent of that used in the former East European centrally planned
economies.
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The Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, the faithful
representative of the rights and interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole
nation, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh’s thought, is the force
leading the state and Society (Government of Viet Nam 1995).
The actual role of the Party in state management is opaque.6 Most senior
government officials and members of the National Assembly are also Party
members.7 Most ministers and many provincial leaders are members of the
Central Committee of the Party. The Prime Minister, President, and Chairman
of the National Assembly are now members of the 19-person Politburo.
The most important economic strategies are outlined in the resolutions of
the Party Congress. The Party Congress is a meeting of Party delegates from
local Party offices throughout the country, usually held every five years since
reunification.8 In between full meetings of the Party Congress, the Central
Committee of the Party9 usually meets 2–3 times a year to discuss particular
policy or sector development issues. The Central Committee of the Party elects
the Political Bureau (Politburo) that meets on a more frequent basis to consider
day-to-day policy management decisions. Within the Politburo, a five-person
standing committee is responsible for day-to-day Party management. Policy
formulation within the Party uses the resources of Party institutions, government
agencies and national research institutes.
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Under the existing legal framework, ultimate legislative authority rests with
the National Assembly. The National Assembly is increasingly active in
reviewing government plans, budgets, and implementation performance, and
more assertive in exercising its authority over lawmaking. It plays an active role
in scrutinising legislation, which it does with increasing care. Laws tend to be
written in fairly broad terms, however, and their interpretation and
implementation depends on administrative directives from the prime minister,
ministers and provincial administrations.
The 1992 Constitution defines the National Assembly as the highest organ
of the state, the highest representative body of the people, and the only
organisation with legislative powers, and the power to amend the constitution.
The National Assembly is elected every five years and has a broad mandate to
oversee all government functions. It usually meets two (or sometimes three)
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times a year for about 1–2 months per session. Changes were introduced which
took effect following the 2002 National Assembly elections which require more
continuous activity by some committees of the Assembly. The influence of the
National Assembly is expected to continue to increase with the appointment
of 125 paid full-time members amongst the 498 members.
As with so many Vietnamese institutions, it is difficult for the outside observer
to make a proper judgement about the role of the National Assembly. At one
level, it would be easy to believe that it is likely to be toothless, as it is elected
through a process carefully orchestrated by the Party and, although it contains
non-Party members, members from the private sector, religious figures and
representation of ethnic minorities, these are vetted by the Party and would
not contain those fundamentally hostile to the regime.
There is substantial evidence, however, that the Assembly is beginning to
be seen by the bureaucracy as a significant source of authority and a potential
arena for independent criticism of government performance. Thus, in the
drafting of important legislation (for example, the 1999 Enterprise Law), the
Assembly has played a strong role in amending and influencing the detailed
provisions of the legislation. As law reform has taken on greater importance in
the overall reform agenda in recent years, the legislative role of the National
Assembly has itself grown in importance.
Debates in the Assembly have also raised critical issues related, for example,
to the official development assistance program. The Assembly also provides a
platform for the articulation of provincial concerns about the balance of national
resource allocation.
It is expected that the role of the National Assembly will continue to expand.
It is difficult to predict what the effects of such developments will be, but it
should be noted that under a one-party system it is possible for a legislature to
play an active and somewhat autonomous role in policymaking, particularly
in a consensus-based system such as that of Viet Nam, not necessarily less real
than that of a multi-party body subject to tight party discipline.10
THE NATIONAL–PROVINCIAL RELATIONSHIP
An important characteristic of the reform process has been the regional diversity
in response to the new opportunities opened up by Doi Moi. Some provinces
have taken a lead in pursuing new initiatives, sometimes innovating ahead of
national policy, while other provinces have been cautious in implementing change.
61POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
It may seem surprising that regional diversity and local initiative should be
identified as key characteristics of the reform process, given that the Communist
administrative system might be expected to be highly centralised and given
the common perception that the government remains overcentralised in many
ways. For example, the power to approve master development plans, in both
particular regions and sectors, remains with the central authority (decided by
the prime minister after receiving ‘opinions’ of line agencies at central level).
Despite such appearances, there is in practice a good deal more decentralisation
to the provincial level than is suggested by the formal rules.
A significant degree of autonomy is extended to local administrations with
regard to disposition of allocated budgets and adoption and implementation
of local socioeconomic development plans. Although the formal fiscal system
appears to be quite centralised, lower-level authorities in practice have some
freedom for manoeuvre by virtue of access to their own sources of funds from
various sources: they own property from which they derive income (for example,
provincial and district state enterprises); they can charge various fees and levies
(for example, for the use of roads and markets), and they are responsible for
the collection of some taxes set at national level, of which they retain a share.
As the financial system is sometimes not very transparent, lower-level units
may sometimes have access to funds not apparent from formal budgets and
not disclosed to the national authorities.
The balance of political and administrative power can also be more
decentralised than suggested by the formal lines of command. As in all political
systems, autonomy at the local level will depend on the standing and authority
of local leaders, and some provincial leaders may have senior Party rank above
that of many national level ministers. Also, although civil servants describe
themselves as being ‘vertically’ responsible to central government ministries,
they are ‘horizontally’ responsible to the local authorities with whom they are
in day-to-day contact. Most civil servants make careers either in the national
government or at the provincial level, with movement back and forth only at a
very senior level. Therefore although a provincial official may notionally be
part of the ‘vertical’ structure of the relevant national ministry, and receive
training and be in communication with the ministry in Hanoi, immediate
accountability will be to provincial authorities.
Provincial and local departments have a dual responsibility to report to the
local Peoples’ Committee and Assembly, and to the central line ministries.
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Responsibility for planning, implementation and operation of facilities is split,
although the implications of this will vary from province to province, depending
on the importance of the province. Large urban centres under central
administration, and a good number of provincial governments, enjoy a high
degree of autonomy. For example, they are authorised to license foreign
investments up to a certain value, approve certain local socioeconomic
development plans, and formulate their own budgets.
Some provincial governments are unenthusiastic about greater financial
autonomy, seeing it to their disadvantage where they lack the capacity required
to undertake needed development tasks, and therefore would prefer high levels
of assistance (and accept the resulting intervention) from the central authorities.
With increasing reliance on aid, the leadership of some localities see the need
for central supply of counterpart funds in order to be able to access aid. Moreover,
donors, while espousing the virtues of decentralising, have often unwittingly
strengthened the power of central bodies by channelling aid funding through
the national ministries in Hanoi.
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
Viet Nam has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt its economic policies and
institutions as and when needed. In particular, the ongoing Doi Moi process
has brought about pervasive reforms in the country, both in terms of economic
strategy and government.
Nonetheless, there are a number of serious constraints that hinder public
sector management. The high degree of centralisation in principle implied in
government rules and regulation, combined with the high degree of autonomy
exercised by lower level bodies in practice, coupled with weak financial
management capability at different administrative levels, erodes the accountability
of policymakers, both at central and provincial levels. There is still a general
lack of adequate administrative capability, particularly at the provincial level,
which limits the prospects for a more effective form of decentralisation.
The policymaking process is often opaque and is not well understood, not
only by outsiders but even by those within government. Allocation of
responsibilities is often far from clear, and the need to agree through consensus
delays decison making. When it comes to implementation, while individual
agencies can be quite decisive, cooperation and coordination between line
agencies is often difficult to achieve. That said, although inter-agency
63POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
coordination is typically not very effective, there is often a strong sense of
responsibility for carrying out tasks which fall within defined organisational
responsibilities.
The perception of some Vietnamese officials at the early stages of the reform
process was that, while there were competent professionals (for example,
engineers), their professional expertise typically was not matched by capacity
for management or policy analysis. When aid from the multilateral financial
institutions and many development assistance community members resumed
in 1993, experience or knowledge of standard development agency approaches
to project appraisal, design, implementation, and evaluation was extremely
limited in Viet Nam.11
The central planning tradition did leave a useful commitment to defining
long-term development objectives in quantitative terms, and setting up
monitorable targets against which to assess achievement.12 But this approach
tended to assume that implementation responsibility primarily rested with
the state and state agencies, and was not sensitive to the more subtle relationships
of the market economy, in which indirect policy instruments are used to
stimulate non-state economic actors to contribute to development, and where
the specific outcomes (for example, the composition of output) result from
decentralised decisions. Therefore the Doi Moi process required a continuing
process of learning at all levels of government, not just of the formal requirements
of reform, but of new approaches to the role of government and understanding
of the relationship between government and other actors in the economy.
NOTES
1 The National Assembly and members of the Provincial People’s Councils are elected every
five years, as are the members of the Central Committee of the Party. Each newly elected
National Assembly than elects state and government leaders.
2 In Viet Nam the term ‘commune’ describes the lowest administrative unit, and has neither
the ideological or economic significance the term carried in China or the Soviet Union.
3 Fascinating insights into the early history of the Party and the extent and importance of
personal relationships can be found in William Druiker’s (2001) biography of Ho Chi
Minh. For an official early history of the Party see Communist Party of Vietnam (1986a).
4 The internal tensions prior to the Sixth Party Congress are apparent in addresses by the
Party Secretary-General in the lead up to the Congress (see Truong Chinh 1986) and in
the official documents of the Congress (see Communist Party of Vietnam 1987a).
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5 See, for example, RIAS (2001) for more detailed discussion of the evolving role of the
Party.
6 A US State Department briefing on Viet Nam notes that the constitution approved in
April 1992 reaffirms ‘the central role of the Communist Party in politics and society, and
outlining government reorganization and increased economic freedom. Though Viet Nam
remains a one-party state, adherence to ideological orthodoxy has become less important
than economic development as a national priority’ (US Department of State 2000). In
contrast, the Heritage Foundation (2001)—which is widely quoted by segments of the
international media—was still arguing in 2001 ‘the bulk of the economy is still centrally
planned and dominated by state-owned enterprises’.
7 At the last elections for the National Assembly, some 85 per cent of elected members were
members of the Party and another 14 per cent were members of the Fatherland Front,
which is closely linked to the Party. Only 1 per cent of elected members were independent.
8 According to the Party’s official history, the foundation conference of the Communist Party
of Viet Nam was held in February 1930 in Hong Kong, the First Party Congress was held
in March 1935 in Macau, the Second in Tuyen Quang province in February 1951, and
the Third in Hanoi in September 1960. All post re-unification Congress meetings have
been in Hanoi; the Fourth in December 1976, the Fifth in March 1982, the Sixth in
December 1986, the Seventh in June 1991, the Eighth in June 1996, and the Ninth
from 19–22 April 2001. Mid-term meetings can be convened to discuss emerging issues
as occurred between the Seventh and Eighth Party Congresses.
9 About 150 members elected by the Party Congress.
10 It is interesting to note that, under a parliamentary system of the Westminster type,
parliamentary bodies have become of diminishing importance in the day-to-day business
of government, as tight party discipline under a multi-party system curtails any independent
role (for example, some would argue that the UK parliament has been reduced to little
more than fulfilling the functions of an electoral college).
11 Even now, while substantial progress has been made in acquiring the relevant skills at the
national level, there are still great weaknesses at the provincial level.
12 Hence, the World Bank was able to claim that Viet Nam development planning framework
was consistent with key principles of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF).
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from the emphasis given to central planning and large-scale production. There
was ongoing debate within the Party about proposed renovation of the economy.
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THE INTRODUCTION OF DOI MOI
This chapter sets out some of the main features of the beginning of the reform
process in Viet Nam, particularly in the critical reform years of 1986–90. The
successful performance of the Vietnamese economy in the crucial period of
dynamic growth, 1992–97, was stimulated by policy reforms, including
improvements in private property rights, increasing macroeconomic stability,
and a continuing shift from state controls to market mechanisms as instruments
of economic management.
THE LAUNCH OF DOI MOI
By 1986, the then Party Secretary-General recognised the problems resulting
from the emphasis given to central planning and large-scale production, stating
…we have made mistakes due to ‘leftist infantilism’, idealism, and to the contravention of the
objective laws of socio-economic development. These mistakes were manifested in the…[emphasis
given to] developing heavy industry on a large scale beyond our practical capacity…[maintaining]
the bureaucratically centralised mechanism of economic management based on state subsidies
with a huge superstructure which overburdens the infrastructure. As a result, we relied mostly
on foreign aid for our subsistence (Truong Chinh 1986:25).
Following the death of Le Duan in April 1986, Truong Chinh1 was appointed
acting Secretary-General of the Party until the Sixth Party Congress in December
1986, when he was replaced by Nguyen Van Linh. At the same time Do Muoi
was elected as Prime Minister, replacing Pham Van Dong.
65
66 VIET NAM: A TRANSITION TIGER?
In the lead up to the Sixth Party Congress, the country was facing mounting
economic problems. Despite price ‘controls’ on most goods and services, the
annual rate of inflation was over 700 per cent. The value of exports was
considerably less then half the total value of imports. Budget resources were
strained because of high military expenditure and support provided to loss-
making state enterprises. There was virtually no foreign investment, the
technology gap between Viet Nam and its neighbours was growing, visits by
Vietnamese nationals to market economies were rare and, apart from a limited
number of diplomats and aid workers, there were very few foreigners from
market economies working in Viet Nam (Mallon 1999).
During preparations for the Sixth Party Congress, considerable debate took
place about past mistakes and the need for a major renovation (Doi Moi) of the
Vietnamese economy. This debate reflected a growing concern about the
negative effects that the central planning system was having on the wellbeing
of the population. The following extracts from a presentation by Party Secretary-
General, Truong Chinh, prior to the Sixth Party Congress, provides an indication
of public concern about progress in socioeconomic development.
Our Party’s policies must proceed from the interests, desires and level of our people. To evaluate
our policies to decide whether they are right or wrong, good or bad, we should see whether the
majority of our people enthusiastically approve and are eager to implement those policies or not.
We should see whether production has been boosted, our economy has developed, life has
become stabilised and gradually improved, national defence and security has become steady and
strong or not.
Since our whole country entered the stage of socialism, not a few cadre and Party members have
alienated themselves from the people, forgetting the years and months of hardship and
sacrifices…thinking that…in the struggle for socialism the people only have to obey them.
Lenin said ‘The danger facing a party in power lies in severing ties with the masses’.
The peasants have a spirit of private ownership. That is true. To advance to socialism, it is
necessary to get rid of that spirit. That is also true…Neither can we say that people who still
have a spirit of private ownership are not patriotic. Such an allegation cannot win the people’s
approval, and only alienates us further from the people…they [the people] cannot agree to our
imposing on them things contrary to their legitimate interests and compelling them to obey our
subjective will.
…mistakes due to wishful thinking, impatience, and our failing to respect objective laws of
development and even going counter to them. At the same time, we have indulged in conservatism
and sluggishness, maintaining for too long the mechanism of bureaucratic centralism based on
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state subsidies. As a result, our production capacities were restricted and could not develop, the
working people could not in practice fully exercise their right to be master of society…causing
endless inflation and price hikes, the people’s life was unstable, ethical and spiritual values were
eroded, and negative manifestations multiplied.
It is regrettable that even now a number of comrades have not fully realised the deep effect in
many respects of that mistake, they fear that by thinking and doing otherwise than state subsidised
bureaucratic centralism they would depart from socialism.
Some comrades propose that in the relationship between centralism and democracy at present,
priority should be given to centralism. Such an opinion is wrong both in theory and in practice.
Democratic centralism is a principle manifesting a well-knit unity. Without giving full play to
democracy we cannot firmly maintain centralism. Without giving full play to democracy and
ensuring the autonomy of the grassroots, ensuring the legitimate interests of the working people
both in agriculture and industry, in production and the circulation of goods, we shall have no or
very little marketable goods, and the latter will not circulate normally. In such a situation, can
we ensure centralism? If we overemphasise centralism to the point of having no goods, and of
bringing circulation to a standstill, will centralism have any meaning? This is precisely the state
of bureaucratic centralism in which we have been enmeshed so far; the Resolution of the 8th
Plenum of the Party Central Committee has analysed, criticised and reject it (Truong Chinh
1986:8–18).
Another address by Truong Chinh, two months later, illustrates the ongoing
debate within the Party about proposed renovation of the economy.
To oppose bureaucratic centralism and the system of state-subsidised economic management is
an extremely hard struggle between the new and the old, between the progressive and the
backward, between the dynamism of the demand for renewal on the one hand and conservatism
and the inertia of habits on the other, between the need to establish the real right to socialist
collective mastery of the working people and the individualism of certain people who, in the
name of defending socialism, try to keep their own special rights and gains. This struggle is
taking place within our Party, within our state bodies and mass organisations, within our people,
within each level and each branch of activity, and within everyone of us’ (Truong Chinh 1986:8–
18).
FIRST STEPS TO IMPLEMENT DOI MOI, 1986–89
Doi Moi was launched at the Sixth Party Congress in late 1986, when the
country faced economic crisis. Despite state price controls, there was a market
inflation rate of more than 700 per cent per year. Total exports at about US$500
million were less than half the total value of imports (US$1,221 million) and
per capita trade levels were very low by East Asian standards. Government
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revenues were low, the fiscal deficit was large and persistent, and some areas
were on the verge of famine. There was some private economic activity, but it
was mostly black market and therefore risky. There was a growing development
gap between Viet Nam and neighbouring economies. Contacts with market
economies were very limited and Vietnamese were actively discouraged from
personal contact with foreigners.
The broad thrust of Doi Moi was officially adopted by the Sixth Party Congress
in December 1986. This included agreement on the need for policy reforms
aimed at reducing macroeconomic instability and accelerating economic growth,
and that all economic levers (price, wages, fiscal and monetary policies) were
to be used to achieve these objectives. The Sixth Party Congress agreed to
abolish the system of bureaucratic centralised management based on state
subsidies, and to move to a multi-sector, market-oriented economy with a role
for the private sector to compete with the state in non-strategic sectors. Limited
investment resources were to be directed towards three main objectives, namely
• the development of agriculture
• the expansion of consumer goods production
• the expansion of trade and foreign investment relations.
The policy directions announced at the end of the Sixth Party Congress in
December 1986 represented a marked departure from previous policies and
were the culmination of intensive internal debate about the failure of the old
system to bring tangible results to the wellbeing of the Vietnamese people.
While the Sixth Congress represented a critical turning point in policy direction,
however, only limited details were provided about the specific policy reforms
that would be implemented to bring about the desired change. The details of
Doi Moi were discussed in a series of Party plena following the Party Congress,
and documents from the Third and Sixth Plena clearly stated the need to move
away from central planning towards indicative planning and macroeconomic
policy levers (Communist Party of Vietnam 1991a, 1991c).
Just prior to the conclusion of the Sixth Congress, a number of decisions
were issued on the family economy2 and the role of the private, cooperative
and state sectors in the agricultural sector.3 Following the Sixth Congress, there
was a gradual relaxation of the administrative constraints to private sector activity
and to domestic trade. In early 1987, many of the checkpoints that had been
established to limit domestic trade were reduced, and private markets for
agricultural goods developed rapidly.4
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While some commentators focus on the reforms implemented from 1989
onwards, important micro-level reforms were introduced from 1986 that
resulted in a strong supply response that greatly improved the environment
for the successful implementation of the subsequent macro level reforms.
In mid 1987, substantial price reforms were introduced with the official
price of most non-essential consumer goods being raised to close to market
prices and the scope of rationing being substantially reduced. At the same
time there was a substantial devaluation of Viet Nam’s currency, the Dong.
A key change was the different emphasis given to the role of government in
the industrialisation process. The state was to concentrate on ‘building the
necessary premises for the acceleration of socialist industrialisation in the
subsequent stage’ (Communist Party of Vietnam 1987b). This was an important
change of focus, as noted by Luoc (1994:23), who states that ‘…while
industrialisation was reaffirmed as a necessary task, the basic content of industrial
policy was confined to creating the premises for industrialisation at a subsequent
stage’.
The Council of Ministers issued regulations5 which clarified
• the difference between state ownership of property allocated to the
enterprise, and the right of enterprise management to use and directly
manage this property
• the relationship between the enterprise and government agencies
• the rights of enterprises regarding planning and decisions relating to
procurement, sales, pricing, financial accounting, employment and salaries
• rights regarding commercial relations between enterprises.
During 1987 and 1988, the government rationalised and reduced the number
of line ministries, state committees and other central government agencies.
A Foreign Investment Law was passed by the National Assembly in December
1987, and enacted in September 1988. It took a couple of years for substantial
foreign investment inflows to result but by 1992 inflows were becoming an
important source of investment.
A Law on Land was also passed by the December 1987 session of the National
Assembly and was enacted in 1988. While state ownership of land was retained,
private land-use rights were recognised by the state. Although it was an
important step towards the introduction of property rights, this law did not
allow for the transfer of land-use rights—despite the existence of an active
informal market for land-use rights (World Bank 1993b).
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Reforms introduced during 1988 provided greatly improved incentive
structures, including steps towards clarifying property rights. A Communist
Party resolution, issued in April 1988,6 provided for a much greater role for
individuals and private enterprise in the agriculture sector. Farmers were given
long-term rights to land, centrally planned targets were abolished, and farmers
could no longer be coerced into joining cooperatives, and were allowed to sell
their produce on the open market.
The Party Resolution No.10, passed in 1988, introduced a critically
important reform, greatly enhancing the rights of rural families, and diminishing
the legal authority of village cooperatives. While there were initially mixed
opinions from external commentators about the impact of Resolution
No. 10,7 the Party Secretary-General argued that this was a turning point in
agricultural development (Do Muoi 1993). Indeed, some argue that it was
one of the key turning points in the whole reform process. Providing farmers
with property rights (albeit limited in extent), combined with price and trade
reforms, contributed to sustained growth in agriculture from 1988. Strong
agricultural growth in 1989 (6.9 per cent) was important in offsetting the
worst impacts of the tight monetary policies that were introduced that year to
control inflation—industrial output fell by 4.0 per cent in 1989.
A month earlier, the Council of Ministers had issued a series of decrees
clarifying the rights of the non-state sector to engage in industrial production.8
These policy guidelines were reinforced by a Politburo Resolution in July 1988.9
These policy guidelines recognised the important potential contribution of
the non-state sector in industrial production, and explicitly stated that the
state recognises and protects the rights of the non-state sector to the ownership
and inheritance of property and lawful earnings of non-state enterprises.
Despite these developments, the World Bank argued in 1990 that
there has as yet been no clear elucidation of property rights, nor is there at present a legal
framework to guarantee and enforce these rights. Consequently, there is considerable uncertainty
about what actually is permissible and what will be permissible in the future, and that uncertainty
retards productive investment (World Bank 1990:55–56).
Undoubtedly there was uncertainty—given development over the previous
decade it would have been unrealistic to expect otherwise. Uncertainty could
only be expected to diminish after the evolving market institutions, including
the legal system, actually developed a track record of underpinning these rights
over an extended period of time.10
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Strong growth in the private sector’s share of retail trade showed that the
private sector had adequate confidence that an institutional basis existed to
enforce basic contracts and to protect property rights in relation to the goods
being traded. That is, even before formal legal changes to institutions were
made, changes were gradually occurring in informal institutions that
substantially affected the way economic business was being conducted. This
does not imply that the institutions were perfect. There was an implicit
recognition in the national policy agenda that more formal institutions would
need to be developed to encourage longer-term private investment in productive
capacity.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
The microeconomic reforms introduced in 1987 and 1988 were important in
generating strong supply responses that directly contributed to reducing
inflationary pressures, and in contributing to an improved economic climate
in which it was politically easier to introduce the tighter macroeconomic policies
required for sustained reductions in macroeconomic imbalances.
The earlier experience gained from the experimentation with reform since
1979 was important in changing beliefs and norms of behaviour that facilitated
subsequent adjustment. Without the earlier reforms, the adjustment costs
associated with the subsequent macroeconomic reforms would have been
substantially greater.
The reform process was inherently experimental and gradual. Reform, when
it came, involved an incremental process, which can be interpreted as a learning
process, with the leadership responding to successes and failures of policies in
practice, and also as the outcome of an ongoing debate within the political
system regarding economic strategy. The fact that the centrally planned
economy never worked effectively in its own terms made the process of Doi
Moi easier than reform of centrally planned systems that had operated as working
systems over long periods.
For the southern provinces in particular the experiment with central planning
was quite brief. From 1976, attempts were made to integrate the southern
market economy into the planning system of the north, but central planning
was only applied in the south with full vigour between 1977 and 1980. The
private sector, although illegal, was never fully suppressed.11 Even in the north,
control over the economy exercised by planners was in practice reduced
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Table 6.1 Some milestones in the Vietnamese reform process,
1986–2002
Year Major reform measures Policy and legal changes
1986 Decisions issued to develop the family The Sixth Party Congress announces Doi
economy; renovate management of Moi as official Party policy in November.
state farms; facilitate the private
economy and business in agriculture,
forestry and fisheries, and to
reorganise and renovate agricultural
cooperatives.
1987 Law on Foreign Investment issued. Land Law establishes private use of
Central treasury established. allocated land in agriculture.
1988 Land Law creates long-term land-use Industry policy introduced encouraging
rights for agricultural uses. Party private investment in industrial development
Resolution No.10 recognises Devaluation of exchange rates. Restrictions
households as the basic unit of on foreign trading enterprises and state
agriculture production. Central banking monopoly of foreign trade relaxed. Law on
functions separated from commercial Import and Export Duties issued.
banking. Foreign exchange controls
liberalised.
1989 Most direct production subsidies and Quotas removed on all but 10 export and
price control removed—end of ‘two 14 import commodities (subsequently
price’ system.Ordinance on Economic reduced to 7 export and 12 import
Contracts establishes rights for legal commodities). Foreign exchange rate system
entities to enter into contracts. unified. Bank interest rates made positive in
Producers allowed to sell their export real terms. Budget export subsidies removed.
output to any licensed foreign trade
company.
1990 Law on Private Enterprises established Law on Foreign Investment. Liberalised Law
legal basis for establishment of sole on State Bank of Viet Nam (SBVN) and
proprietorships. Law on Companies National Law on Banks, Cooperative Credit
established basis for limited liability Institutions and Financial Institutions
and joint-stock companies.Tax reforms, enacted, prohibiting SBVN from
including introduction of special sales commercial banking and empowering it as
tax, turnover tax and profit tax. central bank.
1991 Ordinance on civil contracts issued. Foreign exchange trading floors opened at
Criteria set for establishing state SBVN. Regulation on establishing export
enterprises; all state enterprises processing zones (EPZs) promulgated.
required to re-register. Major Agriculture Bank of Viet Nam allowed
rationalisation of state enterprises to lend to households.
undertaken. Private companies allowed
to engage directly in international trade.
1992 New constitution reaffirms leading Trade agreement signed with the European
role of the Communist Party, but also Union for quota allocated garment exports
recognises private property rights in a to the European Union and granting tariff
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state managed, market oriented, preferences on selected imports from the
multi-sector economy, with socialist European Union. Foreign investment law
orientations. Pilot equitisation program amended to reduce bias against 100 per
for state enterprises introduced. cent foreign owned enterprises and to
introduce build-operate-transfer (BOT)
options.
1993 Amended Land Law makes agricultural Export shipment licensing relaxed—six-
land-use rights transferable and useable monthly licences issued for 22 export
as collateral. Bankruptcy Law and Law commodities. 90-day duty suspension
on environmental protection approved. system for inputs into export production
First Donor Conference facilitates rapid introduced.
increase in access to official
development assistance.
1994 Economic courts established. Labour Import permits for all but 15 products
code establishes protection of employer eliminated. Inter-bank foreign exchange
and employee rights, regulation of market introduced. Pilot work on creation
contracts, social insurance and sets up of general corporations as groupings of SOE
arbitration mechanism. Law on initiated. Export shipment licensing
Promotion of Domestic Investment requirements lifted for all commodities
specifies incentives for domestic except rice, timber and petroleum.
investors.
1995 Law on State-owned Enterprises Import permits on a shipment basis no
consolidates previous legislative longer required for many consumer and
initiatives on state enterprises. Civil producer goods. All export quotas lifted
Code enacted deepening foundation for except for those on rice. Range of goods
market economy, including some legal subject to management by import quota
protection for industrial property reduced to seven. Viet Nam joins ASEAN
rights. Government launches Public and commits to AFTA. Number of turnover
Administration Reform program and tax rates reduced from 18 to 11.
reduces number of ministries.
1996 Credit activities exempted from Regulations elaborate regime under Civil
turnover tax. State Budget Law defines Code for protection of industrial property
tax and expenditure responsibilities of rights. Inward foreign exchange remittance
different levels of government. New tax lifted. Number of items managed by
Law on Foreign Investment reduces import quota reduced to six. Mining Law
import duty exemptions for FDI approved.
projects, and clarifies some investment
policies.
1997 Reforms provide scope for direct Number of goods subject to import controls
private sector rice exports. Restrictions to achieve national balances increased.
on domestic rice trade are lifted. Temporary prohibitions on imports of wide
Commercial Code approved. Law on range of consumer goods imposed then
State Bank of Viet Nam specifies roles lifted. Approval of certain foreign investment
and functions of SBVN. Law on Credit projects decentralised to selected provincial
Institutions establishes basis for people’s committees and industrial zones.
supervision and regulation of banking Law on Cooperatives confirms continued
system.Value Added Tax (VAT) Law government incentives for cooperatives. The
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introduces VAT to replace turnover tax Fourth Plenum (Eighth Party Congress)
in 1999. Corporate Income Tax calls for greater effort to develop
introduces company tax to replace agriculture and rural areas; and to reform
profit tax also in 1999. London and develop state enterprises, cooperatives,
Club agreement to reschedule Viet and individual and private enterprises.
Nam’s international commercial debt.
1998 Forward and swap foreign exchange Private sector enterprises allocated quota to
transactions permitted. Domestic import fertiliser and export rice. Domestic
investment legislation amended to enterprises allowed to export production
improve incentives and simplify access directly without an export/import license.
for domestic investors. Foreign invested Business registration procedures greatly
enterprises permitted to export goods simplified. Intensified process of
not specified in investment licences. consultations with private sector to
Maximum tariff rate reduced to 60 per identify remaining regulatory constraints
cent. Shift to tariffs from quota or and to develop the Enterprise Law.
licensing to manage imports of most National Assembly approves anti-
consumer goods. Decrees 29 & 71 corruption ordinance. The Sixth Plenum
issued aimed at implementing (Eighth Party Congress) renews support
democracy at commune level. for economic reform.
1999 Enterprise Law approved. Business Initial agreement on US–Viet Nam bilateral
licences requirements streamlined. trade agreement. Viet Nam and China
Value added tax (VAT) implemented. agreement on land boundaries followed by
Government issues plan to restructure increased high level contact and economic
and enforce minimal capital cooperation. Party and National Assembly
requirements in joint-stock banks. discipline senior government officials for
corruption.
2000 Enactment of the Enterprise Law. FDI law amended to streamline procedures,
Insurance Law approved in May 2000. clarify land-use right provisions, provide
A formal stock market commences greater flexibility in corporate structure, and
operation in Ho Chi Minh City. liberalise foreign exchange controls. Tenth
Government announces decision to Party Plenum concludes that there is ‘no
reduce public service workforce by 15 other choice but to continue with regional
per cent. Party and government identify and global integration’. Signing of bilateral
information technology as a key trade agreement is followed by first visit by a
element of the development strategy US president to Viet Nam since
and introduce reforms to increase reunification.
competition and lower costs.
2001 Ninth Party Congress concludes with Resolution of Third Party Plenum specifies
resolution confirming a leading role for timetable to accelerate state enterprise
the state, but also recognising a restructuring, and decree issued to facilitate
long-term role for private domestic corporatisation of state enterprises under
and foreign investors in economic the Enterprise Law. Bilateral trade
development. A New Socioeconomic agreement with United States ratified by
Development Strategy for 2001–10 United States Congress on 17 October
and 5 year plan to 2005 are endorsed. and by Viet Nam National Assembly on 28
Amendments to Land Law clarify November. Becomes effective on 10
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stipulations on land prices and December. National Assembly amends
land-use planning, authorised levels on Constitution to recognise role of private
land allocation, compensation for land sector and to better protect private
clearance, and transferring land-use property rights. National Assembly given
rights. Decree 44/2001/ND-CP more formal power to oversee government
(2/8/01) allows enterprises, individuals, actions, including power to pass no-
cooperatives and foreign investors to confidence motions on senior government
export and import all permissible goods. officials. National Assembly also approved
Government announces comprehensive 10 and 5 year development strategies.
master plan for public administration
reform.
2002 Fifth Party Plenum takes decisions New National Assembly elected with 115 of
supporting an enhanced role for the the 498 members elected to serve on a full-
private sector and on improving the time basis. Labour Code amended in April
capacity and performance of grassroots 2002 to provide more labour market
organisations (‘grassroots democracy’). flexibility (especially in terms of wages and
The Plenum also decides that Party recruitment) and allow foreign investors to
members are allowed to own private recruit staff directly.
business.
Sources: Government of Vietnam, Communist Party of Vietnam, World Bank and Asian
Development Bank reports on the reform processes.
throughout the 1980s by a de facto decollectivisation of agriculture and the
growth of extensive parallel markets.
During the first half of the 1980s, Vietnamese policymaking was subject to
contradictory influences, as the commitment to central planning was tempered
by pragmatic responses to difficulties in implementing central controls. During
that period, there was considerable uncertainty over the government’s long-
term aims and policy. The Five Year Plan (1986–90) continued to emphasise
the leading role of the state sectors,12 the need to broaden the collective economy
and to restrict the negative aspects of the private economic sectors, but it was
overtaken by the launch of the Doi Moi policy following the Sixth Party Congress
in November 1986.
Reform came in response to the serious economic problems faced at various
times in the 1980s. Great economic difficulties had been experienced in 1979–
80, following the cessation of Western and Chinese aid, and as early as 1981
agricultural policy was modified, when the end-product contract system13 was
generalised and the role of the informal private sector in such areas as retail
trade, handicrafts and artisanship was officially recognised.
One interesting characteristic of the Vietnamese system was its pragmatic
flexibility—when it was evident that the system was not working, there was a
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willingness to experiment with changes. Such a response is not a necessary reaction;
there are plenty of examples of regimes that respond to difficulties by resisting
change and withdrawing into a defensive posture. Such flexibility and pragmatism,
combined with resolve, in the Vietnamese communist system was not new, as
it had been characteristic of the politics and military tactics of the more than
three decades of struggle that had led to the creation of modern Viet Nam.
This account emphasises that change came as a response to experience with
success and failure of policies. However, there was also a willingness to learn
from international experience. While it is difficult to gauge the influence of
external examples, despite the limitations on travel and exposure to foreign
influences in the pre-reform period, Vietnamese leaders have always been keen
to study relevant international experience. Despite stringent efforts to insulate
the society from hostile political influences in the post-unification period, the
Vietnamese regime was not as controlled, closed or xenophobic a society as
North Korea or Albania. Indeed, the theme of modernisation, which has always
been a core objective for the Communist Party, incorporated concepts of learning
and borrowing from relevant international experience.
There was an implicit recognition that, in many important areas, market
economic systems had brought more tangible material and social benefits to
many of Viet Nam’s neighbours than had been achieved by the existing policy
regime. Viet Nam was also a member of the CMEA and was exposed to the
ferment of debates and policy changes in the other CMEA countries during
the 1980s. Also, while in that period relations with China were not close, the
relevance of Chinese reforms would have been clear to informed Vietnamese
leaders, many of whom had received training in China.
By 1986, at its Sixth Congress, the Party was ready to make a political
commitment to economic renovation (Doi Moi), although it remained unclear
how far economic reforms would be implemented. For some years the
uncertainty of the political commitment manifested itself in cautious and
somewhat tortuous language—in the early years the term ‘market mechanism’
was not in use, the economy being described instead as a ‘multi-sector
commodity-producing economy’. The period 1986–89 was crucial because
this was the period when the process of change was initiated through a number
of significant but still cautious reform steps. From 1989 onwards the pace of
reform accelerated.
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The somewhat cautious and pragmatic approach to reform, while frequently
generating frustrations among external proponents of reform, had two great
advantages.
First, in terms of the contemporary vocabulary of policy analysis, the reform
process had very strong national ownership—it emerged from the national
political process and at all times reflected decisions taken by the Vietnamese.14
Second, there was time for ‘learning by doing’ in the development of new
institutions. The incremental process meant that at each step the effectiveness
of new institutions and policies were tested and adjusted to Vietnamese
conditions.15 This process was particularly evident in the agrarian sector, which
was subject to continuing crisis in the years prior to the adoption of Doi Moi.
NOTES
1 Truong Chinh was a leading Party theorist, who was held responsible for the excesses of the
1954–57 land reforms, but remained influential and emerged as a key proponent of reform.
2 Council of Ministers Decision 146, 26 November 1986, ‘Development of the Family
Economy’.
3 Council of Ministers Decisions 169, 170 and 171, 14 November 1986, ‘Renovation of
the Management of State Farms’, ‘Policy Directions Towards the Private Economy and
Private Business Enterprises in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’, and ‘Reorganisation
and Renovation of Management in Agricultural Cooperatives’, respectively.
4 The extent to which administrative constraints were relaxed varied considerably throughout
the country depending on the actions of local level administrative authorities.
5 Decision 217-HDBT, 14 November 1987, ‘Renovating the Planning, Economic
Accounting and Socialist Business of State Enterprises’. Subsequently, Statute 50-HDBT
‘Regulations for State-Owned Industrial Enterprises’, of March 1988 provided more details
on the rights and responsibilities of state enterprises.
6 Central Committee Resolution 10 ‘Renovation of Management of the Agriculture Sector’,
April 1988.
7 For a nuanced interpretation see Fforde, who argues ‘that implementation of Decree 10
was limited in scope’ (1990:12), that ‘[t]he fact that Decree No. 10 was so rapidly
implemented itself shows the power exercised over local cadres by the level superior to
them’ (1990:13), and that ‘[t]he reasons for the limited implementation of Decree No.
10—its lack of effectiveness outside the rather restricted micro area of cooperative
management—are at root to do with the slow response of state organizations’.
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8 Council of Ministers Decree 27, 28 and 29-HDBT, 9 March 1988, on ‘Rules and Policies
on the Private Economic Sector in Industrial Production, Service Industries, Construction
and Transport’, on ‘Rules and Policies on the Collective Economy in Industrial Production,
Service Industries, Construction and Transport’, and ‘Rules and Policies on the Family
Economy in Production and Service Activities’, respectively.
9 Politburo Resolution 16/NQTW, 15 July 1988, on the ‘Renovation of Management Policies
and Mechanisms towards Non-state Economic Sectors’.
10 A subsequent World Bank Report (World Bank 1993b:27) recognised that the ‘movement
towards strengthening property rights accelerated in 1988, when a Land Law was enacted.
While state ownership of land was maintained under this law, private land use rights granted
by the state were also recognized’.
11 Pragmatic accommodations were made. On visiting a very well run seafood canning plant,
owned by the Ho Chi Minh City Peoples’ Committee in 1989, one author complimented
the general manager on the evident efficiency of the operation and enquired where he had
learnt the business. Somewhat shyly he replied that before unification he had owned the
factory.
12 As, indeed, has the vocabulary of subsequent planning documents.
13 The ‘output contract system’ was introduced into the agricultural cooperatives as early as
1979–80. This reform awarded the individual farmer more rights within the cooperative
and the cooperative more rights vis-à-vis the state. Compulsory deliveries were replaced by
a ‘contract’ under which families were allocated plots of land and were obliged to supply a
certain amount of rice to the cooperative, and any surplus was available for disposal in any
way the farmers wished, thus providing an incentive to increase production at the margin
and to respond to markets.
14 Fforde and de Vylder (1996:315) argue that ‘[t]he fact that until recently Viet Nam
remained ineligible for IFI lending and conditionality has perhaps also contributed to making
the reforms process more authentically Vietnamese’.
15 A paradox of the international debates on reform is that those who have advocated ‘big
bang’ movement to market institutions by application of a set of market economy blueprints
derived from economic doctrine are, presumably unwittingly, engaging in a form of social
engineering comparable to a neo-Stalinist model. The Vietnamese incremental approach
on the other hand might be seen as closer to Karl Popper’s liberal views on the most
appropriate paths to social change. Stiglitz notes that ‘[t]he irony of it all is that the modern
critique of utopian social engineering was based particularly on the Bolshevik approach to
the transition from capitalism to communism, and the shock therapy approach tried to use
the same principles for the reverse transition’ (1999b:22).
1VIET NAM’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
The process of reform in Viet Nam went through three stages: agrarian reform,
price reform, and foreign trade and payments reform.
This chapter outlines the agrarian reforms that were introduced in the 1980s,
representing a decisive shift towards the family farm as the basic productive
unit – the most crucial initial building block of the reform process. This
impacted on the majority of the population as well as the core of the economy.
The chapter also highlights the price reforms where, by 1990, commodity
prices were largely market determined and direct subsidies had been all but
eliminated.
In terms of foreign trade, the government created an ‘open door’ policy that
focused on export development, opening up the country to inputs from world
markets, encouraging national enterprise to take advantage of export
opportunities, and exposing the local economy to the challenges made available
through choice of commodity and technology. Tolerance of a free foreign
exchange market provided an effective mechanism for the growth of market
transactions.
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STRATEGIC BUILDING BLOCKS OF
DOI MOI
AGRARIAN REFORM
Agrarian collectivisation was intended to be an important part of the socialist
strategy. Great efforts were made to develop agriculture using cooperatives as
the basic unit for organising production, as well as for the distribution of
inputs and marketing of outputs. This was particularly true in the north,
where the cooperatives were developed both as productive units and as providers
of social services (such as crèches and kindergartens). Following unification,
efforts were made to extend this system throughout the country. Agrarian
reforms introduced during the 1980s represented a decisive shift towards the
family farm as the basic productive unit. This was the most crucial initial
building block of the reform process because it impacted on the majority of
the population and the core of the economy.
There was some regional diversity in the agrarian reform process, as the
history of agricultural organisation differed considerably between the north
and centre on the one hand, and the southern provinces. Prior to the 1981
reforms, cooperatives in the north were organised based on farmers working in
brigades for work points. Even then, however, there was considerable ‘own
account’ (illegal) activity.
The experience of the south and in particular the Mekong was somewhat
different. There were two successive waves of collectivisation in the Mekong.
The first was stopped in 1979–80 in response to economic crisis, and although
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the second (started in the early 1980s) was declared successfully completed in
1985, cooperatives never played as decisive a role in the southern rural economy
as they had done in the north.
Even in northern and central Viet Nam, farm households were important
elements of the production system, although subject to policies aimed at
establishing collective control through producer cooperatives. Reforms in 1981
and 1988 increased the autonomy of the farming household, with the 1988
reform decisively shifting most economic power from the producer cooperatives
to households and essentially returning agricultural production to a family
basis.
Under the 1988 reforms, cooperatives were still meant to provide a focus for
various rural activities sponsored by the state, but probably in the majority of
communes the cooperatives were reduced to only a minor role, their functions
reduced to acting as local tax collectors, as the holder of residual property
rights, and as an element of the formal state structure. A small group of
cooperatives managed to shift successfully to a profitable service function. Some
cooperatives retained some support from farmers, but were greatly diminished
in importance.
Further measures introduced in 1989 reduced the direct involvement of the
state in input allocation. The procurement of agricultural output at prices
below those on the free market formally ended and the share of output procured
by the state declined considerably. From 1989, there was a substantial surplus
available for free market sales.
The reforms had a considerable impact on rural institutions. Farming families
increased their control over land and other assets. The weakening of the state
trading system at the local level permitted private traders to develop local
markets, while many state trading enterprises became more responsive to market
opportunities. Large-scale wholesaling often based upon access to foreign
exchange and other key inputs (such as transport facilities) generally remained
under the control of state agencies but these competed with each other.
The picture regarding land-use rights became clearer over many years. The
formal legal position lagged behind events. While the formal legal framework
remained ambiguous for some years, there was in practice a decisive shift in
favour of family farms. Residual collective property rights remained socially
important in northern and central regions, where it was common for families
to hold their land on long-term contracts from the cooperative. In areas where
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the cooperatives were weak, enforcement of land-use rights probably reverted
to the village or commune level. In the south, the situation was even more
fluid, and land essentially returned to informal private ownership.
Other farm assets were privatised extensively. Livestock, machinery, brick
kilns and other important sources of cooperative revenues were sold to farmers.
Liberalising agricultural and small scale trade and craft activities fundamentally
changed the character of the Vietnamese economy, adding to the resilience of
the economy during the subsequent decade of economic difficulties.
THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET SYSTEM—PRICE REFORM
For many years, the economy experienced repressed inflation, a typical
characteristic of centrally planned economies. Open inflation surfaced during
the late 1970s. For a decade, high open inflation was combined with the
persistent symptoms of repressed inflation, such as rationing and shortages of
inputs and consumer goods at official prices. As a result of the pressures on the
planning system, there was a partial breakdown in the allocation of subsidised
inputs and of state procurement of consumer goods to fuel the rationing system.
Enterprises, agricultural cooperatives and individuals were thus forced to try
to obtain the goods from non-official sources. State companies began to initiate
direct relationships among themselves in order to obtain commodities, inputs
and spare parts unobtainable through official allocations—an informal reform
process in which the rules of the planning game were spontaneously modified.
Political leaders responded to spontaneous change by making a series of
concessions while trying to regain control of the process. As early as 1981,
industrial sector state enterprises were given the right to do business with each
other and to sell their production freely after they had fulfilled their obligations
to the state. Companies became increasingly interested in transactions on the
parallel market where prices (and costs) were several times higher than official
prices.
The 1979–81 reforms within agriculture and industry, simultaneous
liberalisation of retail trade, a cautious price reform and limited decentralisation
of foreign trade represented important movements towards a market system.
Early attempts to reduce the extreme differences between free market prices
and official prices were made in 1987 following the official announcement of
Doi Moi.1 Prior to the 1989 price reforms, however, the economy remained
segmented between production within and outside the central plan. In the
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period 1989–92, ‘step-by-step’2 movement to reform institutions continued,
cautiously in some areas (for example, in enterprise reform) but decisively
action in other areas (for example, de-control of prices).
As a result of the increased economic autonomy granted to households and
small businesses during the second half of the 1980s, the state sector was left
in a sort of halfway house. Although state enterprises were still, in principle,
subject to the planning mechanism, the central authorities lacked the
instruments to enforce plan discipline. A good deal of autonomy was granted,
and central plan targets and instructions were not rigorously enforced, but
state enterprises were not yet subject to market discipline and their input/
output prices were not always market determined.
Even though a growing amount of economic activity fell outside direct state
control by the mid 1980s, a number of key issues regarding the legal status of
private economic activity remained unresolved (for example, access to land),
many important policy issues related to the management of the emerging
economic system had still be to addressed (for example, price controls, exchange
rate management), and the political legitimacy of the emerging system needed
clarification.
In 1987, the rationing system was abolished for many commodities, and
official prices of non-essential goods were raised to a level close to free market
prices. Administered prices of most consumer goods, and of a large number of
agricultural and industrial inputs, were increased sharply in 1987 and 1988.
However, differences between official and free market prices continued to be
large in the markets for key agricultural products, such as rice, and for foreign
exchange (and, as a consequence, in the markets for all imported goods).
By 1990, commodity prices were largely market determined and direct
subsidies had been all but eliminated. These reforms were critical. Two central
issues in the shift to a market system of economic coordination are the manner
and timing of the shift from administrative to market prices, and the strategy
for introducing a new set of ‘rules of the game’ whereby actors in the economy,
particularly state enterprises, are constrained to respond to market prices by
the discipline of a hard budget constraint. The economy was opened to the
influence of international markets, although this partly involved official
acceptance of a reality in which international trade was already much freer in
practice than principle.
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While price reform was highly successful, it was neither an instantaneous
nor a smooth process. The authorities faced two dilemmas. The first related to
the impact of price reform on those segments of the economy ill-adapted to
respond to the new system. The potential political and social costs of collapse
of large-scale enterprises were obvious and it did not make sense to force the
premature collapse of enterprises which might, if allowed time to adjust, have
a chance of viability. Another set of problems related to the impact of reform
on consumers, in terms of both the risk of increasing open inflation as price
controls were removed and the impact of large changes in relative prices.
The strong open inflation of the late 1980s facilitated the shift from official
to market prices, as official prices became increasingly irrelevant even before
they were formally abolished. There was increased competition as voluntary
transactions between enterprises replaced central planning and state orders. A
fundamental change took place in the entire economic environment, with
profound effects on the behaviour of economic agents. The former sellers’ market
was replaced with the shift towards market-clearing prices.
First steps were made to put a more appropriate machinery of fiscal and
monetary policy in place, while existing instruments were used to reverse
dramatically the continuing very high inflation in early 1989. Price reform
was accelerated. With the exception of a few social benefit items (such as
electricity, house rent, medicines), consumer goods sold through state outlets
were now sold at prices very close to the free market level and were frequently
adjusted to keep pace with free market prices. The state budget was almost
entirely relieved of the burden of directly funding price subsidies. A drastic
devaluation brought the official rate of exchange close to the free market rate,
resulting in positive real interest rates. With the 1989 price reform and increased
autonomy for state enterprises, the attempt at to operate a centrally planned
‘command economy’, for all practical purposes, came to an end.
The speed and depth of the transformation of the price system were decisive
for subsequent economic performance, both in terms of the move towards
market determined prices and the shift in enterprise behaviour in responding
to market opportunities and constraints. Viet Nam quickly moved to a price
system as ‘free’ as those of many long-established and successful market
economies. However, issues of enterprise ownership, management and control
were confronted more cautiously.
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EARLY REFORMS IN FOREIGN TRADE AND PAYMENTS
The decline and eventual collapse of economic aid from, and trade with, the
CMEA compounded the macroeconomic problems faced in the late 1980s. In
response, the government sought to diversify its external economic relations
with an ‘open door policy’ that focused in particular on export development.
The transformation of the foreign trade regime was a potent force for change
in the economic structures of the Vietnamese economy. Opening up to imports
from world markets, encouraging national enterprises to take full advantage of
export opportunities and exposing the local economy to the opportunities and
challenges of technology available internationally have had profound effects
on the commodity composition of production and on the choice of technology.
Planned economies which had been integrated into the CMEA could develop
a structure of production with little reference to relative prices prevailing in
world markets as prices were largely insulated from international influences.
Exposure to world markets and to the price system prevailing in those markets
could be expected to have powerful effects, both on activities which were no
longer sustainable when faced with international competition and on those
activities which benefited from the stimulus of international export opportunities.
In this as in other areas, the impact of Vietnamese reforms was conditioned
by the fact that in reality, the system was at the end of the 1980s spontaneously
adjusting ahead of the change in the policy regime. The central authorities
practised what could almost be described as involuntary liberalisation. The
flows of imports, both smuggled and countenanced by policy adjustments,
provided the material basis for the rapid development of commodity markets
and the ready availability of incentive goods, which was a striking feature of
Viet Nam’s economy towards the end of the 1980s.3
The high level of informal activity which characterised the foreign trade
sector involved, among others, various actors within the state sector. Thus a
good deal of the foreign trade which took place outside effective central state
control involved state enterprises. Unrecorded trade is believed to have been of
a similar size as official trade in some years.
In a sector in which the central government had little success in imposing
its authority, it was perhaps not surprising that the direction of policy was
unclear. The government made feeble attempts to implement a system of quotas
and licenses. In 1989, it was officially recognised that informal trade had led
to a great increase in goods supply on domestic markets, but some officials also
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argued that unregulated trade had resulted in the circulation of counterfeit
goods, tax evasion and severe competition with domestic production. The
government, however, concluded that mainly administrative measures, rather
than trade restrictions, could reduce the deemed harmful effects of foreign
competition. Certainly, the ready supply of low-priced imported goods
throughout the country made a strategic contribution to expansion of the
market and to decentralised growth in economic activity.
A critical determinant of performances of reforming economies is the degree
of adaptability and resilience of the underlying real economy in the face of
new trading opportunities and challenges. In this respect, Viet Nam’s
performance was in striking positive contrast to that of other CMEA members.
The swift re-orientation and expansion of Vietnamese exports enabled the
Vietnamese to withstand the shock of the sudden collapse of Soviet support,
the continuing effects of the US-led trade boycott, and the absence of any
compensating increase in non-Soviet assistance. This was partly the result of
Vietnamese oil exports coming on stream, but was also the result of a rapid
increase in non-oil exports to convertible currency markets.4
Opening up had particularly dynamic effects because of the Southeast Asian
regional context. Neighbouring countries were experiencing very high rates of
growth in international trade and were undergoing structural transitions, with
rising labour costs providing incentives for them to move the more labour
intensive export processing offshore. The potential for expanding trade and
investment was enormous.
In the liberalised trading environment, state trading agencies remained
powerful. They had access to financial resources and their ‘owners’ (either a
line Ministry or a local authority) could retain control of foreign currency,
depending on their negotiating position vis-à-vis central government. They
were controlled by agencies at important levels of the state administrative system
(line Ministries and local authorities) which also controlled other economic
units as well as regulation and supervision of commercial activity. They were
therefore a key part of a system of interlocking structures, which, combined
with their access to cheap credit through the state banking system, gave them
opportunities to reap economic rents in various ways.
In the subsequent process of reform during the 1990s, a private trading
system grew up alongside the state trading system, often acting in cooperation
with the state trading companies (for example, in gaining access to export
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commodities such as rice when the state enterprises continued to enjoy
privileged access through quota systems and licensing arrangements).
Despite significant liberalisation, the Ministry of Trade retained considerable
power to control business entry to foreign trade activities. The Ministry of Trade
issued import and export licenses permitting businesses to engage in foreign
trade.5 Obtaining such a license could be a time consuming and expensive
process.6 Specified criteria to be registered to engage in foreign trade included
minimum capital requirements, past foreign trade experience, and qualifications
of enterprise personnel. While private manufacturing enterprises were permitted
to trade directly in products closely related to their business, private trading
companies found it much more difficult to obtain foreign trade licenses.
In addition, the government continued to operate a system of quotas and
other controls on the import and export of some important commodities,
including rice, textiles, garments, minerals, petroleum products, fertilisers,
motor vehicles, equipment and machinery, and any second hand goods. Not
surprisingly, securing favourable administrative decisions involved a less than
transparent process.
The system operated more flexibly than might be apparent. For example,
although most rice and garment export quotas were allocated to state enterprises,
in many instances most of the actual work was subcontracted to private
enterprises and the state enterprise just collected the rent associated with the
quota (see, for example, ADB and IFPRI 1996). Export growth was an important
priority, and steady progress was made in reducing private sector disincentives
to participate in export trade, resulting in significant reductions in the share of
foreign trade handled by centrally managed enterprises.
In the early stages of the reform process, as the trading system and domestic
price system were liberalised, the exchange rate took on greater importance.7
The evolution of foreign exchange policy was both unorthodox and successful.
In contrast to widespread efforts in many developing mixed economies to defend
official exchange rates at unrealistic levels and maintain exchange controls in
the 1970s, the speed and degree of the movement towards uniform exchange
rates and convertibility was remarkable.
The modification of the exchange regime involved a period in which private
and official foreign exchange markets operated alongside each other, with large
gaps between the parallel and official rates. In 1989, a dual foreign exchange
system, with an official and unofficial rate, replaced a complicated system of
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multiple exchange rates. The formal system was based upon obligatory delivery,
in principle, of a variable proportion of hard currency earnings to central
authorities, whilst the large informal system included direct quasi-legal
transactions between businesses, most of which were part of the state sector as
well as an active small scale foreign exchange market, in particular served by
the gold merchants. US dollars were held alongside gold as a monetary ‘store
of value’.
For a time in the late 1980s Vietnamese citizens had been free to hold
dollars. After a period of relative laxity, in 1991 the central authorities attempted
to enforce central control over foreign exchange markets, but without much
success. Even after the holding of dollars and dollar transactions were made
illegal, such activities continued quite openly. Moreover, many domestic
transactions (notably real estate) were denominated in gold, which could be
brought and sold freely in a well-developed free market.
In principle, the Dong remained unconvertible and enterprises that earned
foreign currency were supposed to deposit it with the officially approved banks,
retaining a right to use part. The system of control, however, was weak. The
official foreign payments system was subject to a degree of risk, as banks were
not trusted to honour obligations in hard currency. This encouraged those in
receipt of hard currency to retain control over it, inhibiting development of an
effective official exchange market.
Foreign exchange regulations were persistently and widely violated,8 with
currency not being deposited in banks, interest-bearing accounts being kept
overseas and foreign exchange being used at the discretion of the institutions
which earned it. The dollar circulated freely in the main urban centres and
was used as an alternative, if not precisely legal, medium of exchange.9
It was typical for state enterprises to retain foreign exchange for lending, to
finance joint ventures and even deposit abroad. Numerous attempts to tighten
control over foreign exchange had little effect. Efforts to reduce the use of
foreign currency within Viet Nam and to pressure Vietnamese to deposit foreign
currency holdings in bank accounts were frustrated by the lack of trust in the
banking system and the continuing gap between the state rate and the free
market exchange rate.
Many of the dealers in foreign currency were state units, and their owners
(Ministries and local authorities) were responsible for violations. Rates on the
free market were reported in the official media.
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By 1989 the margin between the official and free market rates was not high
by the standards of many developing countries, although it continued to subsidise
those who were able to gain access to foreign exchange at the official rate.
During 1989, the margin averaged 12.2 per cent; in 1990 it was 9.4 per cent.
The Vietnamese experience illustrated how difficult it is to transform fiscal
and monetary institutions at a stroke and that, irrespective of whether the
rhetoric of ‘big bang’ stabilisation or gradualism is adopted, in practice a degree
of financial instability and inflation is likely to be experienced during the
transition. This suggests the need for second-best macroeconomic strategies,
to live with financial instability and inflation and limit the damage done to
the growth of market institutions. One second-best solution, implicitly accepted
in Viet Nam, was a dual currency system. The free de facto circulation of dollars
and gold not only facilitated foreign trade during the reform period but also
provided a stable basis for transactions during periods of inflation, and by so
doing increased the efficiency of domestic economic transactions.10 Tolerance
of a remarkably free foreign exchange market provided an unorthodox but
effective mechanism for the facilitation of the growth of market transactions in
a period (up to the end of 1991) in which it was not possible to stabilise the
domestic currency supply and price level. Together with the movement of
official exchange rates close to parallel market parity, the remarkable
permissiveness in allowing the circulation of dollars provided a good monetary
basis for the development of market transactions, sustaining growth in the real
economy despite high levels of monetary instability.
NOTES
1 Free market prices tended to be several times higher than official prices.
2 A term much favoured by Vietnamese authorities in describing the Doi Moi process.
3 Already, in the early part of 1989, the availability of imported manufactures in Vietnamese
markets was striking, both as a result of the initiative of state enterprises in speculating in
imports outside their normal business and as a result of smuggling, particularly from China
and Thailand. Large stocks of electrical and electronic equipment were to be seen not only
in the big cities but in provincial centres. Clear evidence of the relatively free availability of
goods at that time was provided by the sight of Soviet advisors returning to Moscow on
Aeroflot flights loaded with consumer durables. The uncontrolled movements of goods
could have slightly bizarre results, as in the case of one provincial trading enterprise in the
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Mekong that had on display a collection of fine French cognac as a result of a whim of the
management, or the quite unwitting sale of t-shirts displaying Rambo, smuggled from
Thailand. The Vietnamese seemed to be quite astute in acquiring tradable commodities
from CMEA trading partners. As a result, one author’s home in Dar es Salaam is furnished
with two charming Czech chandeliers.
4 The management of a state footwear firm, interviewed in Hai Phong in 1989, volunteered
the information that the firm had substantially shifted its market from Eastern to Western
Europe, despite its formal obligation to supply CMEA trading partners. The incentive for
this shift was that the convertible currency generated by this trade was retained by the firm
to fund its activities (including purchases from other state enterprises) rather than being
surrendered to the State Bank as required by regulations.
5 Article 4 of Decree 89-CP (15/12/95), ‘Revoking the Procedures for Granting Export or
Import Permits for each Consignment’, Government Gazette (15/3/96). Decree 33-CP
(19/4/94), ‘State Management of Export-Import Activities’.
6 Up until Decree 89-CP (15/12/95) was issued, traders also had to seek licenses for each
individual shipment.
7 If the prevailing exchange rate does not realistically reflect the relationship between the
domestic price and border prices, then rents will be available to be reaped. Governments
can adopt a range of exchange rate regimes between strict controls and full convertibility,
such as multiple exchange rate systems and selective export earning retention, in the attempt
to influence the pattern of trade.
8 The realities of foreign exchange practice were brought home to both authors on separate
occasions when visiting the State Bank with a senior international official and a number of
government officials in early 1989. While waiting for our appointed interview, the
international official decided to use the time to change dollars for dong at the official
exchange rate. At that point the Vietnamese official reacted almost with alarm, urgently
explaining that the official rate was much lower than the rate offered (illegally) by gold
merchants—an early encounter with the pragmatism of Vietnamese officials.
9 Despite repeated statements of intent and reassertion of regulations, the dollar has remained
as a currency in wide circulation, freely used for transactions.
10 The ‘dollarisation’ of the economy implied by the tolerance under this system was quite
different from the dollarisation of the Argentine economy that ended in crisis in 2002, in
which the peso was held at a fixed exchange rate with respect to the dollar. The cost to
Viet Nam was the state loss of seigniorage on the money supply circulating in the form of
dollars, but that was a reasonable price to pay for the flexibility achieved during the transition.
1VIET NAM’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
By 1991, Viet Nam had made the first important steps to a market economy
with a degree of macroeconomic ‘shock therapy’, but despite initial
achievements, the economy still faced difficult structural problems.
This chapter focuses on the ongoing reform agenda where in 1991 the Party
re-affirmed its commitment to the Doi Moi process and identified
macroeconomic stabilisation as a key priority for socio-economic development
for the years 1992 to 1995. By 1988-89, the Vietnamese authorities
implemented a rigorous policy package in an effort to balance the state budget.
This pursuit of fiscal and monetary stability formed the basis for further reforms
as Viet Nam had started the reform process with a banking system designed
along Soviet lines.
As the Vietnamese economy moved towards a more market-oriented system,
it became apparent that existing financial institutions were inadequate. While
banking reform was cautious, this slow growth of modern banking avoided the
serious risks demonstrated in the performance of other economies in the 1990s.
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8
ONGOING REFORMS: BUILDING THE
INSTITUTIONS FOR MACROECONOMIC
MANAGEMENT
THE ONGOING REFORM AGENDA
When the Seventh Congress met in 1991, significant reforms had already been
implemented. Farmers had been given medium-term land-use rights, prices
and the exchange rate were largely market determined, and laws on foreign
investment, private enterprises, and companies had been enacted. Economic
growth had accelerated to 6 per cent, following a recovery in agriculture and
strong service sector growth as the number of individual and household
businesses increased. Growth in industrial output also accelerated, but mainly
as a result of previous large investments financed by the USSR in the oil and
electricity sector. Exports had increased to four times the level recorded in
1986, reaching just over US$2 billion. Viet Nam had made the first important
steps to a market economy with a degree of macroeconomic ‘shock therapy’
without suffering a period of macroeconomic decline.
The imposition of very tight monetary policies in 1988–89 was initially
remarkably successful.1 In early 1989, prices were substantially decontrolled.
The official exchange rate was adjusted to a level close to the free market rate.
Considerable freedom was allowed in exchanging the dong for foreign currencies,
and in practice widespread circulation of the dollar in local markets was accepted.




Despite these initial achievements, the economy still faced difficult structural
problems. Three commodities (oil, rice and seafood products) dominated
exports, and there were doubts about whether the acceleration in export growth
could be sustained. There was resurgence in inflation, which reached an annual
rate of 67 per cent at the end of 1991, even though it had been brought down
to single digit levels in 1989. The fiscal situation was still fragile, with the
ratio of government revenue to GDP only 13.5 per cent. Total investment, at
15 per cent of GDP, was less than half that of most East Asian economies.
Foreign investment approvals were increasing, but disbursements remained
low. And there were domestic and international concerns about whether initial
economic improvements could be sustained.
The government continued to intervene in micro aspects of investment and
personnel decisions, and sought to limit outside influences on society. The
1980 Constitution provided little protection for the private sector and foreign
investors. While the number of Vietnamese permitted to travel and/or study
in market economies was increasing, travel continued to be heavily restricted,
and few business people and policymakers had been exposed to the development
experiences of market economies. The number of foreigners working in
Viet Nam had increased, but official permission was still needed for internal
travel. Foreign businesses and international agencies were not allowed to recruit
local staff directly. Office facilities, hotels and housing of an international
standard were not available, and the limited facilities that were available were
very expensive. Personal contact between Vietnamese and foreigners continued
to be actively discouraged by some state agencies.
Therefore, after achieving progress with stabilisation and liberalisation over
1989–91, renewed efforts were required to build on the initial growth in trade
and foreign investment and to adjust the role of government still further. And
as the economy was liberalised, the reform agenda shifted to the complex tasks
of building institutions which could provide an effective environment for the
market economy, consolidate the gains already made and sustain the acceleration
in growth.
At the Seventh Congress in July 1991, the Party re-affirmed its commitment
to the Doi Moi process and identified macroeconomic stabilisation as a key
priority for socioeconomic development for 1992–95. This commitment was
made in the face of a difficult external economic situation arising from the loss
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of assistance from the CMEA and the continuation of the embargo. In response
to a sharp resurgence in inflation in the second half of 1990, and declining
exports and budget revenue in 1991, the Party Central Committee placed the
achievement of macroeconomic stability and the reduction of inflation as top
medium-term goals.
The state enterprise sector was to be consolidated to concentrate on key
sectors and the environment for private business was to be improved. Alongside
its commitment to strengthening the market economy, the Party also committed
itself to maintaining progress in the social sectors. Decisions were also taken to
restructure and streamline the government administration and to initiate steps
to revise the Constitution to accommodate these changes. Thus 1991 saw a
renewed political commitment to continue with the next stage of the reform
process.
The next round of reforms also focused on such institutional measures as
the creation of a relevant system of business law, the redefinition of land-use
rights, to the creation of a new fabric of financial institutions and reform of
public administration.
THE PURSUIT OF FISCAL AND MONETARY STABILITY
An important aspect of a government’s role in the market economy is its
management of fiscal and monetary policy and its impact on macroeconomic
stability. In the prelude to reform, the country had verged on hyperinflation,
fed by weak public finances.
Under central planning, government is in principle able to transfer resources
from the enterprise and household sectors through direct control over resource
allocation, incomes and prices. However, the degree to which that was possible
in Viet Nam was limited by the ineffectiveness of the planning system. The
reform process had further weakened control, fuelling macroeconomic
instability, resulting in the very high inflation from the mid 1980s.
Moreover, reforms in the price system and enterprise reform initially weakened
the old fiscal base. With the shift from a centrally planned, state-owned economy
it becomes both less feasible and less desirable to fund the state budget from
transfers of surpluses from state enterprises. It is less feasible because prices
and outputs can no longer be so readily manipulated to generate the required
surplus. It is less desirable because the essence of a decentralised market system
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is that enterprises should control after-tax profits as a key incentive to
performance and as a device to channel investment funds into profitable lines
of activity. The share of revenue from state enterprises in total government
revenue fell from almost 60 per cent in 1990 to around 37 per cent in 1996.
In the reform process, many of the direct instruments of economic control
had to be replaced by indirect instruments, including those of fiscal and
monetary policy, which form the box of tools for macroeconomic policy
implementation in mixed economies. Despite starting from an initial position
of pervasive controls over actors in the economy, it was difficult to put into
place the instruments of fiscal and monetary policy which are a routine feature
of most mixed economies.
One source of difficulty was the interdependence between macroeconomic
reform and changes in the system at the enterprise level. Effective
macroeconomic policy should provide an appropriate environment for
decentralised decision making at the enterprise level, but successful reform of
the state enterprise sector is, in turn, a necessary ingredient for successful
stabilisation.
An objective of reform is to develop an enterprise sector which is not
dependent on state subsidy and is faced with a ‘hard budget’ constraint. In
the Vietnamese case, although the reform of the enterprise sector has been
slow and incomplete, the government was willing to squeeze the state enterprise
sector and accept significant redundancies. However, efforts to tighten access
to subsidies from the state budget were offset to some degree by the weak
credit system. As the government tightened access to budgetary resources,
laxity in the provision of credit to state enterprises ‘softened’ budget constraints.2
As noted above, Viet Nam—like most reforming economies—suffered a bout
of severe inflation during the early stages of the reform process. The monetarist
view that inflation is associated with excessive growth in the money supply can
be taken as a useful starting point for a discussion of fiscal and monetary stability,
but it is also necessary to explore why money supply gets out of control. This
can happen because governments lose control over their own budget and have
to ‘print money’ to accommodate their borrowing requirement. Even if
government can balance the state budget, the borrowing requirements of state
enterprises might also need to be accommodated by expansions in money
supply. This has emerged as a critical factor in most transitional economies.
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In all these cases, the reasons for instability can be seen as either resulting
from the inability of government to take the necessary action to control the
source of the imbalance (for example, the lack of policy instruments needed to
balance the state budget) or the unwillingness of the authorities to take action
because of the undesirable consequences (for example, bankruptcy of state
enterprises, or increases in unemployment). Achieving stability is both a matter
of political will and of the availability of appropriate policy instruments to
translate intentions into practice, as was illustrated by the Vietnamese experience
in attempting to achieve stability.
In 1988–89, the Vietnamese authorities demonstrated the political will to
implement a rigorous IMF-style policy package (without IMF financial
assistance to sweeten the bitter medicine), including positive real interest rates,
drastic exchange rate adjustment and efforts to balance the state budget. An
attempt was made to check inflation through a draconian stabilisation program.
This program had some success but then foundered because of the inability of
the government to control money supply growth. This inability was a
consequence of weaknesses in the government’s fiscal base and the need to
avert a downturn in the real economy in the face of the collapse of trade and
aid with former CMEA countries. A more effective institutional framework
was needed to implement stable fiscal and monetary policies in a market
economy. This task was still only partially completed at the end of 2002,
despite sustained efforts over more than a decade.
At first sight, it should be relatively easy to move from the tight state
disciplines of central planning to the less onerous burdens of tax payment.
However, an effective tax system needs to be built on a foundation of reliable
accounting, experienced tax administration and a reasonable degree of voluntary
compliance, none of which existed at the outset of the reform process.
Viet Nam took steps to create a new tax collection system and to strengthen
central fiscal institutions after 1989, for example through the creation of the
National Treasury system and the National Tax Collection Office and efforts to
broaden the tax base. As part of the overall fiscal reform, towards the end of
1990, Viet Nam introduced new profit and turnover taxes, based on a relatively
simple system, which did not formally discriminate on the basis of ownership,
and steps were taken to introduce an orthodox system of personal income tax.
However, a lack of transparency remained in the system. With persistent
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problems in collection, receipts were slow to build up. Thus, at the early stages
of fiscal reforms, revenues from foreign trade taxes in the 1991 budget were
estimated at 900 billion dong (around US$100 million), compared with a
formal hard currency foreign trade turnover of over US$4 billion.
Strengthening the capacity of the finance ministry has been a gradual process.
Key ongoing issues include the relationship between central and local
government, the extent to which central policymaking is sufficiently informed
by analysis of the economic impact of policy, and corruption in tax
administration. The fashioning of an efficient and equitable tax system is not
merely a matter of an appropriate tax code. The Vietnamese authorities designed
a tax system that in many ways was admirably neutral in its treatment of
public and non-state sectors. To increase fiscal effectiveness, however, tax
assessment needed to be made more predictable. Adequate wages needed to be
paid to tax officials and effective discipline imposed. Ad hoc tax breaks for the
state sector and ‘special taxes’ imposed by local authorities continued. Despite
a fiscal system that is on paper highly centralised, there was (and is) in practice
a considerable degree of provincial autonomy in revenue and spending matters.
Viet Nam also faced difficult challenges in seeking to control public
expenditure. Prior to the resumption of financial assistance from the multilateral
financial institutions in 1993, state resources to meet the considerable needs
for investment and recurrent expenditure in infrastructure, rural development
and the social sectors, were woefully inadequate, especially given the cessation
of Soviet aid.
While the fiscal and monetary systems remained quite crude, they were
used quite effectively by government to maintain a reasonable degree of
macroeconomic stability through the 1990s. For example, the government
responded to the acceleration in inflation towards the end of 1994 and in early
1995 by slowing capital expenditure and tightening the availability of credit.
As a result, inflation declined during the second half of 1995. Another indicator
of success in macroeconomic balance was the reasonable degree of stability in
the exchange rate for Vietnamese dong.
Starting from a very fragile base, there was some success in improving fiscal
performance.3 By 1996 total government budget revenue was estimated to
have risen to 23–24 per cent of GDP. Further improvement in fiscal performance
was set as an important objective. The target was to maintain revenue collection
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at 24 per cent of GDP, and to reduce the fiscal deficit and ensure that it
remained under 5 per cent of GDP, as part of a strategy to contain the rate of
inflation to an annual rate of 10 per cent.
 Restructuring of tax rates and tax administration, reducing and/or abolishing
subsidies and better control over expenditure all contributed to the improved
fiscal performance, which in turn contributed to the sustained reductions in
the level of inflation.
By the mid 1990s, following successful implementation of stabilisation and
initial market-orientated reform measures, the government formulated
development objectives for a longer-term period. In formulating the 1996–
2000 Five-Year Plan, the government issued a series of decisions relating to
sectoral and regional development objectives for the period up to the Year
2010, and then to 2020.
The overall national development objective was defined in terms of the need
to undertake industrialisation and modernisation in order to
build an industrialised country with modern technology and infrastructure, a rational economic
structure, advanced productive relationships consistent with developing productive potential,
high material and intellectual wellbeing, firm national security and defence, a prosperous people,
and an equitable and civilised society (Communist Party of Vietnam 1996a:37).
Slow progress with enterprise and administrative reforms, low efficiency and
competitiveness in domestic production, adverse climatic conditions and the
impact of the regional economic and financial crisis led to rethinking of priorities
and the revision of development plans. The Fourth Party Plenum (December
1997) emphasised that the immediate priorities were ensuring financial sector
and macroeconomic stability and coping with the unfavourable impact of the
regional economic crisis. The Sixth Plenum (October 1998) reaffirmed the
need to sustain reforms focusing on industrialisation and modernisation, give
priority to agricultural and rural industries and to other areas in which
Viet Nam had a comparative advantage, and to increase economic
competitiveness generally. The East Asian economic and financial crisis of 1997–
98 also brought into greater focus the need to address continuing weaknesses
in public finance and the financial system.
The increasing sophistication of the government in managing macroeconomic
policy was demonstrated in 1998–99, when economic growth slackened as a
consequence of the East Asian crisis, but the government swiftly adjusted its
spending program and thereby avoided serious external and domestic instability.
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MONEY AND BANKING REFORM
Efficient financial discipline is dependent on the existence of a financial system
capable of applying good judgement to the provision of credit. Unfortunately,
an effective two tier banking system cannot be created overnight.4
Viet Nam started the reform process with a banking system designed along
Soviet lines. Under central planning systems, the main function of the banking
system was to facilitate transactions and act as a component of the state
accounting system; the banking system was not typically used as an active
instrument of economic policy as macroeconomic aggregates were controlled
directly through the planning system. In principle, any potential inflationary
pressures resulting from excess monetary balances could be repressed by
planning constraints on their use. Moreover, the allocative functions of the
credit system were minimised—resources were allocated directly through the
plan and the function of credit was merely to accommodate the physical
allocations made by the planning system. Credit was allocated administratively
and the interest rate was viewed neither as an allocative device nor as an incentive
to savings. Given the limited functions allotted to monetary institutions, a
banking system based on one tier of banking institutions combining the
functions of central and commercial banks, was sufficient.
As the economy moved towards a more market-oriented system, it became
apparent that existing financial institutions were woefully inadequate. There
was no institutional distinction reflecting the differing functions of a central
bank, responsible for managing monetary aggregates and overseeing key national
policy instruments such as the exchange rate and interest rates, from the
functions of commercial banks, operating to make allocative decisions through
the provision of credit to enterprises and providing a range options for
households and enterprises to hold liquid assets. Needless to say, there was a
virtual absence of any other forms of formal financial intermediation or of
equity markets.
The first step in financial sector reform therefore was the development of a
two-tier banking system with a clear differentiation between the central (state)
bank and commercial banks. The importance given by advocates of reform to
the development of effective commercial banking particularly relates to the
need for a proper financial context for enterprise reform. As enterprises are
given greater autonomy, their access to automatic state subsidies is reduced
and they are exposed to the rigours of the market, a process that lays the
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foundations for enhanced macroeconomic stability. The ‘hard budget constraint’
will be easily thwarted if enterprises have the option of unrestrained access to
bank credits, while the absence of adequate credit facilities can constrain
legitimate business. An effective banking system is therefore needed both to
confront enterprises with the realities of market operation subject to budget
constraints and to provide them with access to financial markets capable of
operating according to market orientated principles.
The creation of a two-tier banking system is one step in the process of
creating a mature, decentralised system of financial intermediation in which
decentralised financial institutions operate autonomously and commercially,
subject only to general banking regulations and directives which set limits
within which they conduct day-to-day business and the learnt principles of
prudent banking practice which provide a guide to business survival.
However, there are dangers in the transition. Newly created commercial banks
may be subject to pressures to provide credit imprudently and may also be
attracted to the potential returns from reckless lending. It may be difficult for
a neophyte central bank to strike the right balance between encouraging
autonomy and maintaining prudent supervision of the new commercial banks.
Failure to control the process can have inflationary consequences and undermine
the effort to expose enterprises to a market environment. An imprudent banking
system can contribute to economic crisis—the East Asian crisis was partly fuelled
by a lengthy period of imprudent bank lending (mainly by private banks).
It is not easy to create a commercial banking system with a sound portfolio
of assets and reasonable profitability at a stroke, and certainly not in the context
of the pressures rising from more general reform measures. Banking depends
on trust and a culture of prudent banking behaviour, which needs to be acquired
and demonstrated over the longer term. While established international banks
can provide immediate access to effective banking, and arguably earlier and
greater involvement of international banks would have been beneficial,
Viet Nam, no more than other countries in the region, could not have been
expected to abandon its commercial banking system to foreign domination.
The practical and political constraints on the smooth development of a more
commercial banking system are demonstrated by Vietnamese experience.
Formally, the basic structure of a market-based financial system emerged
quite quickly. Following reforms in the banking system, the four state-owned
commercial banks were, in principle, required to operate on a profit-making
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basis. In the early 1990s, a number of joint stock banks were also set up, some
of which were in turn owned mainly by other state enterprises. These were
small and operated within the framework of official interest rate policy. There
were also a number of credit cooperatives and housing banks. A number of
branches of foreign banks also opened.
In the early reform years, however, the Vietnamese banking system remained
limited in its technical capacity to handle many basic banking functions, such
as fund transfer, clearing and so on. These inadequacies resulted from technical
weaknesses (absence of modern equipment, and so forth) and limitations in
personnel and basic management skills, aggravated by low wages. The weakness
of the banks can be seen as part of a more general phenomenon.
Even though a number of the key institutions appropriate to a market
economy were put in place, making them work effectively proved difficult in
the face of entrenched interests, established habits of work and a continued
lack of clarity regarding the status of the state sector, especially the rights of
banks to foreclose. As a result, financial discipline was lacking and the
commercial banking system remains in poor shape at the end of 2002, with
both the state and the banks suffering from a large overhang of questionable
assets and unhealthy balance sheets. Financial intermediation remains
ineffective. While an infant stock market now exists, the shares traded are too
few and volumes too small for it yet to be a significant factor.
For some years, state banks in principle received subventions from the state
budget intended to cover the large negative spread between deposit rates and
lending rates, but in practice they were often not paid. Most state banks
continued to lend mainly to the state sector, despite government statements
asserting the need to treat all sectors equally. However, private sector businesses
have been gaining increasing access to credit (Table 8.1).
After 1989, it was necessary to take action to prevent the collapse of a large
number of state enterprises that had suddenly been deprived of access to
subsidised inputs from the Soviet aid program. The financial performance of
banks depended on the gross margin between loan rates and deposit rates, as
well as on the performance of the loans themselves. On both counts, banks in
Viet Nam faced difficulties and there have been sharp fluctuations in real interest
rates.5
Although the state banks lacked the formal professional skills to carry out
proper audits of their customers, they were in many instances well aware of the
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Table 8.1 Allocation of bank lending to enterprises in Viet Nam,
1991–2001 (end of year)
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
            
Lending to state enterprises
Share of total credit 90.0 81.7 66.9 63.0 57.0 52.8 50.0 52.4 48.3 44.9 41.9
Share of dong loans 88.5 75.9 55.7 51.5 44.8 39.6 41.8 48.3 .. .. ..
Share of foreign currency
loans 96.5 97.9 90.7 81.3 76.3 75.8 68.3 61.8 .. .. ..
Lending to private enterprises
Share of total credit 10.0 18.3 33.1 37.0 43.0 47.2 50.0 47.6 51.8 55.1 58.1
Share of dong loans 11.5 24.1 44.3 48.5 55.2 60.4 58.2 51.7 .. .. ..
Share of foreign currency
loans 3.5 2.1 9.3 18.7 23.7 24.2 31.7 38.2 .. .. ..
Source: Derived from data in International Monetary Fund, 2001. Vietnam: Statistical Appendix
and Background Notes, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; and International
Monetary Fund, 2001. Vietnam: Statistical Appendix and Background Notes, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC (and earlier issues).
risks involved. Banks would seek to recoup some of the losses from subsidised
loans to non-viable enterprises by charging potentially profitable enterprises
rates closer to commercial rates. While such cross-subsidisation improved the
balance sheets of the banks, it reduced the efficiency of their role in resource
allocation.
At the start of the 1990s central banking was in its infancy in Viet Nam. In
principle, as early as May 1990 the State Bank of Viet Nam was endowed with
the normal powers and obligations of a central bank in a market economy.
But, given its earlier role, which combined the functions of a central and
commercial bank, the State Bank of Viet Nam had a branch network at province
level, with a high degree of formal branch autonomy, which created the potential
for political pressures for targeted credit to be brought to bear at the provincial
level. The State Bank also continued to have a close relationship with the state
commercial banks, which placed in question for some time the degree to which
the central banking and commercial banking roles had been separated. There
has, however, been a gradual process of training and institutional development,
which has increased the competence of the Vietnamese banks, while the entry
of foreign banks into the Vietnamese economy has increased the sophistication
of banking services available in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
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By 1998, significant improvements had been put in place in the banking
system in providing access to capital for the private sector. Clarification that
state enterprises are limited liability enterprises and the issuance of regulations
restricting government guarantees to state enterprises helped in providing more
equitable access to bank credit. Amendments to the implementing regulations6
for the Land Law to allow companies, cooperatives and private enterprises to
mortgage land-use rights was also important, although land-use rights can
only be mortgaged to Vietnamese banks,7 and banks have concerns about the
difficulties in foreclosing on mortgages to recover bad debts.8 The private sector
frequently cites the insecurity of title to land-use rights as a constraint to
private investment. Despite the remaining impediments to private sector
financing, there has been a marked increase in the share of total bank lending
directed to the private sector in recent years. In 1997, however, the state
enterprise share of total bank credit remained at almost twice the contribution
of state enterprises to GDP, and state enterprises continued to have access to
non-bank state funds.
Over the 1990s, the professional competence of the State Bank of Viet Nam
has steadily improved and it has increasingly been able to establish itself in an
important advisory role to government on macroeconomic policy and as a key
player in ongoing discussions and negotiations regarding the need to undertake
further bank reform and restructuring and refinancing of the commercial
banking system, which is now at the top of the policy agenda.
Banking reform is one area where the critics of the slow pace of Vietnamese
reform may appear to have some justification. Nevertheless, it should also be
noted that while caution resulted in the slow growth of a modern banking
system it also avoided the serious risks demonstrated in the performance of
other economies in the 1990s. Accounts of developments in Russia indicate
how the rapid development of an uncontrolled banking system can be the
source of corruption, crime and severe disorder. Also, a rapid development of
new private banks could have left the economy highly vulnerable to the finance
and banking crisis that accompanied the regional downturn in 1997.
NOTES
 1 The 1989 stabilisation engendered a good deal of international comment and analysis. See
Dollar (2001), Fforde and de Vylder’s ADB study (1996); and Wood (1989) for specific
analyses of the stabilisation measures. See also van Brabant (1990) and Drabek (1990).
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2 However, the concept of the ‘hard budget’ constraint is more ambiguous than rhetoric
might suggest. In market economies, it is typical for firms to have access to credit and for
creditors (including banks) to tide over firms with temporary losses and cash flow problems.
A system which worked without credit would be woefully inefficient. Most enterprises
require access to a credit market, and for the economic system to be efficient that market
should provide access to funds on the base of the application of reasonable financial criteria.
A ‘soft budget’ constraint implies that state enterprises (or, for that matter, private firms)
have access to funds in excess of amounts justified by the application of sound financial
judgements, which ex ante necessarily involves a strong element of judgment, exercised for
example by competing commercial banks and other financial intermediaries.
3 Little information is available on the state budget during the early period of reform. The
estimates here are drawn from IMF sources.
4 Various periods of difficulty faced by financial institutions in many fully developed market
economies (for example, not only in Southeast Asia but even in Japan and the United
States) suggest some of the complexities of creating an efficient credit market.
5 For example, there was a return to negative real rates in 1990 after the positive yield offered
through much of 1989. The interest rates actually charged to state enterprises could be
adjusted according to their viability
6 Article 13 of Decree 85-CP (17/12/96), ‘Guiding Implementation of the Ordinance on
the Rights and Obligations of Domestic Organisations with Land Assigned or Leased Land
by the State’, Government Gazette (28/2/97).
7 Buildings can be mortgaged to both domestic and foreign banks.
8 A mortgage sale generally requires the consent of the government and mortgagor (Circular
217-NHNN (17/8/96) and the sale must be conducted by an authorised body (Article
273(2) of the Civil Code).
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Viet Nam has surprised many observers by rapidly increasing productivity,
accelerating economic output, and expanding its exports to market economies,
despite the dominant role of state enterprise in industry and external trade.
This chapter examines the process of change through the interplay between
formal and informal institutional development.
It focuses on the following: identifying the key actors in the business sector
during the reform process; examining the institutions and law in business and
economic development; providing an overview of institutional reform processes
in Viet Nam and an international perspective on state enterprise reform and
business development; providing an overview of state enterprise reform in Viet
Nam; looking at state and non-state business development in Viet Nam since
Doi Moi as well as state and non-state industrial output from 1995 to 2000;
and highlighting the implications for private business development and state
enterprise reform.
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9
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND BUSINESS
DEVELOPMENT
A pivotal ongoing component of the Doi Moi process has been the response of
key economic actors to market opportunities. Early reforms facilitated increased
contributions from households and businesses to economic activity, generating
higher income and employment and reduced poverty during a period of
profound restructuring of the economy. A strong supply response during the
early stages of reform—especially the sharp jump in output resulting from
increased household investment in agriculture and retail trade—was vital to
macroeconomic stabilisation.
An important part of the ongoing Doi Moi process is the creation of new
market institutions, including a legal framework for business that defines the
accepted forms of business organisation and governs a wide range of business
activities. So far, however, the process of creating many of the components of a
formal legal and administrative environment for the market economy has been
quite slow. In this, as in other areas, the economy has performed well despite
the perceived weaknesses in the formal institutional framework. Changes in
the behaviour of key economic actors have tended to move ahead of the
adjustments to the formal institutional framework. The description of the
process of change therefore emphasises the inter-play between formal and
informal institutional development.
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ACTORS IN VIETNAMESE BUSINESS ACTIVITY
As Viet Nam shifted towards a market economic system, economic performance
increasingly depended on the decentralised decisions of economic actors
responding to an economic environment influenced by public policy and newly
emerging market institutions.
Key actors in the business sector during the reform process were farmers
and other household business, cooperatives, state enterprises, domestic private
enterprises and business involving foreign investment (in Vietnamese
terminology ‘foreign-invested businesses’). State enterprises have been important
actors in larger scale and more formal economic activity, especially in industry,
but the state share of total employment was much smaller than in most centrally
planned economies at the beginning of transition and has fallen further during
the transition period. Households have been important in rural and informal
urban economic business activity and have provided employment for most of
the population. Cooperatives played a role in agriculture, light industry, retail
trade and other services. Formal private enterprises and foreign investors only
became significant economic actors as the transition progressed.
INSTITUTIONS AND LAW IN BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
North argues that institutions1 ‘form the incentive structure of society, and
the economic and political institutions, in consequence, are the underlying
determinants of economic performance’ (1994:360). In particular, institutions
set the ‘rules of the game’ that accommodate and condition the participation
of diverse actors in the economy. Effective institutions provide investors with
confidence that contracts and property rights will be enforced. Such confidence
is critical to ensuring increased investment. The most obvious institutions
affecting business are the formal policies, laws, regulations and administrative
arrangements that attempt to control and influence the behaviour of economic
actors.
Creating an appropriate legal framework will eventually be part of a successful
reform process. In examining the Vietnamese experience, however, it is striking
that improvements in enterprise performance have usually preceded changes
in the legal framework. It should be recognised when evaluating the urgency
and timing of legal reform and the importance of formal legal arrangements
during transition that informal institutions may evolve effectively ahead of the
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endorsement of the arrangements through legislation, while legislation may
not be very effective if it is not in accord with established views and practices.
The Vietnamese experience is consistent with the views of those who
emphasise that ‘law develops over time and in interaction with changes in the
socioeconomic environment’ influencing the nature and content of laws and
legal institutions.2 In other words, market institutions, including formal
legislation, evolve in response to social demand and need. Demand arises because
legal institutions are needed to reduce the transaction costs of conducting
business as economies develop. Legislation often formalises and reinforces
informal arrangements that have emerged in response to need.3
While the importance of legal institutions in economic development is widely
accepted, many attempts to accelerate economic development by transplanting
laws have not produced the expected results (Berkowitz et al. 2000). John
Gillespie has argued that the uneven reception of imported law in Viet Nam is
consistent with experiences elsewhere in East Asia (Gillespie 2001a).
In the history of developed countries, most market institutions, including
formal legislation, evolved in response to social demand. As an economy becomes
larger, more open and complex, the demand for formal institutions to reduce
risk and the transaction costs of conducting business increases. As the role of
large private businesses increases, both national and foreign, the need for a
more effective legal system—and for administrative practices (including tax
administration) that are rule based rather than discretionary—also increases.
While formal business laws in market economies have tended to converge,
attitudes to law and the role of key institutions still differ widely. This affects
the way laws are implemented, and thus impacts on business decisions and
economic behaviour. While formal institutions may remain in place, even if
there is no demand,4 informal institutions will only be sustained if supported
by society. The sudden introduction of formal institutions can also undermine
the effectiveness of informal arrangements.5
Informal understandings and interpretation are particularly important in
developing and transition economies, where formal rules may not yet have
adjusted to new economic needs and where formal institutions for enforcing
formal rules remain weak and unpredictable, resulting in erratic enforcement.
Even in relation to government regulations, informal understanding and
interpretation of the intentions of government can be as important an influence
on business behaviour as the formal ‘rules of the game’.
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Viet Nam’s experience is consistent with a view that the formal legal institutions
do not uniquely determine enterprise behaviour.6 Even in rule-based societies,
most contract and property disputes are settled informally (Pistor 1999), and
politics can affect the way rules are interpreted.7 Informal institutions (social
practice and behaviour, and pressures to conform) provide alternative mechanisms
for protection of property and rights. Informal institutions play an important
role in all economies, including the most developed economies, and the relative
roles differ from country to country and within countries (Berkowitz et al.
2000). Informal institutions linked to reputations have played an important
role in more developed East Asian market economies (Pistor and Wellons 1999),8
where recognition that a reputation is important to securing future business
transaction provided strong incentives for performance. Pistor argues that
[t]he concept of law as infrastructure fails to realise that formal law is but one set of institutions
that govern behaviour. Where formal and informal institutions evolve over time, they tend to
complement each other. In the context of a political or economic regime change, however,
formal and pre-existing informal institutions compete. Formal law may be rejected or ignored
and substituted with informal institutions that operate independently of and frequently in
contradiction to the formal legal system (Pistor 1999:2).
While arguing that ‘there is empirical evidence showing that the rule of law
does contribute to a nation’s wealth and its rate of economic growth’, Richard
Posner (a Chief Judge of the US Court of Appeals) argues that ‘even very wide
deviations from this capitalist rule-of-law ideal may not seriously compromise
economic efficiency’ (Posner 1998:2–3).
Even in economies with highly elaborate systems of commercial law, segments
of the economy may operate on the basis of informal agreements, where there
is a long-established trust between the contracting parties. The limitation is
that under informal arrangements transaction costs are lower for those who are
members of such informal networks than for outsiders, for whom a legally
enforceable contractual system may be seen as a necessity.
In the case of Vietnam, the tendency of informal change to precede legislation
and for business and government to engage in de facto arrangements to
accommodate new norms of business behaviour may well have a differential
impact on businesses, between those better able to understand and handle
such an environment, with its uncertainties and need to cement informal
relationships through discrete (and illegal) financial transfers, and those more
at home in a more transparent legal environment.9
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Viet Nam can draw on differing legal traditions in framing its new laws.
Some observers argue that legal heritage impacts on institutional and economic
development. Islam and Montenegro cite studies that argue that ‘countries
with French legal heritage have consistently poorer institutional quality than
those with other legal traditions. It is argued that French civil law countries
have been characterised by more interventionist and formal government
apparatus’ (2002:3). While French law had a major impact in the colonial era
of Viet Nam, there was a long hiatus when the legal system was influenced
more by Soviet thinking. Since the beginning of Doi Moi, Viet Nam has sought
to learn from the business regulatory environments in neighbouring countries
and OECD members, and from the experiences of other transition economies.
The view adopted in this study is that, although a well designed, clearly
defined, generally accepted and enforceable system of laws is an optimal goal
for the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs, solutions exist that fall
short of being optimal but are nonetheless workable. Differences in performance
between systems may therefore depend more on the characteristics of the second-
best solutions that emerge, which may involve informal arrangements and
behaviour which by-pass inappropriate rules and regulations to establish
workable ways of maintaining orderly business arrangements even in the absence
of the certainties implied by the term ‘rule of law’.
OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROCESSES IN
VIET NAM
During the reform process in Viet Nam changes in formal rules have often
responded to a spontaneous process of institutional development,
accommodating changes in informal practices. This has critical implications
for interpretations of the Vietnamese experience. On the one hand, the
development and behaviour of businesses, both private and publicly owned,
often moved ahead of reforms in policy, and informal stratagems were often
effective in by-passing unhelpful formal constraints (McMillan and Woodruff
1999a, 1999b). Even within the state sector, corporate behaviour was varied
and not easily characterised by reference to formal arrangements.
But first, it will be useful to highlight the most important formal legal
changes. The 1992 Constitution was a milestone in laying the foundations for
a private sector to compete with the state sector (Government of Vietnam
1992:18–19). The Constitution provided guarantees against nationalisation
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(Article 23), stated that foreign investment and trade were to be encouraged
(Articles 24 and 25), and specified that state enterprises should be run
autonomously and be accountable for their performance (Article 19). Moreover,
the Constitution stated that
[t]he aim of the state’s economic policy is to make the people rich and the country strong, to
satisfy to an ever greater extent the people’s material and spiritual needs by releasing all productive
potential, developing all latent possibilities of all components of the economy—the state sector,
the collective sector, the private capitalist sector, and the state capitalist sector in various forms—
pushing on with the construction of material and technical bases, broadening economic, scientific,
technical cooperation and expanding intercourse with world markets (Article 16).
It also noted that
[i]n the private individual and private capitalist sectors, people can adopt their own way of
organising production and trading; they can set up enterprises of unrestricted scope in fields of
activity which are beneficial to the country and the people (Article 21).
There are areas where legal development has been important. The most
important formal laws governing business introduced under Doi Moi are
presented in Table 9.1. Legal developments have been very important in
attracting foreign investment and have provided a strong signal to domestic
investors that the government is serious in pursuing its stated intention to
move towards a market-based allocation of resources, and a rules-based system
of state management. The business community was receptive to some key
pieces of legislation, most notably in the response to the Enterprise Law, which
exceeded most expectations in terms of new business registrations.
STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Up until a couple of decades ago, the mainstream development profession
tended to identify a potentially important role for state enterprises as
development (even entrepreneurial) institutions. Megginson and Netter recently
argued that ‘25 years ago proponents of state ownership could have just as
easily surveyed the postwar rise of state owned enterprises and concluded that
their model of economic organisation was winning the intellectual battle with
free-market capitalism’ (Megginson and Netter 2001:321). Multilateral
financial institutions actively encouraged the development of state-owned
development banks, financed state-owned industries, and supported the
development of state-owned utilities. This support was not based on a
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Table 9.1 Formal laws governing business entities
Law Dates law approved Categories of business entities
and amended or repealed or arrangements addressed
Companies Enacted December 1990 Joint-stock companies
Amended June 1994 Private limited liability
Replaced January 2000  companies
Private Enterprises Enacted December 1990 Private unlimited liability
Amended June 1994 enterprises
Replaced January 2000
Enterprise Law Approved April 1999 All private enterprises
Enacted January 2000 Allows state enterprises to be
incorporated
State Enterprises Approved April 1995 Entities with state invested
capital (state corporations,
public service enterprises, and
business enterprises)
Cooperatives Approved March 1996 Cooperatives
Financial Institutions Approved November 1997 Banks and other financial
institutions
Insurance services Approved May 2000 Entities providing insurance
Bankruptcy Law Approved December 1993 All business entities
Commercial Code Approved May 1997 All business entities
Environmental Protection December 1993 All business entities
Land Law Approved December 1987 Applies differently to different
Amended November 1993 entities
Amended December 2001
Labour Code Approved June 1994 Applies (but not equally) to all
entities
Mining March 1996 All relevant business entities
Promotion of Domestic June 1994 All domestically owned business
Investment Amended April 1998 entities
Foreign Investment Approved December 1987 Joint-venture entities
Amended June 1990 Foreign-owned entities
Amended December 1992 Business cooperation contracts
Amended April 1997 Build-operate-transfer projects
Amended May 2000
Source: Central Institute for Economic Management/United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), 2001. Improving the Regulatory Environment for Business, Project Document VIE/
01/025, United Nations Development Programme, Hanoi (unpublished).
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particularly pro-state ideological view, but reflected a widely held pragmatic
view that this would accelerate development investment levels above those
that were likely to be achieved by relying solely on the private sector.10
The balance of conventional wisdom changed in the 1980s partly because
of sharp ideological shifts, particularly in the United States and the United
Kingdom, and partly because of pressures to improve fiscal balances and to
increase economic efficiency. There was increasing support for the view that
state ownership was only justified where there was a clear case of market failure
that could not be addressed by less drastic interventions. Megginson and Netter
argued that ‘privatisation now appears to be accepted as a legitimate—often a
core—tool of statecraft of more than 100 countries’ (2001:321).
The influences at work that redefined views about the proper relationship
between the state and the market included
• the obvious failures in the former CMEA economies
• a record of inefficiency and mismanagement of state enterprises in many
developing countries
• a growing perception that government involvement in business distracted
the attention of governments from their core responsibility
• ideological shifts in many OECD economies
• technological developments that allowed competition in markets that were
traditionally seen as natural monopolies (for example, telecommunications).
The most persuasive case against state enterprises is that they are unlikely to
face pressures to perform because, unlike private business, they are not faced
with a ‘hard budget constraint’ (Kornai 1992). The market forces private
businesses to perform by the ultimate sanction of failure if they are persistently
unable to cover costs. In contrast, access to state subsidies, either directly from
the state budget, or indirectly from state banks, means that state enterprises
are not subject to the discipline of market forces.
The sceptical view on state enterprises argued that not only are they insulated
from market pressures to perform efficiently, but they may also be subject to
pressures to pursue goals other than efficient business operations. They may
be instructed to pursue multiple (sometimes conflicting) objectives. In
particular, state business enterprises can be subject to pressure from politicians,
governments and interest groups to pursue unprofitable activities. While the
case for subsidy is typically argued by reference to some legitimate social
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objective, the reality is that state enterprises can be used to further sectional
interests, or to provide ‘rents’ to interested parties, often in a non-transparent
fashion. In effect, state enterprises are often neither accountable to the market,
nor to an efficient system of public supervision.11
Fashions change. With the increasing emphasis among development agencies
in targeting poverty reduction directly, and growing recognition of the need
for state intervention to support more equitable economic development, there
appears to be a shift back towards a more sympathetic middle-ground vision of
the important complementary role the state plays in a market economy. Rodrik
suggests that there has been a major change in thinking from the ‘Washington
consensus’ of the 1980s, where the priority was on ‘rolling back the state, not
making it more effective’ (2000:1–2), and argues that the poor response to
price reform and privatisation in Russia, and dissatisfaction with the impact of
market reforms in much of Latin America, has contributed to this re-think. He
argues that there is an emerging consensus on the need to improve the efficiency
of the state as an essential complement to the market economy.
Others, arguing for a cautious path to reform, point to the social upheaval
and lawlessness following rapid privatisation in Eastern Europe. Stiglitz argues
‘that the destruction of social and organisational capital in the process of
transition…may have played an important role in the failures in Russia and
some of the other countries of the former Soviet Union’ (1999b:7).
A recent World Bank study on ten years of transition experience in the
former USSR and Eastern Europe also recognised the need for caution,
concluding that policymakers ‘face a difficult choice between (i) privatisation
to ineffective owners in a context of weak corporate governance, with the risk of
expropriation of assets and income of minority shareholders, and (ii) continued
state ownership in the face of inadequate political commitment to transparent
privatisation outcomes and limited institutional capacity to prevent asset
stripping by incumbent enterprise managers’ (World Bank 2002:xxviii).
The same report emphasises the importance of the business environment as
much as the form of ownership, noting that
[c]reating an environment that disciplines old enterprises into releasing assets and labour and
encourages new enterprises to absorb those resources and undertake new investments without
tilting the playing field in favour of any particular enterprises, is central to economic growth
(World Bank 2002:xix).
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OVERVIEW OF STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM IN VIET NAM
Whatever the international debate, there are certainly examples in Viet Nam
that lend strong support to the case for state enterprise reform, and for state
enterprise divestiture. Overall, state enterprises have absorbed a large share of
capital, but generated less output and less employment per unit of investment
than other sectors. Despite strong output growth, state enterprise employment
fell during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and only recorded very modest
growth subsequently. Moreover, there are regular reports in the domestic press
of cases of inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption associated with state
enterprises.
This, however, is not the whole story. Experience with individual state
enterprises is variable. Some state firms adjusted remarkably quickly to the
requirements of the market economy, in contrast to others that continue to
operate inefficiently, surviving through state protection and (often hidden)
subsidies, and others that largely ceased operations. With state enterprises
dominating exports and industrial output, Viet Nam’s impressive economic
performance during the early transition period would not have been possible
without strong performance by a significant segment of the state enterprise
sector. State enterprises made an important contribution to recent economic
growth and remain an important source of government revenue.
A crucial aspect of growth performance in Vietnam in the 1990s was that,
although the state enterprises expanded rapidly, they did not ‘crowd out’ the
growth of the non-state sector in most sub-sectors. The share of state enterprises
in official national output estimates actually increased in the period up to
1997, even though this was a period of such dynamic growth in private activities
that visitors returning to Viet Nam in the late 1990s after a decade away could
readily assume that there had been a decisive shift in the balance of the economy
towards the non-state sector. In the late 1980s, the visitor would have stayed
in a state-run hotel, eaten at state-run restaurants, been entertained at a state-
run night club, hired a car from a state-run company, and bought basic
consumer requirements from a state store or cooperative. By 1997, a typical
visitor would have obtained such services from domestic private and foreign-
invested enterprises (the latter enterprise often a joint-venture in which the
state retained a minority interest).
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STATE AND NON-STATE BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT IN
VIET NAM SINCE DOI MOI
Data inconsistencies and inadequacies make it impossible to present a precise
statistical picture of the changes in the economy from official sources, but
there have been a number of clear trends. During the early stages of Doi Moi,
there was an acceleration in growth of output from farm households and
household business (mostly trade and simple processing), and this growth has
been sustained over much of the Doi Moi period.
The state sector recorded modest growth in the first years of Doi Moi, but
output (and state employment) declined sharply in 1989 and 1990. There
was a rapid build-up of foreign investment, and a recovery in growth in state
enterprise output, in the early 1990s. With the fast growth in larger-scale
production, domestic private businesses’ (including households) share of total
output declined during the early 1990s, but continued to be the major source
of employment growth. The role of cooperatives in agriculture, retail and other
service industries dropped sharply during the early stages of reform as many
cooperative activities and resources were transferred to the private sector.
A cyclical turning point was reached in 1997. Even before the onset of the
Asian financial crisis, approvals of foreign direct investment (FDI) were
declining, and FDI inflows dropped sharply following the onset of the East
Asian financial crisis, although output resulting from FDI continued to increase
at faster rate than other sectors. As the formal barriers to domestic private
sector activity were lifted in the late 1990s, there was a sharp jump in the
number of formal domestic private enterprises, and initial estimates indicate
that the domestic private sector recorded higher growth than the state sector
in 2001. Official data on state and non-state sector growth rates are presented
later in Figure 12.1.
Interpreting the data is tricky, given the incentives and opportunities to
under-report private sector output, but according to official series state sector
output growth equalled or exceeded private sector growth in most years in the
decade to 1997, except for 1989 and 1990 when state output suffered from
the collapse of economic cooperation arrangements with the former USSR.
The surprising conclusion from these data is that the state’s share of official
GDP increased over much of the reform period,12 despite reductions in barriers
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Figure 9.1 GDP growth, 1986–2000






























115INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
to private sector investment, and increased competition, including strong
competition resulting from a much more open external trade regime.
Changes in the balance of ownership have not been uniform across sector
and industries. At the sectoral level, state and cooperative involvement in the
agricultural sector and most retail businesses is now negligible. Cooperatives
no longer play a pervasive role in the economy, but play more limited roles in
marketing activities in some areas such as handicrafts. The state sector share of
retail activity has declined. Although the state share of industrial output has
declined in recent years, it remains higher than it was at the beginning of Doi
Moi. The household and cooperative share of industrial output has declined
over the transition period. The formal domestic private sector is just beginning
to emerge, but plays a significant role in some industry and service groups, as
discussed later in this chapter.
The strong growth in state enterprise output distinguishes Viet Nam’s reform
experience from the experiences of most transition economies, and the
experiences of most East and Southeast Asian economies. Moreover, growth
was initially accompanied by declining state enterprise employment, and later
by only modest growth in state employment, indicating significant
improvements in output per worker in state enterprises.13 Official figures
indicate that output per state enterprise worker increased 3 times from 1995
to 1995, and by about another 25 per cent from 1995 to 2000. In interpreting
these data, it should be noted that a substantial part of the early productivity
increases resulted from formally laying off workers who were already not working.
There may also have been an increase in sub-contracting work to the emerging
private sector. Nevertheless, it is also clear that there have been significant
improvements in state enterprise productivity since the Doi Moi process started.
STATE AND NON-STATE INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, 1995–2000
In the second half of the 1990s, the relative output performance of the ownership
groups grew more in line with expectations regarding the results of reform
(Table 9.2). The state share of industrial output declined from just over 50 per
cent to 42 per cent (in constant 1994 prices), the share of the domestic private
sector declined from almost 25 per cent to just over 22 per cent, and the share
of foreign invested enterprises increased from 25 per cent to 35 per cent. State
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and private sector industrial output both recorded solid growth over this period
(58 per cent and 72 per cent respectively), but output from foreign invested
projects grew much more rapidly, increasing by 168 per cent.
Mining accounted for about 13.5 per cent of the value of total industrial
output. Foreign investors dominated mining. Foreign capital in oil and gas
alone accounted for 11.2 per cent of industrial output in 2000. Coal (mostly
state) and precious stones are the only other significant mining activities, each
accounting for about 1 per cent of total industrial output.
Manufacturing accounted for about 80.5 per cent of industry in both 1995
and 2000, but there was a drop in the share of state manufacturing, from 42
per cent to 34 per cent. The share of domestic private manufacturing declined
from about 24 per cent to 22 per cent, while the share of foreign invested
manufacturing increased from nearly 15 per cent to just over 24 per cent.
There were marked declines in the share of food processing, tobacco, textiles
and wood products, and increases in garments, leather goods, rubber, plastics,
electrical machinery, computer and office equipment, and transport equipment.
State enterprises continued to account for virtually all of the nearly 6 per cent
of industrial valued added from electricity, gas and water supply.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AND
STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM
Viet Nam has surprised many observers (the authors included) by rapidly
increasing productivity, accelerating economic output, and rapidly expanding
its exports to market economies, despite the dominant role of state enterprise
in industry and external trade. Most donors had been advising the government
that an increased private sector role was essential for sustaining economic growth
and reducing poverty.14 The strong state enterprise performance therefore needs
to be analysed.
The strong state enterprise performance was undoubtedly due in part to
preferential treatment and access to resources, the low starting base, restrictions
on competition (especially in the earlier periods of reform), and the weak
governance and accountability mechanisms which have meant that many state
enterprises managers face strong personal incentives to expand output and
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turnover. Under-reporting of private sector activity also affects the picture of
relative sectoral growth.
Some of the larger scale industries dominated by state firms increased their
share in total production (for example, power, building materials, and
telecommunications) as a secular phenomenon at this stage of Vietnamese
development. The rapid build-up in official development assistance and FDI
has also boosted state enterprises in the power, water supply, construction,
and construction material sectors. In addition, during the early 1990s, the
output of state-owned heavy industry expanded as a result of earlier investments
(most notably Soviet investments in oil and power development).
In the lighter industrial and processing sectors, state enterprises continued
to benefit from protection provided by the state (for example, in garments and
in key agricultural commodities, through preferential access to export quotas).
Some state firms achieved genuine competitive successes in export markets,
including in joint ventures with private foreign investors.
By contrast, agriculture, the sector with the highest proportion of private
(household) activity, grew more slowly than the overall average. Although
buoyant growth was achieved in historical and international comparative terms,
the expected secular trend is for the proportion of agriculture in total output
to decline as the economy grows.
Despite the above points, the relatively effective performance of state
enterprises in Viet Nam needs further explanation, particularly in light of
conventional wisdom regarding the ineffectiveness of state enterprises and the
failure of state enterprises with similar preferential treatment in other developing
countries. This raises a number of important questions.
• What special factors, if any, contributed to strong state enterprise
performance in Viet Nam?
• Can this strong performance be sustained in the future?
• Why has the private sector taken so long to develop, especially in the
industrial sector?
• Are there lessons to be learned that can be replicated elsewhere?
Much of the material in the following chapters in this section is an attempt
to answer these questions.
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NOTES
1 Institutions as defined by North ‘Institutions are the humanly defined constraints that
structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws,
constitutions) and informal constraints (e.g. norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed
codes of conduct) and their enforcement characteristics’ (1994:360).
2 Pistor and Wellons (1999) identify this approach with the work of the eighteenth century
economist Adam Smith and the nineteenth century German sociologist Max Weber.
3 For example, in the development of land law in many countries, legislation has included
formalising and accommodating customary tenure arrangements that have developed
historically.
4 Pistor notes that informal institutional arrangements in East Asia, which had been seen as
a source of stability, became ‘increasingly regarded as an impediment for future economic
development. While many formal rules had long been on the books, a demand for them
was created only with the economic regime change, which in some cases (Korea, Taiwan)
was accompanied by a political regime change’ (Pistor 1999:6).
5 Messick argues that attempts to impose formal institutions can even be counterproductive
noting that ‘a variety of studies, in settings as diverse as medieval Europe and contemporary
Asia, show that informal mechanisms based on incentives provided by repeat dealings can
ensure the performance of contracts that no court has the power to enforce. One early, and
surprising, finding of this research is that in some instances the sudden introduction of a
formal mechanism to resolve legal disputes can disrupt informal mechanisms without
providing offsetting gains’ (Messick 1999:118).
6 Pistor argues that Asian experiences show that economic development is possible even
when rational legal systems play a subordinate role: ‘For much of the period of high speed
economic growth in East Asia since the late 1950s, the law that had much earlier been
transplanted from the West played only a marginal role…It was supplemented by negotiated
bargains between governments and business elites, as well as by rulings and decrees issued
by the executive which had extensive discretionary powers. Large parts of the society
remained outside the realm of formal law. Private transactions were governed by customary
rules and disputes settled out of court’ (Pistor 1999:5).
7 Upham (2001:19) notes that while both George W. Bush and Al Gore promised in the
2000 US elections to maintain the rule of law ‘they also each promised to appoint judges
who would support certain positions on abortion, affirmative action, and other highly
politicized issues’.
8 See also Van Arkadie (1990) for a more general discussion of the interplay between formal
and informal institutions.
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9 One may speculate that the disproportionate weight of foreign investors from the region
may not only reflect geographical proximity but also the greater ease with which firms
from the region adapted to the Vietnamese environment.
10 There were counter views—for example the case against state enterprises was put vigorously
by Peter Bauer (for example, see Bauer and Yamey  1957:155–61), but in the 1960s and
1970s such views were in the minority and tended to be viewed as away from the
mainstream.
11 The fact that this line of argument is so universally popular among the staff of multilateral
funding institutions may be that the description fits so well the lack of accountability and
‘hard budget constraints’ in their own organisations (which are enterprises owned by many
states, and which are themselves asked to achieve multiple objectives).
12 The jump in the state share in 1995 is partly due to a shift in constant prices from 1989
prices to 1994 prices, but even allowing for this the trend remains the same.
13 As with all data on Viet Nam, this table should be seen as indicative. Estimates of state
enterprise employee numbers were reported separately prior to 1995. From 1995, state
enterprises employees are estimated as total state employees, minus state employees working
in science and technology, state management and national defence and public security,
education and training, health and social relief, culture and sport, activities of the Party
and mass organisations, and community and personal services. Moreover, different official
statistics give quite different estimates of output levels and growth prior to 1995.
14 World Bank (1995a:xii) warned that ‘[o]verwhelming international evidence indicates that
there are limits to what reform without divestiture of non-strategic enterprises can accomplish
and sustain. Divestiture of non-strategic state enterprises will be critical to encourage entry
by private business in productive sectors’
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STATE ENTERPRISES
STEP-BY-STEP STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM
In contrast to the rapid progress in divesting land-use rights for agriculture,
forestry and aquaculture, the approach to state enterprise reform has been
cautious. Before 1998, the only substantial divestiture of whole enterprises
was the relatively rapid liquidation and/or mergers of (mostly small) non-
viable enterprises from 1991 to 1994. The equitisation1 program adopted by
the Seventh Party Congress in 1991 made particularly slow progress, with
only 14 small and medium sized enterprises equitised by September 1997
(Communist Party of Vietnam 1991a).
More rapid progress was made in sharpening the incentives facing state
enterprises by hardening the budget constraint and introducing competition
(both domestic and through foreign trade). This had a positive impact on
enterprise productivity, with substantial reduction in state enterprise
employment during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
While reforms in the ownership of state enterprises moved at a slow pace,
the negative consequences have not been as apparent as many external
commentators had predicted. Characteristics of the sector that may have
mitigated expected negative consequences include the following factors
• state enterprises accounted for a relatively small share of national




• there were relatively few large-scale, capital intensive state enterprises.
Most enterprises were decentralised geographically with considerable
management discretion enjoyed by the diverse ‘owning’ agencies within
the national and lower level branches of government
• sound macroeconomic management limited government budget resources
to subsidise state enterprises, thus hardening budget constraints
• Viet Nam did not experience the institutional collapse that occurred in
Eastern Europe. Despite limited formal legal infrastructure, property rights
and basic rules governing commercial relationships continued to be enforced
• foreign direct investment was encouraged to introduce new capital,
technology and marketing skills to state enterprises
• early reforms were introduced to increase competitiveness and improve
incentive structures, including trade liberalisation, property right reforms
(for example, long-term land-use rights), and the relaxation and subsequent
abolition of official price controls (Mallon 1998b:14–15).
STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM FROM DOI MOI UP UNTIL THE
EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS
2
The need to improve the efficiency of, and incentives for, state enterprises was
a recurring subject of development policy debate well before Doi Moi was
announced. Lengthy sections of resolutions from past Party Congresses had
been devoted to options for improving state enterprise efficiency. This reflected
the strong commitment for the state, and state enterprises, to play a leading
role in the nation’s development.
The strong commitment to a leading role for the state was maintained in
policy statements throughout the early Doi Moi period, but in recent years
there has been somewhat less emphasis on the contribution of state enterprises,
and a gradually increasing emphasis on a role for private domestic investors in
the nation’s long-term development. Elements of the state enterprise reform
program during the early Doi Moi period included
• commercialisation to increase efficiency
• re-registration, restructuring and liquidation
• pilot equitisation
• establishing the basis for leasing and divestiture
• developing a legal framework (including the Law on State Enterprises)
• development of enterprise groupings (state corporations).
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Commercialisation of state enterprises
Promulgation of Decree 217 in late 1987 marked the first post Doi Moi step
towards a broad-based state enterprise reform program aimed at placing state
enterprises on a commercial footing, with increased autonomy and financial
responsibility.3 This decree put into effect a Party Resolution4 to give greater
autonomy to state enterprises and to introduce a ‘socialist cost-accounting
regime’. Subsequent implementing regulations further clarified relationships
between government agencies and state enterprises under the new system.5
While ‘the people’ retained ownership of state enterprises, enterprise assets were
‘placed under the direct management and utilisation of the collective of workers
and the director for the development of production and business’.6 Employees
were to remain ‘masters of the enterprise’—approval of a general meeting of
employees would still be required for decisions on major issues such as
development strategies, annual business plans (which must also be approved
by government agencies), profit distribution and employee welfare policies.
Important changes introduced under Decree 217 included
• the introduction of a profit based accounting system. Profits were to be
assessed based on actual costs and revenues (not on plan directives)
• replacement of physical output targets with profit targets for most
enterprises. Physical output targets were to be limited to the production
of goods of ‘strategic importance’
• increased autonomy for enterprise managers in production, personnel
and financial decision making
• abolition of budgetary support as well as the state supply of inputs, and
restrictions on selling in the open market
• limitation of subsidies to on-lending through state-owned commercial
banks. Bank credit was to be provided to state enterprises on a commercial
basis
• allowing enterprises, except those with high levels of public investment,
to retain depreciation charges.
A crucial change was the introduction of economic contracts as the basis for
transactions between business entities. Economic arbitration offices were
established to assist in enforcing contracts.7 State enterprises had to purchase
inputs directly from suppliers, rather than being supplied by the state. Except
for a few products that had to be sold at government mandated prices,8 state
enterprises could sell on the open market.
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Initially, only large-scale state enterprises were permitted to undertake direct
external trade and were legally able to retain only a portion of foreign exchange
earnings,9 but subsequent reforms, aimed at boosting exports, relaxed restrictions
on state enterprise capacity to engage in external trade.10 Follow-up regulations
helped define an economic role for state enterprises independent of the broader
functions of government,11 to clarify corporate governance provisions12 and to
permit state enterprises to enter joint ventures and forms of economic cooperation
with other entities, including private enterprises and foreign investors.13
Increased autonomy, harder budget constraints, and improved profit
incentives contributed to significant restructuring of state enterprises. Pressures
to restructure intensified with the cessation of economic aid from, and trade
with, the former socialist bloc countries in Eastern Europe over 1990–91.
While Decree 217-HDBT was a turning point, serious problems persisted. In
May 1990, the government initiated a review of the early experience with state
enterprise reform to assess the need for further reform.14 With harder budget
constraints and increased competition—between state enterprises, with the
emerging private sector, and from imports—the numbers of loss-making
enterprises also increased. There were growing concerns about the lack of
accountability for the use of state assets and the rapid increase in numbers of
state enterprises, particularly at the local level. There was also concern that
decision making was constrained by ambiguity and inconsistency in regulations,
and overlapping responsibilities between management and government agencies.
Following this review, the Seventh Party Congress in 1991 noted that
…the weakest aspect of the state-run sector as a whole remains its inefficiency in business
operations. A fairly large number of state-run industrial enterprises, especially those under district
management, are beset with difficulties. Many state-run trading enterprises have made losses:
quite a few have been misused by private businessman for illegal activities (Communist Party of
Vietnam 1991a:77).
The Seventh Party Congress renewed the commitment to greater state
enterprise autonomy, and an expanded private sector role, stating that
all enterprises, regardless of the system of ownership, should operate in accordance with a system
of autonomy in business, co-operation and competition, and are equal before the law…The
private capitalist sector is to develop without limits in terms of scale and location in sectors and
professions that are not prohibited by law (Communist Party of Vietnam 1991a:154).
While the Party still maintained that state enterprises were to continue to
play a leading role in the economy, there were also calls for consolidation of the
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state enterprise sector, including the liquidation of non-viable enterprises and
the equitisation of non-strategic state enterprises. Subsequently, the government
introduced a second round of reforms.
Re-registration, reorganisation and liquidation of state enterprises
The decentralisation of authority to establish state enterprises under Decree
217-HDBT was followed by a proliferation of new state enterprise registrations,
particularly at the local level. Local authorities had strong incentives to establish
new state enterprises because they were able to exercise greater discretion in
using state enterprise resources than they could with other state resources.
However, increasing reports of financial failure and irregularities prompted
government action to strengthen central control over state enterprises.
A second round of reforms started in 1991 which focused on reorganising
and consolidating the state enterprise sector. The government issued a decree
in November 1991 requiring all state enterprises to re-register or close.15 The
decree specified criteria for establishing state enterprises, with commercial
viability the main criterion for non-strategic enterprises.16 Minimum legal
capital requirements were specified for different categories of state enterprises.
Authority for approving the establishment of state enterprises was limited to
the Prime Minister, Minister, or Chairman of the Provincial or Municipal
People’s Committee depending on the scale and/or nature of the enterprise.
State agencies, and/or organisations with state management functions, were
not allowed to operate as state enterprises.
When that Decree was issued, there were an estimated 12,297 state
enterprises (Nguyen Ngoc Tuan et al. 1995:2). By 1 April 1994, 6,264 state
enterprises had been re-registered. The reduction in state enterprise numbers
was achieved through liquidation (about 2,000) and mergers (about 3,000).
Increases in average capital of state enterprises reflected the ongoing revaluation
of state enterprise assets and mergers, and the impact of growth in investment
in the state enterprise sector from domestic sources and joint ventures with
foreign investors.
Most liquidated and merged enterprises were small locally managed state
enterprises with less than 100 employees and 500 million dong in capital
(about US$45,000 at that time). The assets of liquidated enterprises were
generally sold to bidders from either the state or private sector. Total assets of
liquidated enterprises accounted for less than 4 per cent of total state enterprise
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assets and about 5 per cent of state enterprise turnover (Tran Ngoc Trang
1994). Money raised from the liquidation of state enterprises was first used to
pay outstanding debts and surplus funds were transferred to the state budget.
In March 1994, instructions were issued for a second phase of re-
registration.17 All re-registered state enterprises would continue to be monitored
to ensure compliance with their certificate of registration. The new decision
also required all umbrella entities, such as unions of enterprises and state
corporations, to be registered as commercially viable business entities or be
dissolved. The process of mergers and liquidation under the second phase of
the re-registration process led to further, more modest declines in the number
of state enterprises, to an estimated 5,500 at the end of 1997.
Equitisation and divestiture
The Seventh Party Congress called for pilot activities to dissolve or change the
ownership of enterprises that did not need to be retained under state ownership
(Communist Party of Vietnam 1991a:14). A Party resolution18 agreed that
the conversion ‘of a number of eligible state enterprises into joint-stock
companies...[which]...should be undertaken on a pilot basis and under close
guidance, and experience should be drawn with utter care before divestiture is
conducted on an appropriate scale’.19 The National Assembly approved a pilot
equitisation program in late December 1991, and the government issued a
decision to proceed with this pilot program in mid 1992. It aimed to increase
efficiency through improved management and incentives; mobilise increased
capital for investment, and allow enterprise employees to become owners of
the enterprise.
Equitisation was in effect a form of partial privatisation—state enterprises
were to be transformed into joint-stock companies and a proportion of state
shares in the enterprise were to be sold.20 Implementing guidelines specified
that pilot enterprises should be small or medium size and potentially profitable,
but not ‘strategic enterprises’. Shares in equitised enterprises were to be
registered, transferable and inheritable and be available to both employees and
persons outside the enterprise. No single individual was allowed to own more
than 5 per cent of all shares, and no institution could own more than 10 per
cent. Enterprise employees were to be given preferential access to enterprise
shares and provided with suitable redundancy and/or retirement packages as
appropriate.
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The Ministry of Finance was authorised to coordinate and work with the
Central Institute for Economic Management, the Ministry of Labour, War
Invalids and Social Affairs, the State Bank and other government agencies to
implement the pilot program. A Central Steering Committee for Enterprise
Reform (CSCER) was established in September 1992 to oversee government
initiatives in reforming state enterprises.21 Line ministries and the chairpersons
of provincial and municipal People’s Committees were assigned to establish
divestiture steering committees to develop divestiture plans for submission to
the CSCER and the Ministry of Finance for approval. Complex implementing
arrangements provided opportunities for interested parties to slow progress.
Initially, seven enterprises volunteered for the pilot program, but these later
withdrew. Subsequently, 21 new enterprises were selected, and the government
later ordered the selection of another 200 enterprises. Most enterprises
subsequently withdrew. Despite follow-up instructions22 calling for acceleration,
implementation remained slow. Only 17 enterprises had been equitised by
the end of 1997, despite a 1996 government directive instructing that 150
enterprises were to be equitised by the end of 1997.23
In the lead up to the Eighth Party Congress, a review by the Central Institute
for Economic Management concluded that equitised enterprises increased
turnover and profit with no compulsory redundancies, and increased wages
paid to workers (Le Dang Doanh 1995). Why then was it so difficult to gain
the support needed to facilitate more rapid equitisation? Reasons given at that
time included
• concerns by managers that they would lose the preferential treatment
given to state enterprises (access to land, quotas, subsidised credit, and
less strict financial reporting requirements)24
• the lack of clear and transparent guidelines on equitisation procedures,
especially those for valuation, formal classification of what enterprises
could be equitised, and what to do with the social welfare services, funds
and facilities provided by state enterprises prior to equitisation
• the fact that many state enterprises are too small for a joint-stock company
structure to be economic
• the lack of liquidity in share trading because of restrictions under
equitisation and the lack of formal share-trading institutions
• the limited institutional capacity to implement equitisation
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• complex institutional arrangements that provided opportunities to slow
progress
• political concerns about the impact of equitisation on the leading role of
the state in the economy and, consequently, on state control over the
economy.
Following the Eighth Party Congress in mid 1996, the government issued a
series of new regulations to address these concerns. These will be discussed later.
Legal framework for state enterprise activities
The general legal framework governing business enterprises has evolved slowly
and has gradually reduced differences in treatment between enterprises. The
National Assembly approved the Law on Foreign Investment in 1987 and
Laws on Private Enterprise and on Companies in 1990. As discussed earlier,
the 1992 Constitution was also an important milestone in defining the rights
of the non-state sector to operate alongside the state sector (Government of
Vietnam 1992).
The 1993 Law on Bankruptcy and the 1995 State Enterprise Law were
meant to facilitate improved governance and the closure of non-viable state
enterprises. The Law on State Enterprises made progress in
• clarifying responsibilities and accountability and establishing state
enterprises as limited liability entities25
• distinguishing between state public service enterprises26 and business
enterprises
• clarifying rights to establish and dissolve state enterprises,27 and the role
of the government in exercising ownership rights in enterprises, including
defining those rights that can be delegated to central ministries and/or
provincial/municipal people’s committees
• defining the rights and responsibilities of state enterprises, including rights
with regard to equitisation, divestiture and selling assets
• defining the rights and responsibilities of the chief executive, senior
management, and the board of management
• specifying the rights and role of state management agencies and worker
groups in day-to-day management decision making.
The law also addressed the rights and obligations relating to the management
of investments by the state (or state enterprises) in other enterprises.28
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State business enterprises were subject to similar corporate governance
structures as private enterprises, and profit maximisation was to be their main
objective. State business enterprises had the right to ‘transfer, lease, rent and
mortgage properties under their management, except important equipment
and factories that are prescribed by the state...[and]...land and natural
resources’.29 Autonomy in day-to-day management decisions, in mobilising
capital and in allocating profits, was guaranteed within state guidelines. State
enterprises were guaranteed the right to decide the level of salary and bonuses
of employees within the framework of norms established by the state. State
enterprises were required to comply with accounting and auditing standards
established by the state and ‘to make public its yearly financial report and
other information, with a view to allowing a correct objective assessment of the
enterprise’s operation’.30
The government retained the power to exercise ownership rights in state
enterprises, including making decisions on the main components of the business
development plan for the enterprise, promulgation of model statutes governing
the organisational and operational arrangements, making decisions on capital
structure, allocation of profits, sale or lease of major assets, and organisational
arrangements to protect the rights of the state as owner of the capital of the
enterprise, making decisions on management structures, appointment of senior
management positions, making decisions on salary norms and allowances paid
to employees, board members, and the chief executive of the enterprise.
A Board of Management was to be established for each state corporation
and large state enterprises to ‘manage the activities of the enterprise, and be
responsible to the government, or a state management body delegated by the
government, for the development of the enterprise in accordance with the
objectives assigned by the state’.31 Board members were appointed for a term
of five years, contracts were renewable, and provision was included for
performance contracts.32 The workers’ collectives were to be consulted on key
management issues, including the collective labour accord, the use of enterprise
funds directly related to the interests of labourers, business plans and assessment
of business performance, measures to improve working conditions, training
opportunities, and the wellbeing of workers. They also were given the right to
propose candidates for the Board of Management.33
However, key provisions of these two laws were never enforced. Few
bankruptcy cases have been brought to the economic courts34 and the law is
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widely seen as providing very little protection for creditors. Few state enterprises
have published financial reports as provided for in Articles 12 of the Law on
State Enterprises. There have been great delays in issuing implementing
regulations and in effectively implementing key provisions. There has been
little enforcement of provision of financial and performance reporting, despite
the establishment of the General Department for the Management of State
Capital and Assets in Enterprise in the Ministry of Finance with specific
responsibilities for ensuring the financial accountability of state enterprises.
The government continues to face serious difficulties in enforcing its ownership
rights to sell or equitise state enterprises. The classification of state enterprises
as public service or business enterprises (as required under the state enterprise
law) was delayed by the absence of criteria and clear allocation of responsibilities
for the process.
The main reasons for poor enforcement were that there was limited national
understanding of the purposes of the laws and limited, if any, national demand
for the laws. The two laws were approved because disbursements under a World
Bank-funded structural adjustment loan were conditional on them being
approved. There was little consultation with the business and financial sector
in drafting the laws. This experience demonstrates the limited role of legislation
as an instrument of change, where the laws are neither supported by a consensus
of the concerned parties nor respond to a demand arising from within the
society.
State corporations
The need to streamline state enterprise administration and to separate state
ownership from state regulatory and public service functions has been a central
proposition in the enterprise reform debate since the reform program started.
The administrative grouping of enterprises under umbrella organisations was
seen by the authorities as facilitating this separation.
Many state enterprises had for many years been grouped under unions of
enterprises based on decisions issued by the government in 1978. New
regulations governing unions of enterprises were issued in March 1989 which
defined two alternative models for unions of enterprises:35 as a legal entity
formed as a voluntary association of members,36 or as a stronger entity
responsible for all enterprises covering specific public services such as power,
postal services, rail transport, and air transport. In the second model,
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membership was to be compulsory, member enterprises would not have a
fully independent legal status, and the assets of member enterprises would
belong to the union of enterprise. The proposals were resisted by both unions
and member enterprises, and the institutional status quo prevailed.
While the Political Report of the Seventh Party Congress in 1991 called for
enterprises to be grouped into large state corporations (Communist Party of
Vietnam 1991b), Decree 388 (requiring re-registration of all enterprises) was
vague on procedures for re-registration of existing Unions of Enterprises and
state companies and corporations. The government issued two decisions in
March 1994 specifying procedures for the re-registration of corporations and
enterprise unions, which provided for the registration of two categories of state
corporations, commonly referred to as Decision 90 and Decision 91 State
Corporations.37 All state corporations, companies and enterprise unions were
required to re-register as state corporations or state enterprises or be disbanded.
Enterprise unions and other entities that only provided administrative services
were required to be disbanded.
The stated objective of this decision was to consolidate enterprises in order
to rationalise state enterprise supervision, and to facilitate the abolition of line
ministry and local authority control over state enterprises. Arguments in support
of state corporations focused on the economies of scale from larger state business
entities, the increased scale needed for domestic enterprises with external
competitors in domestic and international markets, the need to free state
administrative resources to focus more on managing a reduced number of
businesses better, and the idea that large state businesses were essential for the
state to play a leading role in the industrialisation and modernisation of the
economy.
Decision 90 State Corporations were required to have at least five member
entities and total legal capital of VND 100 billion. Ministers and heads of the
People’s Committee at the provincial or municipal level could approve the
establishment of Decision 90 State Corporations. Decision 91 State Corporations
could only be established with at least seven member entities, a total legal
capital of VND 1,000 billion, and the approval of the Prime Minister. State
corporations were not subject to the Company Law. They did not own their
member entities, and were not holding companies like the South Korean
chaebols. Many of their powers were more administrative in nature, similar to
the enterprise groups (jituan) in China.
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There is little evidence that the state corporations model has been successful
in meeting stated policy objectives. Corporations have not resolved conflicts
over the exercise of ownership rights. The state still directly exercises control
over final decisions on major policies, investment plans and on the appointment
and dismissal of senior management. Government officials from line ministries
continue to intervene in the management decisions of corporations.
Member enterprises complain about direct involvement of state corporation
officials in the day-to-day management of enterprises and argue that the state
corporations merely add another layer of bureaucracy without producing any
value added from their members’ contributions. Profitable member enterprises
complain that they have to cross-subsidise inefficient enterprises, endangering
their own viability in the process. Profitable state corporations are sometimes
pressured to provide social services that would normally be a government
responsibility. A lack of consolidated financial statements makes it difficult to
assess the financial impact of state corporations, and suggests that there has
been little improvement in terms of accountability and transparency. Amongst
the first 18 Decision 91 Corporations established (see the following table), a
number were well under the specified minimum capital requirements.
There has been considerable debate about the desirability of the state
corporation model. Many external commentators have been especially critical
of this approach, arguing that Viet Nam should learn from the problems with
the South Korean chaebols. Frequently raised concerns included
• the potential for state corporations to strengthen state monopoly positions
and reduce the competition that had stimulated enterprise performance38
• state corporations with monopoly powers could evolve as a pressure group
opposed to further reform and opening up of the economy
• potential inefficiencies resulting from profitable enterprises cross-
subsidising loss-making enterprises within the corporations.
The actual extent to which Decrees 90 and 91 contributed to increased
monopoly powers has not been thoroughly studied. In some sectors, member
enterprises have to compete with other members of the same corporation,
other enterprises (both private and state), and imports. In the case of Vinafood
1 and 2, key policies that protected these entities from competition have been
lifted since they were established as state corporations (Table 10.1).39 However,
where there are natural monopolies, the domestic market is concentrated and/
or trade barriers remain significant, there is potential for corporations to
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coordinate the operations of their member enterprises to exploit possible
monopoly positions. Certainly some state corporations have continued to use
monopoly pricing (for example, in telecommunications and aviation), and the
government has only permitted the introduction of very limited competition
in these sectors. Partly in response to these concerns, the government has
formally included the study of options for regulatory and institutional reforms
to prevent abuses of monopoly power in its reform agenda.
The Law on State Enterprises clarified the legal status of state corporations
as legal entities with the same rights and obligations as state enterprises. The
law states that state enterprises generally have the right to decide whether to
join as members of state corporations, but provision is included for compulsory
membership when this is of special importance.40 The law requires that state
corporations to establish a Board of Management and Control Commission to
supervise the executive and to make major policy and investment decisions,
Table 10.1 Decision 91 State Corporations
State corporation Member No. of
enterprises joint-venture Legal capital
(excluding j-v) enterprises1  (billion dong)1
Electricity Corporation of Viet Nam 34 - 19,332
Coal Corporation of Viet Nam 47 4 824
Viet Nam Petroleum Corporation
(PETROVIETNAM) 17 4 761
Cement Corporation of Viet Nam 14 4 2,235
Viet Nam National Shipping Lines (Vinalines) 24 12 2,145
Viet Nam Airline Corporation 20 6 1,043
Viet Nam Post and Telecommunication Corporation 88 6 4,740
Viet Nam Rubber Corporation 32 2 2,700
Viet Nam Steel Corporation 17 4 1,336
Viet Nam Coffee Corporation 68 - 276
Viet Nam Tobacco Corporation 12 - 550
Viet Nam Paper Corporation 18 - 1,028
Viet Nam Textile and Garment Corporation 53 2 1,186
Northern Food Corporation—VINAFOOD 1 30 2 194
Southern Food Corporation—VINAFOOD 2 33 3 568
Viet Nam Chemical Corporation 50 14 ..
Viet Nam National Gem and Gold Corporation 12 - 12
Viet Nam Ship Building Corporation 22 2 204
Note: 1 At the time the decision to establish the Corporation was issued.
Source: Government Gazette, various issues.
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and to appoint an executive team led by a chief executive to take responsibility
for the day-to-day operations of the Corporation.41 Recent regulations on
equitisation require state corporations to administer the equitisation of selected
member enterprises.
STATE ENTERPRISE REFORMS FOLLOWING THE EIGHTH
PARTY CONGRESS
The Political Report to the Eighth Party Congress in mid 1996 criticised the
slow pace of state enterprise reform, noting in particular the slow pace of reforms
aimed at improving enterprise efficiency and accountability and also the lack
of progress in the pilot equitisation program. At the same time, the report
stressed that calls for mass privatisation were inappropriate.
The Eighth Congress stated that ‘the state economy plays the leading role
and, together with the cooperative sector, will become the foundation of the
economy’ but that it was also important to ‘create favourable economic and
legal conditions for private entrepreneurs to feel assured in investing in long-
term business’ (Communist Party of Vietnam 1996a:50). The Congress noted
an urgent need to improve the efficiency and transparency of state business. It
also highlighted the need for a greater focus on improving financial management
of all state enterprises, and to rely on profitability indicators to evaluate the
performance of state business enterprises while also using social indicators to
evaluate the efficiency of state public service enterprises.
Continuing slow progress with enterprise and administrative reform,42
concerns about the low efficiency and competitiveness in domestic production
and the impact of the Asian economic crisis led to a notice from the Politburo
in April 1997 calling for an acceleration of the equitisation process.43 The
Fourth Party Plenum (December 1997) emphasised the need for financial
sector and macroeconomic stability if Viet Nam was to cope with the
unfavourable impact of the regional economic crisis and for a renewed focus on
state enterprise reform.
The resolution of the Fourth Party Plenum charged that some officials are
‘inefficient, bureaucratic, corrupted, overbearing, oppress the people, hinder
economic development and cause indignation amongst the people’ (Communist
Party of Vietnam 1996b). This resolution highlighted the need for accelerated
enterprise reform as the third of six priority program areas. Priorities for
enterprise reform included: accelerating the equitisation program; developing
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the legal basis for small state enterprises (less than VND 1 billion in capital)
to be restructured (merged, divested, leased, or contracted out under
performance contracts), incorporating state business enterprises as limited
liability or joint-stock companies under the Company Law; promulgating
regulations to deal with supervision of enterprises with monopoly powers; and
introducing regulations imposing compulsory auditing and publication of
annual reports. The resolution also sought action
• to encourage farmers to buy shares in equitised agriculture processing
and trading enterprises
• to allow foreigners to be buy shares in equitised enterprises
• to formulate policies and legislation to control monopolies
• to improve the state corporation model to strengthen vertical and
horizontal cooperation
• to reorganise inefficient corporations.
Further calls to accelerate broader economic reforms were made less than a
year later at the Sixth Party Plenum (October 1998). Subsequently,
implementation of state enterprise reform activities has accelerated, but the
government continues not to meet its own targets for equitising enterprises.
These continuing delays, despite the increasingly strong Party and government
commitment to substantially reducing the numbers of state enterprises, suggests
that resistance to change is still strong at intermediate levels and within state
enterprises.
‘Compulsory’ equitisation
Decree 28, issued in May 1996, abolished the enterprise management’s right
to veto equitisation decisions and provided clearer guidelines on responsibilities
for action. At the same time, a Central Steering Committee on Equitisation
was established, chaired by the Minister of Finance, to oversee the equitisation
process.44 Decree 28 was amended in March 199745 and replaced by Decree
44 in June 1998.46 Both decrees sought to mobilise increased capital and new
technology to develop state enterprises and to encourage employee owners of
enterprises to play the role of real owners, to increase incentives, and incomes.47
The options to be followed in equitisation were clarified, specifying the
responsibilities of government agencies and enterprise management in
implementing equitisation, defining worker entitlements, and establishing a
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central committee for reform of enterprise management.48 Importantly, Decree
44-CP included an appendix that listed the categories of state enterprises which
could not yet be equitised, and those enterprises in which the state had to
retain controlling or special shares.
Subsequent implementing regulations listed the steps that had to be followed
in the equitisation process. Decisions on the equitisation of enterprises with a
total of VND 10 billion (about US$900,000 at that time) were delegated to
relevant ministers, or provincial chairpersons.49 Bonus and welfare funds were
to be distributed to current employees to purchase shares. Decree 44 included
provisions for equitisation through the issuance of new share capital,50 selling
part of existing state equity in a state enterprise, separating and selling part of
an existing state enterprise, and selling all state equity in an enterprise.51 State
corporations were required to prepare lists of member enterprises to be
equitised.52 Participation by foreign investors was also permitted on a pilot
basis, subject to the approval of the Prime Minister.53
The above changes addressed many of the constraints to accelerating
equitisation.54 Whereas only 17 state enterprises were equitised from 1992
until the end of 1997, some 102 enterprises were equitised in 1998, 249 in
1999, 212 in 2000, and 197 in 2001.
Despite this progress, the government recognises that further changes are
required to meet ambitious targets to reduce state enterprise numbers
substantially by 2005. Part of the problem is that many state enterprises are
not suited to the equitisation process either because they are not viable in their
current form or because they are too small to operate under a joint-stock
management structure. Consequently, the government has also stepped up its
efforts to improve the regulatory framework for divestiture, leasing and
contracting-out of state enterprises.
A second concern relates to the undervaluation of equitised enterprises and
a lack of transparency in the sale of shares in equitised entities. Undervaluation
results particularly because land-use rights do not have to be factored into
enterprise valuations, although they are typically the most valuable asset. While
this undervaluation is not a great problem from an economic efficiency
perspective, lack of transparency in share sales and the broad public perception
that access to shares is usually limited to (the often already privileged) state
enterprise management and employees, state officials connected with the
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enterprises, and business partners of the enterprise are cause for public concern.
This will become a growing concern as larger and more profitable state
enterprises are equitised.
Divestiture, leasing and contracting-out of state enterprises
The government issued regulations setting out procedures for divestiture and
dissolution of state-owned enterprises in mid 1996, and amended these in
April 1997.55 Implementing instructions were issued in mid 1997.56 In
September 1997, the government issued Decree 103 on the Regulation on
Contracting Out, Leasing and Divestiture of State Enterprises.57 Prior to this
decree, there had been informal experiments with leasing and contracting out
services and assets as a means for improving state enterprise efficiency. Indeed,
some state enterprises earned a substantial proportion of their income from
contracting out assets (including rights to use land and export quotas). However,
there had been no transparent system for pricing and allocating these ‘leasing’
arrangements and it is difficult to assess the extent of such arrangements, but
they were reported to be significant in areas such as retail services. Decree 103
aims to provide a more transparent process to facilitate the divestiture, leasing or
contracting out of state enterprises with legal capital of less than VND 1billion
(about US$70,000), or up to VND 5 billion for loss-making enterprises.
The stated objectives of this decree were to increase the efficiency and
competitiveness of the state run sector; to ‘promote the labourer’s right to
mastery’, and create employment and higher income opportunities for workers,
reduce state costs and responsibilities for business management. The scope of
the decree was limited to the restructuring of whole enterprises, and specifically
did not apply to the sale or leasing of parts of enterprises.58 Substantial
preferences (reductions in the sale price of up to 70 per cent) were given to
labour collectives to buy these enterprises. Larger preferences were given to
collectives guaranteeing to retain the most workers. Other individuals or entities
could purchase enterprises at up to a 50 per cent discount if they retained all
workers for at least one year. Further reduction in sale price of 20 per cent
could be obtained for immediate cash payments for enterprises.59 There are
also provisions for state enterprises to be assigned free of charge to labour
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collectives, provided the collective commits to increasing investment,
maintaining employment, and not dissolving or selling the enterprises for at
least three years.
A critical concern with Decree 103 was the lack of transparency in valuation
procedures. Combined with the substantial discounts offered, there would
appear to be considerable scope for privileged persons to acquire state assets at
very low prices. Public concerns about the lack of transparency and restricted
access to these potentially profitable opportunities—and questions as to why
employees fortunate to have had the benefits of state employment should be
entitled to special privileges—have slowed implementation of this decree.
Nevertheless, 37 state enterprises were sold, and 4 contracted out during the
period 1999 to 2001. Another 60 enterprises (43 in 2001) have been assigned
to labour collectives.
Corporatisation: transformation of state enterprises to limited liability
companies
The Enterprise Law included provision for state enterprises to be corporatised as
state-owned limited liability enterprises. A decree outlining the procedures for
corporatisation was issued in September 2001.60 Detailed implementing
regulations were issued in January 2002 authorising ministers and the heads of
provincial people’s committees to approve the corporatisation of individual state
enterprises.61 Under these regulations the Prime Minister’s approval is required
for the corporatisation of any members of Decision 91 State Corporations.
These actions were in response to instructions given in the resolutions of
the Third Party Plenum, and the five-year plan endorsed by the National
Assembly, to accelerate actions to transfer all state business enterprises into
state limited liability enterprises. The aim is to transfer all state business
enterprises into limited liability enterprises by the end of 2005. Given the
past pace of state enterprise reform, this appears to be an ambitious target.
The government has also ordered that new regulations be drafted to specify
the relationship between subsidiaries of state corporations, and to increase the
accountability of subsidiary enterprises. Options being considered include the
transformation of state corporations into holding companies.
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FUTURE DIRECTION OF STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM: RECENT
RESOLUTIONS ON STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM
The Third Party Plenum resolution
The Third Party Plenum62 called for further acceleration of reforms to increase
state enterprise efficiency. Efficiency was to be assessed ‘based on a
comprehensive view in economic, political and social aspects; in which the
return on capital shall be one of the major criteria to assess the efficiency of
operating business enterprises with the results in implementing social policies
as the major criterion to assess the efficiency of public utility enterprises’. The
resolution notes that it is not essential for state enterprises ‘to hold a large
share in all branches and sectors and products of the economy’. Acceleration of
the equitisation process was seen a key to achieving ‘radical change for improving
the efficiency of state enterprises’. The Resolution of the Third Party Plenum
instructed that during 2001–05, the government should
• basically complete the restructuring of existing state enterprises: equitising
state enterprises where the state does not need to retain 100 per cent
ownership; liquidating inefficient state enterprises; transferring, selling
and leasing small state enterprises which cannot be equitised and the
state does not need to keep control
• corporatise as limited liability enterprises all state enterprises where the
state was to retain 100 per cent of equity. Amend the existing mechanism
and policies to establish a consistent legal framework that ensure autonomy
and accountability in state enterprise business operations
• reform and clean up state enterprise finances; resolve unrecoverable debt
and labour redundancies and devise measures to prevent their recurrence
• reform and enhance the business efficiency of state corporations to establish
several strong economic groups
• invest to develop and set up new state enterprises where needed in key
sectors, branches and important localities
• reform and modernise the technology and managerial capability inmost
state enterprises.
The resolution clarified that the state is to retain 100 per cent ownership in
state business enterprises involved in producing explosive materials, toxic
chemicals, radioactive materials, and cigarettes, and managing the national
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power transmission grid and international and national communication
networks. The state will retain a controlling share in larger enterprises that
‘contribute significantly to the state budget and/or spearhead the application
of hi-tech, and breakthrough technologies and also contribute considerably to
macro-economic balances’, and in state enterprises that ‘provide necessities
for…rural populations and ethnic minorities in the mountainous and remote
areas’. Enterprises belonging to Party organisations shall be subject to the same
restructuring as other state enterprises, while enterprises belonging to political
and social organisations will be required to register under the Enterprise Law.
The state will retain 100 per cent ownership of public service enterprises in
areas such as ‘printing money, flight controls, maritime control, radio frequency
management and distribution; production and repair of weapons and military
hardware and equipment for national defence and security; enterprises entrusted
with special national defence tasks and enterprises operating in strategic locations
and combining the economic operations and national defence tasks in
accordance with the government decisions’. The state will retain a controlling
share of public service enterprises responsible for ‘technical inspection of large
transport vehicles, publication of academic books, political papers and books,
current event and documentary films; management and maintenance of the
national railways and airports, management of watershed irrigation system,
plantation and protection of watershed forests; water drainage in large cities;
lighting system of cities; management and maintenance of land roads, bus and
coach stations, important waterways; production and supplies of other products
and services as provided for by the government’. The resolution also noted that
households and non-state enterprises will be encouraged to provide public
goods and services.
The resolution called for a Competition Law to be issued ‘to protect and
encourage enterprises from all economic sectors to compete and cooperate on
equal footing within the common framework of the law’.63 It called for steps to
be taken to monitor and assess the efficiency of state enterprises regularly and
to strengthen accounting, auditing, reporting and publication of information
on the financial performance of state enterprises. A state Finance Investment
Company is to be established to manage state shares in business enterprises on
a pilot basis. Mechanisms were to be developed for tendering out the provision
of public goods and services.
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The government plans to ‘rearrange and strengthen those corporations that
are vital to the national economy while merging or dissolving other state
corporations’.64 State corporations are to be retained and strengthened in
petroleum exploitation, processing, and wholesaling; the supply and
distribution of electricity; the exploitation, processing and supply of coal and
other important minerals; metallurgy; heavy manufacturing; cement
production; post, telecommunications and electronics; airlines; maritime;
railway; chemicals and chemical fertilisers; key consumer good and food
industries; pharmaceuticals; construction; wholesale grain trading; banking;
and insurance. State corporations are to be transformed as holding companies,
on a pilot basis, with member entities corporatised as limited liability
enterprises, with a minimum capital of VND 500 billion.65
A number of specialised economic groups are to be established based around
state corporations, but with private sector participation. The government argues
that economic groups are seen as important in allowing Vietnamese enterprises
to compete internationally in sectors such as petroleum, telecommunications,
electricity and construction. At the core of these groups will be conglomerates
operating at home and abroad with a minimum capital of VND 10 trillion
(US$667 million).
Government state enterprise reform agenda
The government expressed concern that ‘only 40 per cent of the SOEs operate
at a profit, 29 per cent have prolonged losses and 31 per cent break even’ and
considered state enterprise restructuring as ‘key to enhancing the
competitiveness of the economy and ensuring successful integration’.66 In its
report to donors in December 2001, the government noted a recent acceleration
in state enterprise reform
…government decrees and other legal documents have been issued to provide guidelines  for
equitising state enterprises, for the divestiture, leasing and contracting out of state enterprises,
and for the transfer of state enterprises into single-member limited companies, creating the basic
legal framework to facilitate the operation of state enterprises within a socialist-oriented market
mechanism. Initial progress has been made in adjusting the number, structure, and size of state
enterprises. The number of state enterprises has been reduced from more than 12,000 to just
over 5,000, and it is planned to further reduce the numbers by one-half, maintaining only those
operating in key economic areas, especially in public services (Government of Vietnam 2001).
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The stated objectives of accelerated equitisation are to create enterprises
with a variety of owners, including a large number of workers; utilise the capital
and assets of the state in an efficient manner to mobilise domestic capital for
business development and create a dynamic and efficient management
mechanism for state enterprises; enhance ownership of the workers, shareholders
and promote supervision of enterprises by society; and ensure harmonised
benefits between the state, the enterprises and labourers. The government also
intends to include the value of land-use rights in enterprise valuations, and to
identify options to ensure that valuations better reflect market value. Options
to be piloted include public tendering for shares, and the sale of shares through
intermediary financial institutions. Revenue from the selling of shares are to
be used to implement redundancy policies, and for re-investment by the state
in business development. While equitisation remains the preferred policy, efforts
will also be made to accelerate the transfer, divestiture, merging, and/or
liquidation of state enterprises that are not suited to the equitisation process.
Increased efforts are to be made to build public understanding of, and support
for, these policies.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT
Achievements and remaining constraints
State enterprise reform has been one of the most contentious areas of
Viet Nam’s economic reform process. The most substantial changes occurred
during the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to the cessation of economic
cooperation with the former Eastern European countries. During this period
nearly one-third of the workforce was made redundant. Subsequently, the
number of state enterprises, and the share of state enterprises in GDP, remained
little changed over most of the 1990s.
With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to identify the impact of three
tracks taken in reforming state enterprises in Viet Nam. The most significant
influence was from the track exposing state enterprises to some of the rigours
of the market, by forcing them to compete—on a gradually more level playing
field—with each other, with imports, and with an emerging private sector.
Direct subsidies were abolished, and many indirect subsidies reduced (but far
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from eliminated). The net result is that most state enterprises face a less elastic,
if not hard, budget constraint, and operate in a substantially more competitive
environment.
Another track involved a protracted effort to develop a new policy and
regulatory framework to restructure and improve state enterprise efficiency.
The net result of this track was a plethora of decrees, decisions, directives and
circulars dealing with enterprise restructuring. The issuance of regulatory
documents in Viet Nam is generally a time consuming, labour intensive process,
involving many rounds of meetings and consultations. Sustaining this effort
for such a protracted period suggests a strong commitment for change from at
least some parts of the leadership. However, if there was such a strong
commitment to reform, the obvious question is why many policy reforms were
largely ignored by those responsible for their implementation. Why was Decree
388,67 issued in late 1991, enforced quite effectively, but Decision 202,68
issued a few month later, largely ignored despite repeated follow-up instructions
urging action? Both regulations should have been implemented at a similar
period of time, and both would have potentially important costs for some
interests. Follow up regulations were issued in both cases in an attempt to
facilitate implementation. These questions are raised, although the authors are
unable to provide definitive answers. The processes of consultation and debate
in drafting new policy documents and regulations have had a powerful
educational impact, changing attitudes that eventually contributed to the
acceleration of reforms. It is not possible, however, to determine whether faster
reforms would have been possible if the government had taken a more
authoritarian line in imposing implementation.
The third track was to allow pilot reforms and experimentation—to learn
by doing. This had been the track adopted in many of the earlier reforms in
agriculture, and with cooperatives, trading and other services. However, this
approach was markedly less successful in the case of state enterprise reform.
This was no doubt due to the fact that reforms in the area of state enterprises
had much more clearly discernible costs to many of the officials responsible for
implementing these measures.
The various tracks complemented each other, gradually building the support
for state enterprise reform, needed to accelerate reform in the face of resistance
from vested interests. State enterprise reform is a difficult process that requires
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substantial inputs of political capital. Leading proponents of reform in
Viet Nam have noted the need to weigh up the potential gains of reform with
the probability of success in deciding where to focus their efforts.
Viet Nam has achieved relatively strong economic growth and reductions in
poverty via a combination of rather cautious changes in state ownership,
increasing competition, and step-by-step removal of barriers to private sector
development. But, there remain important questions about the appropriate
pace of further reform and appropriate goals in striking a balance in the structure
of ownership.
One interesting analytical issue relates to the relative importance of measures
to change the structure of ownership as compared to measures to increase
competitiveness and exposure to market forces. A possible interpretation of the
Vietnamese experience is that promotion of competition is more important
than promotion of changes in ownership.
Pace of state enterprise reform
Despite official commitments to accelerating state enterprise reform, resolutions
of both the Eighth and Ninth Party Congresses maintained that the state was
to continue playing a leading role in economic development. Of all recent
Party policy resolutions, the continuing commitment to state-led economic
development provoked the strongest criticism by multilateral financial
institutions and OECD donors,69 with many warning that state enterprises
have been a (if not the) major impediment to achieving strong and sustainable
economic growth and that economic growth and stability can not be sustained
without accelerated state enterprise reform.70 Those arguing for faster reform
say that even greater progress could have been achieved with faster dismantling
of state enterprises. They argue that this would have facilitated much greater
private sector investment and employment creation.
An alternative view is that a stable set of state institutions, including state
enterprises, along with market liberalisation have helped lay the foundations
for a competitive private economy. A steady organic growth of private business
has provided greater stability, more equitable distribution of the benefits of
growth, and a more solid base for future development than may have been
achieved by attempts to ‘kick-start’ a private sector through the rapid transfer
of state assets despite the absence of an appropriate institutional environment,
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with the attendant risks of ineffective enterprise management, asset stripping
and the hasty creation of private property rights of questionable legitimacy.
Even within the Party there are conflicting views. Some senior Communist
Party and government leaders have persistently criticised lower administrative
levels for failing to meet state enterprise reform targets. The lack of national
consensus on the direction of state enterprise reform was clearly recognised in
the resolution of the recent Third Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress
…a high degree of unanimity of perception is yet to be obtained regarding the role and position
of the state economic sector and state enterprises … many issues remain unclear, entailing
conflicting opinions, yet practical experiences have not been reviewed for proper conclusions.
There are many weaknesses and bottlenecks in the state administration of state
enterprise…Mechanisms and policies are entangled with many inadequacies…failing to generate
a strong motivation for managers and workers in enterprises to raise labour productivity and
business performance; a segment of state enterprises’ managers fail to meet professional and
moral requirements. The Party’s leadership and the government’s guidance…are still
incommensurate to this important and complex task.71
Implications for future reform
Despite the acceleration of state enterprise reforms in recent years, and regardless
of the arguments about the pace of reform, there is clearly much unfinished
business. Probably the most important incentive for the state to accelerate
state enterprise reform is an increasingly public debate about equity, corruption
and the misuse of state assets in the reform process. Most Vietnamese state
enterprises are small. It will never be economic to implement effective governance
of state investments in many of these small state enterprises. The more viable
option—if the state is to achieve its objectives of increasing efficiency and
reducing corruption—is for most of the small state enterprises to be sold. But
the same public concerns about corruption and equity which lend support to
the case of divestiture also require a greater transparency in the processes by
which state assets are sold.
There is now a growing private sector with the capacity to buy the smaller
state enterprises, but public bidding for the sale, or leasing out, of all of the
smaller state enterprises will be essential in retaining public support for the
process. Government policy seeks to ensure that workers have preferential access
to state assets under public bidding processes, but there are questions as to
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why preference should be given to state enterprise workers, who are not among
the more disadvantaged groups in society.
Although the case of divestiture of the smaller state enterprises is strong, the
state retains an unequivocal commitment to retaining and strengthening state
enterprises engaged in some core industries and services, and in the provision
of public services. In this regard, Vietnamese policymakers cite the examples of
other successful East Asian and European economies in which an active role of
the state has been combined with effective use of market instruments. Given
this approach, the challenge is to improve governance of these enterprises, and
to improve performance incentives for enterprise manages, in order to sustain
the growth in labour productivity achieved in recent years. It is not difficult to
envisage a gradual relaxation of the state’s position with regard to state ownership
over time, as a large-scale domestic private sector emerges with the legitimacy,
resources, and capacity to acquire and develop these businesses.
In discussions in the donor community in Hanoi, there was at times a certain
reluctance to deviate from the ‘Washington consensus’ on the role of the state,
because of a belief that this might lend support to groups opposed to further
reform. But it is also important that experience and pragmatism, and not
ideology, drive policy advice. Experiences of difficulties faced in other transition
economies have demonstrated not only the failure of the central planning model,
but also failures of poorly designed and managed reform efforts that neglect
the important role that effective institutions (state and private) play in
developing competitive market economies. There are limits to short-cutting
development processes by simply copying models from long-established market
economies.
In an analysis of the reform process, perhaps the key question of political
economy is not whether it conforms to some abstract model of transition to a
market economy, but rather what are the concrete patterns of interest
engendered by the reform? In the Viet Nam case, an interesting aspect has
been the degree to which those in the system have been able to benefit from
the reform process and have therefore found it acceptable. Given that the Party
highlighted conflicting internal views in the resolution of the Third Plenum,
achieving consensus for more accelerated reforms in this area will require more
time and debate in the Party and government.
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NOTES
1 In Vietnamese, equitisation (cæ phÇn hãa) refers to the transformation of a company to a
share-holding company. Under the old Company Law this implied a divestiture of shares
because this law required a share-holding company to have at least seven shareholders. The
new Enterprise Law allows for the state to be the single owner of limited liability companies,
but requires at least three shareholders in joint-stock companies.
2 See Mallon (1996) for more detail.
3 Decision 217-HDBT (14/11/87), ‘Renovating Planning, Economic Accounting and
Socialist Business of State Enterprises’; and reinforced by Statute 50-HDBT, (3/88)
‘Regulations for State-owned Industrial Enterprises’.
4 Resolution of the Third Plenum of the Sixth Party Congress (Communist Party of Vietnam
1987b).
5 Decree No. 50-HDBT, (22/3/88) provided details on implementing Decree 217-HDBT.
Decree No. 98-HDBT (2/6/88) defined the rights and limits of worker unions in state
enterprise decision making. Decision 93-HDBT (2/12/89) defined the powers of
management in making management decisions. Decision 332-HDBT (23/10/91) provided
details on the rights and responsibilities of enterprises regarding the management of state
assets.
6 See Article 4 of ‘Regulations for State-owned Industrial Enterprises’ attached to Decree 50-
HDBT (22/3/88).
7 The legal basis for these changes was reinforced by State Council Ordinances on: Principles
of Accounting and Statistics (29/9/88); Economic Contracts (29/9/89); and Economic
Arbitration (12/1/90).
8 By the early 1990s, controls were limited to public utilities and services, petrol, fertilisers,
cement, steel, sugar and paper.
9 In practice, even before the controls were relaxed, many state enterprises showed little
enthusiasm to transfer convertible currency to the State Bank.
10 Decision 218-CT (16/8/89), ‘Foreign Earnings Management’, and Decree 64-HDBT
(10/6/89), ‘Management of Import Export Business’, and the devaluation and unification
of the exchange rate.
11 Decree 50-HDBT (22/3/88), ‘Regulations for State-owned Industrial Enterprises’.
12 Decree 144-HDBT (10/5/90), Decision 316-CT (1/9/90), Directive 408-CT (20/11/
90), Directive 138-CT (25/4/91), Decision 332-HDBT (23/10/91),
13 Decree No. 28-HDBT (22/3/89), ‘Regulation on Joint-Ventures’, and Decree 38-HDBT
(10/4/89), ‘Economic Cooperation in Production, Distribution and Services’.
14 Decision 143-HDBT (10/5/90).
149STATE ENTERPRISES
15 Decree 388-HDBT (20/11/91), ‘Establishing and Liquidating State Enterprises’, Directive
393-CT (25/11/91) and Circular 34-CT (28/1/92). Later amended under Decree 156-
HDBT (7/5/92) and Decision 196-CT (5/6/92).
16 Strategic state enterprise was not defined, but was understood to include enterprises that
contributed to national defence, public utilities and enterprises producing basic factors of
production (for example, steel and cement), and key services such as banking.
17 Decision 90-TTg (7/3/94), ‘Work to Re-arrange State Enterprises’.
18 Specifically, a resolution of the Second Plenum of the Seventh Party Congress.
19 Resolution 2-NQ-HNTW (4/12/91).
20 Decision 202-CT (8/6/92), ‘Implementing Experiments to Convert State Enterprises to
Share Holding Companies’, and Decision 84-TTg (4/3/93), ‘Accelerating the Pilot Scheme
for Converting State Enterprises into Share Holding Companies’.
21 Decision 84-TTg (1/3/92), ‘Establishing a Central Steering Committee on Enterprise
Reform’. This committee is now chaired by the Minister for Planning and Investment.
22 Decision 84-TTg (4/3/93), ‘Accelerating the Pilot Scheme for Converting State Enterprises
into Share Holding Companies’.
23 The target was specified in Article 3 of Decision 548-TTG (13/8/96), ‘Establishment of
the Equitisation Steering Committee under Decree 28-CP (7/5/96) of the Government’.
24 One of the first equitised enterprises, the Refrigeration Electrical Engineering Company,
faced initial difficulties in retaining export permits after equitisation.
25 Law on State Enterprises, Article 1.
26 A state public service enterprise was defined as ‘a state enterprise that produces and provides
public services pursuant to state policies, or directly involved in the discharge of defense or
security tasks’ (Law on State Enterprises, Article 3 (4)). More detailed definitions were
subsequently provided in Decree 56-CP (2/10/96) ‘On Public Utility State Enterprises’.
27 The Prime Minister’s approval was required for state corporations and large state enterprises
to be established. Ministers and Heads of the People’s Committees of the Provinces and
Municipalities were allowed to approve the establishment of other state enterprises.
28 Law on State Enterprises, Articles 49–54 (and Article 3 for definitions of state predominant
and special shares).
29 Law on State Enterprises, Articles 7–8. State enterprises also had the right to ‘reject and
denounce all requests for supply of resources not prescribed by law from any individual,
agency or organisation, except voluntary contributions for humanitarian or public utility
purposes’.
30 Law on State Enterprises, Articles 10–12 (quote from Article 12(2)).
31 Law on State Enterprises, Article 29.
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32 Law on State Enterprises, Articles 31(2), 34 and 35.
33 Law on State Enterprises, Articles 41–42.
34 By itself, this would not be bad. A good bankruptcy law could encourage problems to be
resolved without having to resort to the courts. The problem, however, has been that
bankruptcy actions have been slow, costly and often unsuccessful.
35 Decree 27-HDBT (23/3/89), ‘Replacement of the Charter for Unions of Enterprises’.
36 Directors of member enterprises were to be represented on the Board of Directors of the
Union of Enterprises. The head of the Union of Enterprises was to be elected by member
enterprises, subject to the approval by the government.
37 Decision 90/TTg (7/3/94), ‘Work to Re-arrange State Enterprise’, and Decision 91-TTg
(7/3/94), ‘Pilot Work to Establish Business Groups’.
38 Article 2(2) of this decision does emphasise that, in establishing business groups, efforts
should be made to ‘limit both monopoly powers and disorderly competition’.
39 Most importantly private enterprises were allowed to engage directly in external trade in
agricultural commodities (including rice). Agriculture trade reforms were key conditions of
an ADB-financed agriculture adjustment program.
40 Law on State Enterprises, Article 7 (1.d).
41 See Chapter V of the Law on State Enterprises. See also Decree 39-CP (27/6/95), ‘Model
Charter on the Structure and Operations of State Corporations’.
42 Resolution 8/1998/NQ-CP (16/7/98) notes that ‘impediments in the system of institutions
and administrative procedures remain large. Some cadre, especially at the executing level,
still cause hindrances and harassments to the production and business activities of the
population and the enterprises. Implementation of the policies and regulations of the state,
including correct ones which are promulgated in time, has not been serious…’
43 CPVN Central Committee Notice 63-TB-TW (4/4/97). ‘Opinion of the Politburo on
Proceedings with Active and Stable Implementation of the Equitisation of state Enterprises’.
44 Decision 548-TTG (13/8/96), ‘Establishment of the Equitisation Steering Committee
under Decree 28-CP (7/5/96). This committee was then abolished under Decree
44-CP in 1998.
45 Decree 25-CP (26/3/97), ‘Amending a Number of Articles of Decree 28 (7/5/96) on the
Transformation of a Number of State Enterprises into Joint-Stock Companies’, Directive
568-TTg (20/8/97), ‘Accelerating the Equitisation Program’.
46 Decree 44-CP (29/6/98). ‘The Transformation of State Enterprises into Joint-Stock
Companies’.
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47 Decree 44-CP (29/6/98). ‘The Transformation of State Enterprises into Joint-Stock
Companies’, Article 2.
48 Decision 111-CP (29/6/98). ‘Establishing the Central Committee for Reform of Enterprise
Management’. This decision repealed earlier decisions establishing the Central Steering
Committee for Reform of Enterprises (Decision 83-TTg, 4/3/93) and the Central Steering
Committee for Equitisation (Decision 548-TTg, 13 /8/96).
49 Decree 44-CP (29/6/98), Article 17. The cut-off value in Decree 28-CP was
VND 3 billion: this had been increased to VND 10 billion in Decree 25.
50 This allowed an enterprise to be transformed into a joint-stock company, new shares to be
issued, and these new shares to be sold to fund expansion, thus diluting state equity.
51 Decree 44-CP (29/6/98). ‘The Transformation of State Enterprises into Joint-Stock
Companies’, Article 7.
52 Decree 44-CP (29/6/98). ‘The Transformation of State Enterprises into Joint-Stock
Companies’, Article 15.
53 Article 3 of Decree 28-CP (7/5/96), ‘Transformation of a Number of State Enterprises
into Joint-Stock Companies’. This is not allowed under the current Company Law, but
exceptions are often made for ‘pilot’ reforms.
54 Directive 20 CT-TTg (21/4/1998). ‘Stepping up the Reorganisation and Renewal of State
Enterprises’, and Directive 659-TTg (20/8/97), ‘Speeding up the Equitisation of State
Enterprises’. Decision 1021-CP (1/12/97). ‘Setting-up Working Teams for Restructuring
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Prior to Doi Moi the state allowed small-scale non-socialist enterprises to operate
in a few industries and services, but restricted private commerce to trade in
unprocessed products. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, household
business expanded to such an extent that the domestic private sector accounts
for most employment and recent employment growth.
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the private and public economic sectors, looking at the evolution of a private
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HOUSEHOLD AND PRIVATE BUSINESS
DEVELOPMENT
THE EMERGING NON-STATE SECTOR
Prior to Doi Moi, the domestic private sector largely comprised households
engaged in farming, handicrafts and limited retail trade services. At the time
of the Sixth Congress, the Party distinguished between a socialist sector (state
enterprises, collectives and households) and non-socialist enterprises. The state
allowed small-scale non-socialist enterprises to operate in a few industries and
services, but restricted private commerce to trade in unprocessed agricultural
products (Nguyen Van Dang 2001).
The role of household business in the economy expanded during the late
1980s and early 1990s, and households businesses are now an important
contributor to output and employment, especially in the agricultural and service
sectors. In contrast, the role of cooperatives has diminished sharply. The
1997–98 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) found that nearly 62 per
cent of the population depended on farming (mostly household farms) and
another 24 per cent depended on non farm self-employment. Only 25.7 per
cent of the labour force was engaged in wage employment. Those engaged in
non-farm self-employment generally enjoyed higher living standards than other
groups.1
More recently, there has been a marked expansion in private firms in terms
of numbers, employment and output, reflecting significant progress in
deregulating domestic private sector involvement in industry and service
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activities, and especially in external trade, since 1999. The domestic private
sector now accounts for most employment and recent employment growth;
dominates agricultural output; and accounts for an increasing share of trade
and other key services. Changes in the non-state share of industrial output
have been more modest.
STRIKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Private sector growth has made a significant contribution to growth and reducing
poverty. The key to reducing poverty in Viet Nam has been growth in
employment and livelihood options for rural households and the self-employed
in the urban informal sector. In Viet Nam, as elsewhere in the region, the
number of jobs created for every unit of investment is much greater in the
private sector than the state sector.
With capital as a critical constraint, the incentive for the private sector is to
maximise output through the adoption of relatively labour-intensive processes.
With preferential access to credit and natural resources, easier access to foreign
investment, and weaker incentives to maximise profits, Vietnamese state
enterprises have invested in more capital-intensive industries, so that typically
state enterprises have created fewer jobs per unit of investment.
Thus the private sector has made a particularly strong contribution to
employment growth. The private sector absorbed many of the workers laid off
from the state sector, and much of the large annual increase in new entrants to
the workforce. State enterprises’ share of employment fell from 9.3 per cent of
the total in 1988 to 5.1 per cent of the total in 1995. The proportion of public
servants in the workforce fell from 4.8 to 3.6 per cent over the same period.
Private enterprises are also more flexible and innovative than state sector
entities, a factor which is likely to be particularly important in the development
of modern manufacturing and service sectors. The life cycle of most
manufactured products is limited. Innovation and adaptability are essential to
maintain growth momentum. And innovation will be of critical importance in
continuing Viet Nam’s successful integration into the international economy.
Although Viet Nam has had remarkable success in promoting exports, for that
process to be sustained, further increases efficiency will be required to effectively
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compete in an increasingly competitive international market. Innovation is
even more crucial in the modern service sectors.
The growth of a lively and competitive private sector can also act as a stimulus
to improved state enterprise performance. Efficiency gaps between state and
private enterprises are generally reduced when state enterprises are forced to
compete with each other and with suppliers from other sectors (including
importers and other domestic producers). As argued above, one reason for
Viet Nam’s economic success in the 1990s was that, even before the growth of
private sector, the state sector was not monolithic; parts of it operated on a
decentralised and competitive basis. Measures that promote private sector
development and increase the competition faced by state enterprises will
contribute to further innovation and growth in efficiency in state enterprises.
Another important reason to promote private sector development is that
the government simply does not have the administrative or financial resources
to implement manifold commercial business activities while also implementing
its ambitious social and physical infrastructure development programs.
The administrative difficulties (for both the government and businesses) of
the government being involved in too wide a range of business decisions will
become more onerous as the number of business entities needed for Viet Nam
to grow and compete increases, particularly in small and medium-scale labour-
intensive service and manufacturing activities.
Although the case for encouraging the private sector is strong, this does not
imply that a completely laissez faire approach is appropriate as a strategy to
ameliorate Viet Nam’s development constraints. While a strong private sector
helps generate growth and reduce poverty, it cannot guarantee an equitable
distribution of increased output. Recent poverty studies suggest that, while
past patterns of development have greatly reduced poverty, the better-off
segments of the population have benefited more than the poorest.
The state needs to continue in a leading role to ensure the equitable
distribution of the health and education services, supply the physical
infrastructure needed to facilitate the geographical spread of development and
service the fast growing urban centres, and should even selectively invest in
directly productive activities, where foreign or domestic private investment are
not sufficient.
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EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR POLICY
The movement towards acceptance of a fully active role for the private sector
by the Vietnamese authorities has been gradual, and policies have often been
ambiguous. There was much more rapid and less ambiguous acceptance of the
role of the markets than of the private business. And, for some time, it appeared
that foreign private business was more acceptable than national private firms.
Household business activity was considered much more acceptable than private
firms which employed large numbers of workers. While Viet Nam’s Constitution
guaranteed that ‘enterprises belonging to all components of the economy…are
equal before the law’ (Government of Vietnam 1995:Article 22), enterprises
have not enjoyed equal administrative and regulatory treatment.
Managers of all forms of enterprises were vulnerable to ad hoc interpretation
of the changing legal and regulatory framework by officials in government and
administrative agencies because of ambiguities in public policy. Difficulties
also arose because of the rapid pace at which new laws were issued and because
regulations were sometimes inconsistent and overlapping; and because the roles,
responsibilities and accountability of different government agencies were not
clear. There were also counterproductive attempts to regulate far too much.2
Consequently, regulations often added unnecessary transaction costs in business
and provided opportunities and incentives for corruption.
Early reforms fell short of providing an adequate policy and regulatory
environment. This was not only a matter of the regulations as such but also of
bureaucratic attitudes. Former Prime Minister Pham Van Dong noted in 1993
that drastically changing society’s way of thinking was one of the most difficult
aspects of the reform process. The stigma attached to traders under
Confucianism, and to any business activity under Communism, ‘is not easily
undone overnight’ (Tuong Lai 1999:5). While some adjustments were made
in a surprisingly flexible manner, there were also inevitable tensions.3
Prior to the enactment of the Enterprise Law in 2000, legislation and
regulations governing different business entities were promulgated on an ad
hoc basis to meet the needs of an emerging market economy. Specific legislation
was enacted for different categories of owners and for different forms of
investment. Restrictions on capital structure were specified for different
categories of business entities. Registration responsibilities were spread amongst
different government agencies depending on the ownership and form of the
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business entity. All this tended to restrict entry and make it difficult to adapt
to changing economic opportunities because it limited businesses’ flexibility
to increase capital and/or change the nature of their activities without going
though a costly and time-consuming process of re-registration. Such rigidities
hurt smaller enterprises the most because compliance costs were spread over a
relatively small base, and this encouraged them to continue operating on an
informal basis.
There are a numbers of areas in which private businesses have been
constrained by the policy regime. One area in which private business was at a
distinct disadvantage was in establishing joint ventures with foreign investors.
Foreign investors had an incentive to select a state enterprise as a partner in
order to get easier access to decisionmakers in order to facilitate administrative
approvals. More direct discrimination included regulations that allowed state
enterprises, but not private enterprises, to contribute land-use rights as equity
in ventures with foreign investors.4 Private enterprises also faced tighter
restrictions on transferring land-use rights.
Land has been a constraint on private sector development and remains one
of the more contentious ideological issues. The constitution clearly states that
all land belongs to the people (that is, it cannot be owned by individuals).
However, individuals and business entities can acquire long-term rights to use
land. Rights to use land are usually by far the most valuable assets held by
Vietnamese households and business entities.
The lack of freehold title to land need not be a constraint, provided that
there are efficient markets for trading land-use rights.5 This, however, has not
been the case. Markets in land-use rights remain poorly developed and
inefficient. It is difficult for private individuals or businesses to mortgage, and
thus raise finance for investment, from their most valuable asset. Commercial
banks are concerned about the difficulties in foreclosing on mortgages in a cost
efficient manner to recover bad debts.6 Actors in the private sector frequently
cite the insecurity of title to land-use rights for commercial and industrial
purposes as one of the most important constraints to private investment.
Vietnamese businesses and professionals also have been disadvantaged in
terms of access to the latest business, market, trade, and professional literature
and information. While controls on access to the internet have progressively
been relaxed since late 1997, costs remain high because of monopoly pricing.
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While the situation has gradually improved, the costs of international
telecommunications, books, newspapers and magazines were higher than
elsewhere in the region for the same reason.
During the decade prior to the passage of the Enterprise Law, reforms aimed
at promoting private sector development were gradually instituted. A Party
Plenum in 1989 called for a multi-sector economy with various forms of ownership
and the Seventh Party Congress in 1991 stated that ‘the private capitalist
sector will be allowed to engage in those businesses prescribed by the law and
beneficial to the national economy’ (Nguyen Van Dang 2001). Changes to
the Constitution (1992) and the Land Law (1993) provided signals to private
enterprises that the state was moving towards protecting key property rights.
These policy and legal changes, and associated administrative reforms, helped
promote social and political acceptance of the private sector, thus increasing
private sector confidence that the reform process would be sustained. Changes
in business policies were reinforced by a gradual opening up of economic and
social life. People had greater freedom to make their own decisions. By the mid
1990s, permission was no longer required for internal travel7 and the number
of Vietnamese travelling to market economies on business and to study was
growing. Personal contact between Vietnamese and foreigners was much more
frequent and only likely to be restricted in exceptional circumstances. There
was increased access to international perspectives and experiences through
television, movies and other media.
A decisive shift in policy towards actively promoting the development of
domestic private sector firms was quite late in coming. A pivotal change occurred
with the extensive consultations and public discussion leading to simplification
of business licensing and registration requirements during the late 1990s and
the enactment of the new Enterprise Law from 2000. Subsequent resolutions
from Party plena in 2001 and 2002, and constitutional change (December
2001), have reinforced the legitimacy of private sector firms. The Fifth Party
Plenum in 2002, resolved to allow Party members to own private firms. A
deputy head of the Party Central Economic Committee summarised the changes
as follows
[w]e used to advocate an economy of which a large proportion of output would come from the
socialist sector, and wanted to eliminate gradually the non-socialist sector. Nowadays, we have
shifted to a multi-sector economy. Many new economic sectors have taken shape, and they co-
exist with such conventional ones as the people, collective and private-owned sectors. Each
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sector has an important role in the economic structure and serves as a constituent of the socialist
oriented market economy. These sectors are allowed to develop, cooperate or compete with one
another healthily. An enterprise may contain different forms of ownership. The legal system has
gradually shifted to one of general provisions governing all the sectors…
…Previously, we used to believe that central planning was characteristic of socialism and would
not accept market relations. Nowadays, we consider the market both the basis and object of
planning which is orientative and particularly important in macroeconomic terms. We recognize
the market as instrumental in helping enterprises select their scope of production and business
plans. Thereby, we have established the elements of the market: goods, services, technology,
information services, consultancy, marketing, legal framework, finance, banking, auditing,
insurance, capital and labour (Nguyen Van Dang 2001).
EMERGENCE OF DOMESTIC PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN THE
1990S
Before Doi Moi, private business was mostly limited to household businesses,
often with uncertain legal status, and operating mainly in the black economy.
By the end of the 1980s, however, there were very many traders operating
throughout the country, and much small-scale private activity in both urban
and rural areas, albeit mostly still without official approval. The number of
household businesses increased from about 0.84 million in 1990 to 2.2 million
by 1996.
Following approval of the Company Law in 1990 the number of private
companies increased steadily, with 190 joint-stock companies, 8,900 limited
liability companies, and 21,000 private enterprises registered by 1996.
From the beginning of the Doi Moi period the private contribution to light
industry, including handicrafts, household and small industries, grew at a
lively rate. Most of the former industrial and service sector cooperatives engaged
in light industry were disbanded, or reorganised as private enterprises. By
1995, there were over 400,000 production units operating outside the state
sector, which generated around 30 per cent of total industrial sector output.
Private businesses have been even more important in the service sector, where
they account for about half of total output. They dominate retail trade activity,
with their share increasing from 41 per cent in 1986 to nearly 76 per cent in
1996. The state share of the service sector (including public administration,
education and health) averaged around 45 per cent through the 1990s.
Excluding public administration, education and health, the state accounted
for about 22 per cent of value added in services in 1996.
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A recently-published survey of developments in small and medium-sized
private business between 1991 and 1997 concluded that
[g]enerally speaking, small-scale enterprises in Vietnam were considerably larger and more robust
in the 1997 survey than they had been six years earlier. Income, capital and assets have all grown,
among the urban as well as the rural enterprises. Furthermore, higher levels of value added per
worker unveil growth not only in size, but also in efficiency. The increases in labour productivity
are universal and in many instances remarkable. In Hanoi it increased by as much as 70 per cent.
This growth has been linked to a general increase in the capital intensity of enterprises. Workers
today have much more machinery and equipment at hand than six years ago (Ronnas and
Ramamurthy 2001:327).
The lively growth of the national private sector, despite what seemed to be
an unhelpful, if not hostile, regulatory environment, has been a particularly
striking aspect of Vietnamese development. As noted earlier, casual observations
suggest that the rate of private sector growth has probably been considerably
greater than that reported in official statistics. In part, this is evidence of the
extraordinary vitality of Vietnamese entrepreneurship. This has been
demonstrated not only in Viet Nam, but also by overseas Vietnamese in contexts
as diverse as North America and the former Soviet economies. It may be that if
entrepreneurial ‘animal spirits’ are strong enough, they can overcome quite
negative regulatory environments. A long-established pragmatic culture amongst
segments of the administrative system, and amongst political leaders, probably
also facilitated entrepreneurial activity.
Thus, somewhat paradoxically, while the regulatory and administrative
system resulted in distortions of incentive structures and possibly a sub-optimal
allocation of resources, it did not prevent the vigorous growth in non-state
economic activity. While the high degree of discretion left to officials in
implementing many policies and regulations left the system open to abuses
and corruption, it also provided for a degree of flexibility whereby businesses
became adept at manoeuvring around regulations and maintaining cooperative
relations with local officials.
Observation suggests that, at the local level, many businesses establish close
relationships with government and party officials.8 Many businesses also have
family members who are involved in the public sector. In addition to helping
negotiate administrative and regulatory hurdles, this can be important in
enforcing contracts and in enforcing property rights. However, it is also apparent
that many business people tend to be quite discrete about the degree of their
success, not wishing to attract too much official interest.
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PRESSURES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR REFORM
The strong focus on employment growth
Grassroots pressure to improve economic opportunities and increase living
standards has been important in driving the reform process. Continuing
improvements in living conditions were important in sustaining the credibility
of the government and the Party, and strong backing of Party and government
leaders has helped in removing formal institutional barriers to business
development. Agriculture and the household sector presently provide the
majority of employment in Viet Nam, but this is generally low productivity,
low income employment with minimal growth prospects. The private sector
has been seen as crucial to increasing employment and incomes.
During the late 1990s, concerns about the potential impact of the Asian
financial crisis and declining foreign direct investment reinforced growing
domestic pressures to reduce barriers to private sector development. The Fourth
Plenum (December 1997)9 called for broader enterprise reform and the
introduction of a more consistent regulatory framework for all types of business
entities in order to achieve a more level playing field, and announced initiatives
to
• amend the law on domestic investment to make it more readily applicable
for different forms of enterprises10
• develop a new enterprise law to apply to a range of different business
entities and with more transparent governance requirements
• streamline procedures for business registration, and for issuing residence
permits and travel documents, to facilitate business development and
employment generation11
• clarify regulations on the inspection and monitoring of enterprises by
government agencies12
• distinguish clearly between civil and criminal breaches of the law and
take strong action to punish criminal business activity
• develop a regulatory environment conducive to healthy competition and
establish institutions to resolve commercial disputes in line with the
principles of a market economy.
With growing economic turmoil in neighbouring Asian countries, pressure
for action had intensified by the time the Fifth Plenum was held in July 1998.
This plenum stressed the need for action to mobilise and utilise more effectively
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the large amounts of untapped capital still ‘under the mattresses’ in Viet Nam.
There has been increased (or at least more public) policy debate about the
positive employment, distributional and equity impacts of small private
domestic investments compared with the more capital intensive investments
typically made by state enterprises and foreign investors. There has also been
more public discussion in the media about the adverse impacts of unnecessary
and poorly drafted regulations in facilitating corruption, and stifling investment
and employment growth.
Interactions between civil society and the bureaucracy
The growing public debate about administrative barriers to business
development reflects grassroots discontent with cumbersome and costly
administrative procedures and also the public dissemination of more
sophisticated analysis of the equity implications of administrative and regulatory
constraints to private sector development by research organisations such as the
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), and the Viet Nam
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI).
Public dissemination of information about the employment and equity
implications of administrative and regulatory constraints to private sector
development have helped increase public awareness of the issues and helped to
build support for reform. For example, CIEM produced and widely
disseminated a report analysing the experiences with the old Company Law
which concluded that cumbersome business procedures are circumvented in
practice, encourage corruption, and add unproductive costs to doing business
(CIEM 1998). The report drew public attention to the reality that the
opportunities for corruption increase as civil servants are given greater discretion
in making administrative decisions affecting the profitability of business
activities. Given increasing public concern about corruption, the widespread
distribution of these findings undoubtedly helped mobilise support for
subsequent reform.
As businesses have developed, managers have had to deal with an increasing
number of officials from outside established networks in order to secure licenses,
pay taxes, secure financing, receive quality certification, and so forth. Business
people became more aware of the administrative barriers to enterprise
development. This, and the increasing number of entrepreneurs who do not
have direct access to decisionmakers, has helped create demand for more
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transparent rules of the game. Business people began to see benefits in working
with other business people, the Party, government officials, and the media, to
push for change. Increased demand for change coincided with more systematic
consultation between the state and the business sector to address business
constraints.
The VCCI has been the dominant business association in recent efforts to
improve the enabling environment for business. The VCCI differs from its
counterparts in most market economies in terms of its close relations with the
government. Most of its staff have worked with the government, and the
government has financed much of VCCI’s infrastructure. While external
observers may argue that the VCCI is constrained in criticising the state, because
of the close links with the Party and the government, at least some domestic
business people argue that it is especially effective in presenting business
complaints to the government because of its close links with the senior leadership
of the government and the Party. It has played a visibly proactive role in pushing
for the reforms embodied in the Enterprise Law and related business regulation
reforms.
In addition, more independent business associations have begun to emerge
which represent the interests of the new private sector (for example, the Young
Entrepreneurs’ Association) and representing industry interests in dialogue
with the government and in public policy debate through the domestic media.
The resolution of the 2002 Fifth Party Plenum
There is now increasing senior level recognition of the contribution of the
private sector to socioeconomic development, and increasing top down pressure
for change. The Fifth Party Plenum (March 2002) stressed that the private
sector is
…an integral part of the national economy. In the past years, the Party and state reform guidelines
and policies have enabled the private economy to grow vigorously nationwide, spreading out to
all branches and sectors which are not prohibited by laws and have mobilised more social resources
in production and business thus generating more jobs and procuring further for the state budget
and making an important contribution to GDP growth (Communist Party of Vietnam
2002:n.p.).13
The Plenum endorsed measures to create an attractive business climate and
a fair and competitive playing field for all enterprises and set priorities for
further reform to support private section development, including further
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improving the Enterprise Law and reducing remaining barriers to the entry of
new businesses; changing the land law and mortgage procedures to make it
easier for the private sector to use land-use rights as equity and/or collateral;
facilitating lending to the private sector through the provision of guarantees
and consulting services; changing the accounting system to encourage private
enterprises to adopt professional accounting systems that distinguish more
clearly between civil and criminal violations of commercial regulations; asking
national leaders to promote the image of the private sector; and allowing business
people to retain Party membership.
While these trends represent important progress, much remains to be done.
For example, the Fifth Party Plenum endorsed the establishment of business
associations, but details of their legal status are still to be resolved. Consultations
on business issues are still done on an ad hoc basis. Thus, progress in reducing
barriers in one area is often (at least partially) undermined by administrative
inertia, or new decisions and circulars emanating from line ministries and/or
provincial authorities. The Fifth Party Plenum also noted concerns about both
the weaknesses of the private sector and problems in ensuring compliance
with business regulations, stating that
Vietnam’s private economy is basically of small scale and capital and equipped with obsolete
technologies, low levels of management and expertise as well as competitive edge. Many private
economic businesses have not strictly observed work rules regarding working allowances and
conditions for employees; quite a few units have evaded tax or violated laws.14
The following section describes the process of business regulation reform
that was aimed at both promoting private sector development and developing
a simplified and more enforceable regulatory environment for business.
THE ENTERPRISE LAW
The consultative processes adopted during the drafting of the new Enterprise
Law15 reflected a crucial turning point in government relations with the business
sector. Consultations between government, the business community, the media,
and members of the National Assembly were protracted and substantive,
resulting in widespread support for, and awareness of, this legislative reform.
Reform proposals also included explicit reference to regional experiences with
private sector development. The substantive consultations appear to have helped
build business confidence that the government and Party were serious in their
commitment to private sector development.
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The enactment of the Enterprise Law in 2000,16 and related regulatory
reforms, greatly improved the institutional environment for private business.
Key implementing regulations (on registering business and cancelling licenses
and permits contrary to the Enterprise Law) were issued in March 2000.17
The net impact of these changes was to help
• reduce ambiguities and inconsistencies inherent in earlier legislation
• provide an umbrella framework for a range of business entities previously
governed by different legislation (joint-stock companies, limited liability
companies (including corporatised state enterprises), and private firms)
• clarify mechanisms to protect investors and enterprises against state
interference in the operations of the enterprise
• simplify enterprise registration procedures
• introduce partnerships as a new form of business
• clarify the rights and interests of company members, and especially the
interests of minority shareholders
• clarify mechanisms for decision making within the company structure.
• protect the interests of lenders by clarifying the conditions for withdrawing
capital from company
• clarify procedures for profit distribution to protect the interests of
shareholders
• define procedures for transferring ownership of non-cash assets
• clarify procedures for merging or breaking-up an entity, and for shifting
from one form of entity to another.
In related reforms, the government revoked the need for about 150 business
licenses and permits, and simplified many remaining business licensing
procedures. While enforcement remains an issue—and many licenses are still
required—regulatory reforms have greatly reduced establishment costs and
the time required to register businesses. Simplified procedures have reduced
opportunities and incentives for corruption, reduced uncertainty about the
legality of business operations, and allowed investors to focus their efforts on
business development. A very tangible impact of the changes has been the
marked reductions in the time lapsing between submission of dossiers
requesting business registration, and the eventual approval (from an average of
about 90 days to 7 days), and reductions in the typical fees paid to consulting
firms for registering a company from about VND 10,000,000 to VND
500,000.18
166 VIET NAM: A TRANSITION TIGER?
These administrative changes were of greatest benefit to smaller enterprises
because the costs of complicated procedures are largely fixed: that is they were
not related to the size of the enterprise. For small enterprises, these costs could
account for a large percentage of their total costs structure. Larger enterprises
could spread fixed costs over a larger cost and revenue base. Costs of complex
and less transparent regulations were particularly high for those without personal
access to decisionmakers in the bureaucracy (for example, firms in isolated and
rural areas and firms headed by ethnic minorities, women and other groups
that are underrepresented in government). Thus, simplification of procedures
helped to reduce the bias against such groups establishing new businesses.
RELATED INITIATIVES GIVING GREATER RECOGNITION TO
THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Many initiatives have been introduced since approval of the Enterprise Law
which have the potential to improve further the regulatory environment for
small enterprises. Since February 2000, private enterprises have been allowed
to convert, transfer, lease, provide their assets as collateral and capital
contribution to banks or to joint-ventures. The Ninth Party Congress (March
2001) endorsed a Socio-Economic Development Strategy for 2001–10 that
included a commitment to move towards equal treatment for all enterprises. A
Public Administration Reform Master Plan approved by the Prime Minister in
September 2001 is a potentially important step towards addressing remaining
administrative barriers to private enterprise development. The December 2001
meeting of the National Assembly amended the Constitution to provide clearer
recognition of the long-term role for the private sector in the economy, and
formally approved the Socio-Economic Development Strategy for 2001–10.
The strong official endorsement of the private sector appears to have had a
significant impact in building investor confidence, and in increasing pressure
on those mid-level officials who have been reluctant to implement streamlined
business procedures.
IMPACTS OF THE ENTERPRISE LAW
The net result has been a rapid acceleration in the registration of new businesses,
including businesses that previously operated in the ‘grey’ economy. During
the first year of enactment, 14,444 enterprises were newly registered under
the Enterprise Law—about 2.5 times the number of registrations in 1999
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under earlier legislation. By the end of 2001, some 35,000 enterprises had
been newly registered under the Enterprise Law. Some of these enterprises
were already operating informally, but most were newly established. Some
existing companies prefer to establish new companies as part of their expansion
plans in order to benefit from tax incentives offered to new businesses.
Not only did the number of private businesses grow at a high rate, but their
average size and diversity of business activity of sole proprietorship and limited
liability companies also expanded. The rate of growth in output by the domestic
private sector has exceeded that of both state enterprises and foreign invested
enterprises since 2000. Despite this growth, nearly all Vietnamese private
enterprises remain relatively small.
The most significant growth has been in the number of new joint-stock
companies. The number of joint-stock companies registered in 2000 exceeded
the number of joint-stock companies established in the previous nine years.
The number of limited liability enterprises newly registered under the
Enterprise Law almost equals the total number of such enterprises registered
under the old Company Law. The rate of growth in the number of new sole
proprietorship enterprises has also accelerated. In addition, some 4,000 existing
enterprises increased their chartered capital and/or broadened the scope of
registered business activities.
Not only did the number of private businesses grow at a high rate, but the
average size and diversity of business activity of sole proprietorship and limited
liability companies also expanded. With the rapid expansion in numbers of
joint-stock companies, the average registered capital of joint-stock companies
declined, from VND 11 billion in 1991–98 to VND 4.2 billion in 2000.
Prior to the Enterprise Law there were only a few, relatively large share-holding
companies (including equitised state enterprises).
In mid 2001, the Steering Group for Enterprise Law Implementation
(SGELI) estimated that the total registered capital of private enterprises had
reached VND 24,000 billion (US$1.65 billion), that newly registered
companies have created 300,000 new jobs, and that newly registered sole
proprietorship businesses have created another 200,000 jobs.
Prior to the enactment of the Enterprise Law most new enterprises were
registered to engage in trading activities. Some 61 per cent of enterprises were
primarily engaged in trading services, 26 per cent in manufacturing and
processing, 3 per cent in construction, and the remainder in other services and
168 VIET NAM: A TRANSITION TIGER?
general business. Following enactment of the Enterprise Law, trading activities
still account for the largest share of new business registrations, but the share of
manufacturing and other services has increased. Some 42.7 per cent of the
businesses registered during 2000 were engaged primarily in trading services,
31.4 per cent were in industry and construction, 3.9 per cent in agriculture
and 21.9 per cent in other services and general business. The sector classification
system for registered enterprises is still evolving, and thus these numbers should
be seen as indicative. However, the figures suggest that private investors are
now more prepared to make longer-term business investments.
There is also some indication of more equal regional distribution of newly
established enterprises. During the period 1991–98, some 72 per cent of all
enterprises were established in the southern provinces, mostly in and around
Ho Chi Minh City. While the number of enterprises registered continued to
increase throughout the country, the share of newly registered enterprises in
the southern provinces fell to 56 per cent of total newly registered enterprises,
Table 11.1 Number of newly registered enterprises, 1991–2001
Type of enterprise 1991–98 1999 2000 2001a
Sole proprietorship 26,708 2,427 6,412 2,709
Limited liability company 12,163 3,147 7,304 3,976
Joint-stock company 316 208 726 543
Partnership - - 2 0
Total 39,187 5,782 14,444 7,228
Note: a First five months of the year.
Source: CIEM and Enterprise Department, Ministry of Planning and Investment.
Table 11.2 Average registered capital of new enterprises, 1991–2001
(VND million)
Type of enterprise 1991–98 1999 2000 2001a
Sole proprietorship 197 400 439 546
Limited liability company 1,006 1,360 1,091 1,276
Joint-stock company 11,832 5,316 4,223 4,923
Partnership - - 550 88
TOTAL 542 1,099 959 1,297
Note: a First five months of the year.
Source: CIEM and Enterprise Department, Ministry of Planning and Investment.
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while registrations in the northern provinces increased to 32 per cent, and
registrations in the central provinces increased to 12 per cent of the total during
the first five months of 2001. The acceleration in new registrations in the
northern and central provinces is particularly pronounced for the larger limited
liability and joint-stock companies (Table 11.3). However, most new business
registrations continue to be concentrated in the major cities.
COOPERATIVE SECTOR
Official data suggest that cooperatives played an important role in all sectors
prior to the start of Doi Moi, accounting for 35 per cent of gross social product
in 1985. Cooperatives accounted for 43 per cent of valued added in agriculture,
24 per cent of industry and 18 per cent of general trade in 1987 (see General
Statistical Office 1989, 1992). Subsequently, the share of cooperatives fell
sharply, with the most rapid declines being in agriculture and trade. By the
mid 1990s, cooperatives accounted for less than 1 per cent of GDP.
The role of cooperatives in agricultural production fell to virtually nothing
after the 1988 agriculture reforms. The role of cooperatives in industrial output
fell sharply after 1988 to about 1 per cent of industrial output by 1994. Most
cooperative production capacity was transferred to the private sector. Price
reforms, relaxation of restrictions on private sector development, state enterprise
reforms, and the loss of East European markets all contributed to reduced
incentives for cooperative forms of industrial production.
The 1996 Cooperative Law and the new cooperatives
In response to concerns about the declining role of cooperatives, the government
drafted a Law on Cooperatives which was approved by the National Assembly
in 1996.19 The law included provisions for cooperatives to receive up to 50 per
cent reductions on land-use rents and taxes for the first two years of operation
and preferential access to credit. Family members of cooperative employees,
many of whom will also be engaged in the private sector, are to benefit from
50 per cent reductions on tuition fees in government training institutions and
from government financed training.20 On the other hand, regulations on
inheritance of investments in cooperatives are vague, being largely left to
regulations in the Statute of Individual Enterprises. The policy objectives in
providing such differential treatment to cooperatives are not specified in the
regulations.
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Table 11.3 Newly established enterprises, by region, 1991–2001
(per cent)
Type of enterprise 1991–98 1999 2000 2001a
Northern provinces 16.9 18.2 28.4 32.1
Private enterprise 6.4 4.4 7.7 7.4
Limited liability company 10.3 12.2 18.4 21.0
Joint-stock company 0.2 1.6 2.2 3.7
Central provinces 11.4 10.4 13.1 12.0
Private enterprise 8.8 6.5 8.3 6.3
Limited liability company 2.6 3.4 4.3 4.9
Joint-stock company 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.8
Southern provinces 71.7 71.4 58.5 55.9
Private enterprise 52.7 30.9 28.7 23.8
Limited liability company 18.4 39.1 27.5 29.1
Joint-stock company 0.5 1.5 2.3 3.1
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: a Year to June
Source: CIEM and Enterprise Department, Ministry of Planning and Investment.




Number transformed but without
prior to with business business Number
new law licence licence closed No action
Cooperatives 9,810 4,250 1,203 1,088 3,269
Per cent of total 100 43.3 12.3 11.1 33.3
Source: CIEM 2001. Report to CIEM Workshop on Implementation of the Cooperative Law,
www.ciem.org.vn.
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Subsequently, the government issued a comprehensive set of implementing
regulations.21 The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), the Ministry
of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), and the Central Union of
Cooperatives soon thereafter organised training courses throughout the country
to encourage the transformation of old cooperatives, and/or re-registration of
cooperatives, under the new Cooperative Law. Steering committees were
established at the provincial and at district levels, to facilitate transformation
at the commune level. The due date for transforming cooperatives under the
new law was 31 December 1998, but many cooperatives had still not been
transformed by mid 2001 (Table 11.4).
Newspaper reports indicate that there was more rapid progress in
transforming cooperatives in the second half of 2001 and in the first quarter of
2002 (Viet Nam News, March 2002). The Fifth Party Plenum in March 2002,
was critical of ‘the errors of Party organisations and authorities from central
down to grassroots levels’ in failures to develop the collective economy, and
stressed the need to ‘accelerate, develop and improve the efficiency of the
collective economy’ (Nhan Dan News, 4 March 2002). The Plenum concluded
that
the collective economy and cooperatives are crucial for individual households and small and
medium-sized enterprises to lean on each other to survive and grow in the fierce competition of
the market economy. The collective economy and cooperatives also constitute a means, which
combines with the state economy in addressing social issues, reducing hunger and poverty and
raising community awareness…the collective economy should be developed in diverse forms
with cooperatives as the mainstay to…guarantee that the collective economy and state economy
become the bedrock of the socialist-oriented market economy.
It is not at all clear, however, how realistic these resolutions are (at least in
terms of the economic contribution of cooperatives) as the share of cooperative
output in GDP was less than 1 per cent in 2000, roughly the same share as in
1996 when the new law was approved. Recent studies indicate that there
continues to be ambiguity about the role of cooperatives, the relative roles and
responsibilities of cooperative management and members, and of the rights of
local authorities to interfere in basic cooperative management decisions (CIEM
2001).
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LESSONS AND ISSUES FROM RECENT PRIVATE SECTOR
REFORM EXPERIENCES
Informal institutions have played a key role in that rapid expansion of household
and micro business in Viet Nam during the Doi Moi period. However, as firms
grow, and commercial transactions expand beyond village, provincial and
national borders, so the demand for more formal institutions grows. But it
takes time to develop new institutions and, in planning institutional
development, it is important to recognise that new institutions need to reflect
local realities and meet demands from the business community. Access to formal
institutions, especially if they are ‘over-designed’, may be very expensive for
many entrepreneurs. The challenge is to maximise the benefits from both
existing (often informal), and new institutional arrangements. Institutional
reform should generally focus on complementing, rather than displacing,
existing market institutions.
The recent acceleration in growth of formal private enterprises reflects
increasing private investor confidence that an institutional and policy
environment is emerging that will protect their property rights. The turnaround
in the state approach to private sector development is reflected in the Enterprise
Law. While the thrust of earlier business legislation was that private enterprises
might be permitted if they complied with government controls, the Enterprise
Law codifies mechanisms to protect the rights of citizens to establish and
operate private businesses. It also establishes the right of investors to be protected
from undue official interference, provided businesses operate legally. Other
factors that have contributed to increased confidence over the last 2–3 years
include
• a clearer commitment from the country’s leadership about the long-term
role for the private sector in economic development
• the fundamental change in thinking at all levels of society reflected in the
process of recent regulatory reform and drafting of the Enterprise Law
• commitments to the private sector that are increasingly reflected in state
policies, legislation and other institutional reform affecting the private
sector
• simplified procedures that have reduced opportunities and incentives for
corruption, reduced uncertainty about the legality of business operations,
and allowed investors to focus their efforts on business development.
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REMAINING CHALLENGES
Although the government and Party have left some key questions unresolved
about the appropriate balance in the roles of the state, markets and market
institutions, ambiguities about the state commitment to private sector
development have been reduced in recent years. Meanwhile, accelerated business
development continues to contribute to employment growth, and thus to
poverty reduction.
The challenge lies in sustaining this progress. This will require continued
efforts to address remaining institutional inadequacies that result in high
transaction costs and thus constrain business investment and employment
growth. Continuing progress in improving consultations between the state
and business people will be useful in identifying remaining inadequacies.
Successful institutional reform and development requires broad support.
Institutional reform usually results in both winners and losers. Policymakers
need to understand the distributional consequences of proposed reforms. In
some cases, sustained efforts are required to build support for reforms.
Formalising consultative processes and requiring regulatory impact assessments
(that also incorporate consultative processes) could add to the quality of new
policy and regulatory documents. There is also a need to develop the capacity
of research agencies and associations in undertaking applied research, and in
preparing policy submissions, on business development issues.
The domestic business media played an important role in securing support
for the Enterprise Law, and for complementary regulatory reform. The media
could play an increasingly important role in increasing awareness of private
sector constraints and business issues, and in providing the greater transparency
needed to succeed with anti-corruption efforts.
Learning by doing and by empirical observation have been important inputs
into Viet Nam’s reform program. Viet Nam has actively studied experiences in
other countries in planning reforms, and experiences from more successful
provinces have been extended elsewhere throughout the country. Competition
between regions for investment can help in developing the most appropriate
institutions as it ‘highlights successful institutions and promotes demand for
them’ (World Bank 2001b:4). However, it is also important that such
competition does not lead to new distortions in the form of protection and
other subsidies for investors.
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Regulatory reform has reduced the discretion of civil servants in making
decisions affecting business investments. This has the potential to facilitate
private sector development and reduce some opportunities for corruption. But
there are contradictory tendencies. With a growing role for the private sector,
and increased contracting out of the provision of public goods and services to
the private sector, improved transparency and accountability in public
procurement and policy process is also needed. Otherwise, efficiency gains
could be dissipated through new types of corrupt relationships between the
state and private sector.
NOTES
1 Vijverberg and Haughton (2002) found that participation in non-farm self-employment
was ‘associated with a higher standard of living…and…greater economic mobility’.
2 The proliferation of new decrees, laws and policy reforms may, at least, partly reflect the
fact that donors often see such measures as important indicators of success for institutional
building technical assistance projects and policy based lending.
3 Kornai (1992:579) argues that such tensions are inevitable in post-socialist societies.
4 Article 11(6) of Decree 85-CP (17/12/96), ‘Guiding Implementation of the Ordinance
on the Rights and Obligations of Domestic Organisations with Land Assigned or Leased
Land by the state’, Government Gazette (28/2/97, p.14).
5 The state retains ownership of land in Hong Kong, and parts of Australia, with land-use
rights leased on a long-term basis.
6 A mortgage sale generally required the consent of the government and mortgagor (Circular
217-NHNN (17/8/96)) and the sale must be conducted by an authorised body (Article
273(2) of the Civil Code).
7 People still had to register when changing addresses, and some restrictions on moving
addresses between provinces.
8 Officially, Party members were not allowed to engage in private business prior to the Fifth
Party Plenum in 2002.
9 Fourth Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress (December 1997)
10 Amended in April 1998. The Law on the Promotion of Domestic Investment was intended
to address concerns of domestic investors that foreign investors received preferential
treatment, but cumbersome and ambiguous procedures meant that relatively few domestic
businesses applied directly to benefit from the incentives provide under this law.
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11 Steps were taken soon after to simplify business registration and on the issuance of visas for
domestic and foreign business people. Business registration reforms were included in Circular
5/1998/TTLT-KH&DT-TP (10/7/98). ‘Procedures for Establishing and Registering
Private Enterprises and Companies’.
12 Actions on these issues were reflected in Decree 61/1998/ND-CP (15/8/98), ‘Inspection
and Control Work with Regard to Enterprises’ and Directive 16/1998/CT-TTg (31/3/98),
‘Settlement of Enterprise Petitions’.
13 Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee
(Ninth Tenure) on Renovating Mechanisms and Policies to Encourage and Facilitate Private
Economic Development. See also the Government Action Plan to Implement the Resolution
of the Fifth Plenum (Decision 94/2002/QD-Tty, 17/7/02), Cong Bao, Hanoi.
14 A decree addressing this issue was being discussed in early 2002.
15 This section draws on research undertaken as part of the CIEM/UNDP project on
‘Improving the Regulatory Environment for Business’ which has supported business reforms
since 1997.
16 This law replaced the old Company Law and Private Enterprise Law.
17 Decree 02/2000/ND-CP(2/3/00) on registering business under the business law, and
Decree 03/2000/ND-CP (2/3/00) and Decision 19/2000/QD-TTg cancelling licenses
and permits contrary to the Enterprise Law.
18 Actual costs vary substantially. Estimates are as reported by the Steering Group for Enterprise
Law Implementation, and have also been widely reported in the domestic press.
19 National Assembly (3/4/96), ‘Law on Co-operatives’.
20 Decree 15-CP (21/2/97), ‘Policies to Promote the Development of Cooperatives’.
21 Decrees 02-CP (2/1/97), 15-CP (21/2/1997), 16-CP (21/2/97), and 41 to 46-CP (29/
4/97).
1VIET NAM’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
There was a prelude to growth in the 1980s: economic stagnation was coupled
with the government’s poorly coordinated and initially ineffective attempts to
reduce imbalances through currency, price and wage reforms. The turning
point came as a result of a package of measures introduced in 1989 to reduce
inflation as a vigorous response in real output to the early reform efforts.
During the first half of the 1990s the Vietnamese economy moved from
economic crisis to buoyant growth, sustained until the East Asian economic
crisis began to impact on Viet Nam.
This chapter examines the success of export-led growth following the East
Asian crisis of 1997 with particular emphasis on sectoral developments in
agricultural policies and growth, as well as an examination of industrial growth
– a sector which has grown much more rapidly than agriculture.
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12
THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
PRELUDE TO GROWTH: ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN THE 1980S
The economic difficulties facing the country in the period leading up to the
implementation of Doi Moi were described earlier. Following an initial economic
recovery immediately after formal reunification in 1976, attempts to impose
central economic controls and conflicts in Cambodia and in the border area
with China contributed to economic stagnation and increasing macroeconomic
imbalances during the late 1970s. Annual economic growth averaged only 0.4
per cent in the five years to 1980. With population increasing by about 2.3
per cent each year, this represented a decline in per capita income. Prices
increased by an average of more than 20 per cent each year. Individuals
attempted to meet basic needs by producing and trading outside official
channels.
Despite some economic recovery and growth in national output in the first
half of the 1980s, public sector and trade deficits continued to increase sharply.
By the mid 1980s, inflation soared and output growth fell sharply. Agricultural
growth slowed, and paddy production per capita fell by 1 per cent in 1986
and a further 8 per cent in 1987. Following the poor harvests of 1986 and
1987, large areas of the country experienced near-famine conditions.
The reliability of the economic growth data for the 1980s is particularly
uncertain. Data was collected to estimate net material product under a centrally
planned accounting system. The available series indicates low but positive
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growth for the years 1985–89. However, a decline in agricultural value added
was recorded in 1987 and a decline in industrial output in 1989. At best, per
capita economic growth was around 2 per cent per annum, and was probably
lower.
The Doi Moi process outlined in the previous two sections of this study was
initiated during a mounting economic crisis in the late 1980s. There was a
gradual relaxation of the administrative controls on private sector activity and
domestic trade. In early 1987, many of the checkpoints that had been
established to limit domestic trade were reduced, and private markets for
agricultural goods developed rapidly.1 In mid 1987, substantial price reforms
were introduced with the official price of most non-essential consumer goods
raised to close to the market price and rationing cut back. At the same time,
the dong was substantially devalued. However, government attempts to reduce
imbalances through currency, price and wage reforms were poorly coordinated
and initially ineffective. Large macroeconomic imbalances persisted, and
economic prospects were uncertain.
THE TURNING POINT: 1989–92
The critical turning point in Vietnamese economic performance came in the
period 1989–92, when growth in GDP rose from 4.7 per cent per annum
(1989) to 8.1 per cent per annum (1992), and inflation had been reduced to
less than 20 per cent (Figure 12.1). The economic history of the period 1989–
92 is therefore of particular interest.
The striking improvement in economic performance happened in a period
in which Viet Nam experienced a sharp decline in external assistance. External
assistance from the Eastern Bloc declined sharply and then abruptly stopped
in 1990–91 as a consequence of the dramatic political changes in the Soviet
Union. Access to finance from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank continued to be blocked by the US
government until 1993, and few OECD countries provided assistance at the
time.
Recently, claims have been made that Viet Nam is an example of the success
of foreign aid in promoting poverty-alleviating growth (Development Economics
Vice Presidency 2002). Claims could possibly be made for the effectiveness of
external assistance in later periods, but the crucial period for reform and the
turning point for economic performance was characterised by a sharp reduction
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in the level of foreign aid. Indeed, a simplistic interpretation of Figure 12.1
might suggest that higher levels of investment were required to achieve constant
and then declining levels of growth during the mid 1990s. This apparent
decline in investment efficiency occurred as ODA and FDI inflows were
increasing. Of course, the real story is much more complex.
Economic management in the years 1989–92 had to meet the difficult
challenge of achieving a degree of monetary and price stability at the same
time as encouraging expansion in the real economy during a period in which
the economy faced a tight external constraint. Policymaking in that period
involved a large degree of economic crisis management. The response on the
part of the Vietnamese authorities was a pragmatic combination of
implementation of market liberalisation (Chapter 7) and fairly orthodox
macroeconomic stabilisation.
Figure 12.1 Financing development and growth, 1986–2001
Source: Data from General Statistical Office (various years), Statistical Yearbooks, Statistical
Publishing House, Hanoi; and International Monetary Fund (various years), Recent Economic
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In 1989, the Vietnamese authorities implemented a rigorous IMF-style
policy package (without IMF assistance to soften the social costs).2 When the
program was introduced, the economy was experiencing hyperinflation, with
price increases of 774 per cent in 1986, 223 per cent in 1987 and 394 per
cent in 1988. In the semi-reformed economy, there were enormous imbalances
between the official economy and free market transactions.
The package of measures introduced in 1989 helped to reduce inflation to
35 per cent in 1989. The initial success was not sustained because of the
inability of the government to control money supply growth given the weak
fiscal base and the need to avert a collapse in the real economy.
In 1991, as the full effects of the decline in trade with the CMEA countries
took hold, there was a significant decline in both exports and imports. The
avoidance of a decline in real GDP at that time (GDP grew 5.8 per cent in
1991) was an indication of government policy success, although price
stabilisation had not yet been achieved. Inflation again rose to 67 per cent in
1990 and 1991, before the government again tightened monetary policy and
the real economy expanded, bringing inflation back down below 20 per cent.
Since 1992, inflation has remained below 15 per cent.
The critical factor influencing economic performance was a vigorous response
in real output to the early reform efforts. The cumulative effects of the land
reforms, liberalisation of domestic trade, price reforms, including an increasingly
realistic foreign exchange regime, and greater macroeconomic stability,
stimulated a strong supply response. In 1992, both agricultural and industrial
output expanded rapidly. As crude oil exports expanded, the decline in exports
was reversed and imports could be increased. The economy turned the corner
with little external assistance.
ACHIEVEMENT OF RAPID GROWTH: 1993–97
During the first half of the 1990s, the Vietnamese economy moved from
economic crisis to buoyant growth. This was sustained until the East Asian
economic crisis began to impact on Viet Nam in 1998. Real GDP growth rose
to an annual rate of 8 per cent in 1992, and stayed at 8–9 per cent through
1997. Increasing supply and prudent government financial policies ensured
inflation was kept under tight control from 1992.
An important qualitative aspect of the economic performance was that growth
extended to all sectors, with relatively strong growth in agriculture making an
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Table 12.1 Annual growth rates, 1994–2000
a
Year Inflation GDPb Industrial Exports Non-oil
output exports
1995 12.7 9.5 14.5 28.2 30.9
1996 4.5 9.3 14.2 41.1 43.5
1997 3.6 8.2 13.8 24.6 28.9
1998 9.2 5.8 12.5 2.4 5.3
1999 0.1 4.8 11.6 23.2 16.2
2000 -0.6 6.8 17.5 25.2 15.9
2001 est. 0.8 6.8 14.2 3.8 12.5c
Notes: a The IMF report from which the data in this table are abstracted also presents IMF staff
estimates that give a lower GDP growth rate for 1997–2000 apparently mainly because the IMF
staff estimate growth rates for services significantly below official estimates. IMF staff estimates
show the service sector growing less than 1 per cent 1998–99—considerably below the GDP
growth rate and even below population growth. Official government estimates show services
growing below the GDP growth rate and as such seem reasonable enough. On balance, the
government estimates appear more plausible.
b Constant 1994 prices. c Growth during the first 10 months of 2001.
Source: Official government estimates as presented in International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Vietnam: selected issues and statistical appendix, Country Report 02/5, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC.
important contribution to overall growth. While, in a statistical sense, the
industrial sector led GDP growth, expanding at an average annual rate 13–14
per cent per annum in each year 1993–97, the growth rate in agriculture in
the range 3.5–5 per cent per annum in each year over the same period was also
impressive compared with long-term historical trends and international
experience. Agriculture still had sufficient weight in the economy (in 1994, it
still accounted for 27 per cent of GDP) that lively growth in agricultural
output was an irreplaceable component of the high overall growth. The high
rate of agricultural growth ensured national food security, which had been at
question in the 1980s, but also contributed substantially to exports and
ameliorated the widening gap between urban and rural incomes (Table 12.1).
In this period, the inflow of external finance became more important. Foreign
direct investment rose to US$832 million in 1993, US$1,048 million in 1994
and US$2,074 million in 1997. During that period, Viet Nam participated
in the boom in East Asian investment. Aid flows built up more slowly and
during the 1993–1997 period remained of minor importance in overall
development financing compared to the flows of private investment.
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PROXIMATE SOURCE OF SUCCESS: EXPORT-LED GROWTH
The obvious and immediate engine of growth was the expansion in exports.
Between 1989 and 1997 the dollar value of Vietnamese exports rose seven-
fold. This high export growth rate had a pervasive influence. It generated fast
income growth. In the agricultural sector, it sustained a growth rate in excess
of the expansion of the domestic food market. Rapidly increasing export
earnings, supplemented by capital inflows, generated the foreign exchange
needed to fund imports, including capital goods. Entry into new branches of
trade stimulated technical transfer and innovation. Buoyant foreign exchange
earnings made it easier to liberalise the foreign exchange regime and protection
levels.
Underpinning the early growth in exports were
• the initiation and subsequent growth of petroleum exports
• agricultural expansion, which both ensured food supply and made a
significant contribution to export growth
• a rapid expansion of seafood and aquaculture exports during the 1980s
and 1990s
• a diversification of agricultural exports to coffee, tea, cashews, pepper,
cinnamon, rubber, fruit and vegetables, especially during the mid to late
1990s
• a rapid expansion of exports of garments and footwear throughout the
1990s so that by the middle of the decade they accounted for a large
share of exports
• a steady expansion of handicraft exports (fine arts, pottery, glassware and
embroidery) and wood products
• the emergence of electronic equipment as a fast growing export by the
end of the decade (exports of electronic equipment declined in 2001 in
line with the sharp rise in international demand for electronic products).
Geographic proximity to high income, and/or rapidly growing, Asian
economies has also been important as these countries are the major markets for
Vietnamese exports. Japan was the major market for Vietnamese exports in
2001, followed by China, Australia, Singapore and the United States.
An important characteristic of the export performance has been its diversity.
The initiation of the export of crude oil at the beginning of the decade was
important, as it helped fill the foreign exchange gap resulting from the end of
aid from, and the decline in trade with, the CMEA. Crude oil exports expanded
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from US$79 million in 1988, to US$756 million in 1992. By 1995, petroleum
exports topped US$1 billion per annum, one-fifth of total exports (Table 12.2).
In the subsequent period (1996–97), petroleum exports continued to grow,
but fell as a share of total exports, as agricultural and light industrial exports
grew at high rates. 1998 saw a continuing increase in the quantity of oil exports,
but a decline in their value as a result of sharp price declines, thus compounding
the problem of generally flat export growth following the onset of the East
Asian crisis. During 1999–2000, fast expansion in the quantity and value of
oil exports contributed to the export growth of more than 20 per cent per
annum.
In one sense, the presence of crude oil is an exogenous factor, although its
exploitation did require complex negotiations with foreign partners and the
encouragement of foreign private and state investment. However, while the
gains from mineral exploitation can be interpreted as a windfall, the international
record demonstrates that the uses made of such windfalls can vary quite widely—
Figure 12.2 Export growth in selected Asian economies, 1986–2000
Sources: World Bank, 2002. World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC;
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there are plenty of examples of mineral booms having little sustained
development impact, or generating ‘Dutch disease’ problems.3
In the event, during the 1990s Viet Nam avoided ‘Dutch disease’ effects.
Despite the usefulness of the oil revenues, the growth in oil production never
resulted in the export economy becoming dominated by oil, at the expense of
other exports. Non-oil exports expanded alongside the oil industry. This can
be contrasted, for example, with the experience of Nigeria (with roughly the
same per capita income level as Vietnam), where the rapid expansion in oil
revenues was associated with a decline in the competitiveness and levels of
traditional exports.
The surge in rice production, which resolved the national food security
problem, also supported the swift growth of Viet Nam to the front ranks of the
international rice trade, making Viet Nam one of the big three rice exporters
(along with the United States and Thailand). By 1999, rice exports peaked at
4.5 million tons. In the first half of the decade, grain production increased by
about 1 million tons each year, with more than 3 million tons of rice becoming
available for export by 1996, a significant contribution to the rapid growth in
total exports. Efforts are currently being concentrated on improving the quality
of rice exports.
In addition to the early success with rice exports, an important and sustained
contribution also came from other agricultural and marine products. Although
the collapse of the CMEA trading bloc in 1991 had a negative impact on
exports of industrial (‘cash’) crops, Viet Nam quickly developed other markets
for such crops as coffee, cashews, rubber and tea, and more recently fruit and
vegetables.
Successful expansion of agricultural exports was a direct benefit of Doi Moi.
Policy reforms had strengthened incentives. Production of food, industrial crops,
livestock, fishing, and aquaculture products all grew at very high rates,
responding to price and land reforms, investment of time in accessing new
ideas and seeds, investment in terms of income foregone while coffee plants
were maturing, and limited investments in post-harvest facilities.
Expansion in some tree crops (particularly rubber) also initially reflected a
return from state farm investments in the 1980s, and then was increasingly
supported by the fast growth in private (smallholder) production. In minor
export crops, such as cashews and pepper, Viet Nam has moved from negligible
production to being a major player in world markets. Exports of marine and
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aquatic products (for example, shrimp, fish, cuttlefish and crab) have also grown
at a very high rate, topping US$1 billion for the first time in 2000.
During the 1990s, Viet Nam was particularly successful in expanding coffee
production, displacing Indonesia as the world’s third largest producer in 1999
(after Brazil and Colombia) and then overtaking Colombia in 2001 with coffee
exports totalling 931,200 tons.
Viet Nam’s experience with coffee has also demonstrated the potential risks
involved in primary commodity exporting. Starting as a small producer, Viet
Nam was initially a price-taker, responding to prices determined in international
markets, to which its own contribution was still minor. While a small supplier,
Viet Nam was subject to the fluctuations in the international coffee market,
but could still expand production without having to take into account the
impact of its own output on prices. That changed, however, as Viet Nam
became a big enough player in the world coffee market for its own contribution
to have a significant impact on world supply and as such contribute to price
instability. As a result, benefits from the dramatic increase in coffee production
have been offset by the fall in coffee prices on international markets to historic
lows in real terms. As a result, coffee production and exports are expected to
fall in 2002.
The key to ongoing export success is to move on to new products when Viet
Nam’s share in a given world product rises to a level at which it cannot expect
to expand its sales by further increasing market share. This has been possible
to some degree by diversification within the agricultural export sector, but
further expansion will increasingly have to be based on growth in industrial
exports.
 In this regard, an important feature of Viet Nam’s export performance has
been the diversification into industrial exports. As Western and Asian markets
replaced traditional trade with the CMEA at the beginning of the 1990s,
light manufacturing exports expanded, reflecting the re-orientation of existing
state-owned light manufacturing firms to the requirements of new markets
and the increasing contribution of private foreign direct investment. Clothing
and textile exports topped US$1 billion in 1996 and footwear did likewise in
1998. Contributions to this growth came from adjustment to new market
opportunities by existing state enterprises and direct foreign investment
(including joint ventures with state firms). There was a good deal of regional
interest in the possibilities for using Viet Nam, with its low labour costs, as an
186 VIET NAM: A TRANSITION TIGER?
export platform at a time when boom conditions in other East Asian economies
were pushing them into other stages of the export product cycle. Many buyers
from the region came to Viet Nam and, sensing opportunities, provided basic
inputs (raw materials), know-how and equipment in return for future
production. Much of this indirect foreign investment never appeared in official
statistics as foreign investment.
Despite the strong export diversification and growth, the IMF (1999:59),
citing ‘pervasive NTBs and relatively high tariffs’, judged Viet Nam’s trade
system as ‘one of the most restrictive of Fund members’ at the end of the
1990s. Other external observers have argued that Viet Nam has adopted import
substitution policies that place undue emphasis on protecting capital-intensive
industry (and state enterprises) and have restricted trade in areas where the
country has greatest comparative advantage.4 The private sector has, until
recently, has been restricted in directly engaging in trade (other than for goods
produced by that firm).
Nevertheless, export growth has been extraordinarily high and, with the
exception of oil, most of this has involved the export of labour-intensive
agricultural and light manufacturing products. Jenkins (2002) reports that
the share of manufactured industrial goods increased from 14 per cent of exports
in 1991 to 37 per cent in 1999 and that, if processed agriculture products are
included, ‘manufacturing accounts for two-thirds of exports in 1999’. Jenkins
estimated that the employment impacts of recent trade developments have
been positive and that, while there ‘were some industries where import
substitution occurred, most notably motor vehicles and other transport
equipment…in most industries the share of imports in domestic demand
increased’.5 He estimated that the share of imports in domestic demand for
manufactured goods increased from 56 per cent in 1995 to 61 per cent in
1999.
The degree to which the Vietnamese economy opened up during the 1990s
is illustrated in Figure 12.3, which shows comparative data for trade turnover
as a percentage of GDP for selected Asian economies. Viet Nam has transformed
from a closed economy, with a very low ratio of trade to GDP, to an economy
with total trade turnover greater than annual GDP. This ratio is high compared
with the Philippines or Indonesia, is on a par with Thailand, but is considerably
lower than that of Malaysia.6
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GROWTH FOLLOWING THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS OF 1997
The reverse side of the benefits flowing from successful integration into the
global economy is vulnerability to external shocks. Given the role played by
the fast growth of foreign investment and exports in fuelling the 1993–97
expansion, it was inevitable that Viet Nam would be vulnerable to downturns
in the regional and global economies. With the onset of the East Asian economic
crisis, growth in the economy slowed and foreign direct investment declined
sharply.
Nevertheless, the economy exhibited a degree of resilience in the face of the
East Asian crisis of 1997. Viet Nam performed better than many other
economies in the region (Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines
Figure 12.3 Total trade turnover in selected Asian economies,
1986–2000 (per cent of GDP)
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and Singapore have all experienced one or more years of output decline since
1997) and better than most observers (including the government) expected.
The Vietnamese economy weathered the East Asian crisis rather well, and
per capita incomes continued to increase, albeit at a reduced rate. The downturn
in the world economy in 2001 has had an additional negative impact, resulting
in low export growth and overall economic growth lower than long-term plan
targets.
A number of factors contributed to the resilience of the Vietnamese economy.
The diversified export base helped. Although export growth fell to less than
3 per cent in 1998, exports returned to double digit growth rates in 1999 and
2000. This was partly the result of the buoyancy of petroleum exports, but
also because of the fast expansion of footwear, garments and marine products,
as capacity created in the earlier period came into use.
One way the East Asian crisis seriously impacted on Viet Nam was through
the sharp decline in foreign investment. Regional investors had played a leading
role in the build-up of foreign direct investment. After 1997, foreign direct
investment declined and the government slowed down planned public
investment. The downward pressures on capital formation were partly offset
by increased domestic private investment, which became increasingly important
in the post-1997 economy. There was a rise in the domestic rates of savings
and investment, and foreign aid flows continued to accumulate, reflecting with
a lag the rapid growth of commitments following the ending of the US embargo
in 1993.
Somewhat ironically, Viet Nam also benefited from the slow pace of reform
of the financial sector. Foreign banks had been allowed to open branches, but
domestic capital markets were only at a very early stage of development. Most
international private financial flows were to finance foreign direct investment.
There was little portfolio investment or external flows into the banking system
or local financial markets. Although there was an element of speculative boom
before 1998 (particularly in relation to foreign investments in the real estate
sector), there had been no financial bubble fuelled by international financial
flows and expansion in bank credit, as experienced elsewhere in the region,
and by the same token there was no speculative shock as the bubble burst.
In general, the play of market forces has the maximum positive impact in
periods of international economic expansion. During periods of economic crisis,
the political case for moderating the effects of the market becomes more
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Table 12.3 Growth rates in selected Asian economies, 1996–2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
China 7.7 7.0 1.8 7.6 8.3 3.9
Hong Kong 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 7.3
South Korea 6.8 5.0 –5.3 3.0 10.5 0.1
Taiwan 6.1 6.7 4.6 5.4 5.9 –1.9
Indonesia 3.5 3.7 1.5 6.9 5.4 5.3
Malaysia 10.0 7.3 –7.4 6.1 8.3 0.4
Philippines 5.8 5.2 –0.6 3.4 4.0 3.4
Singapore 7.7 8.5 0.0 6.9 10.3 –2.0
Thailand 5.9 –1.4 –10.8 4.4 4.6 1.8
Note: Asian Development Bank, World Bank and Government of Vietnam estimates of growth
are not always consistent.
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2002. Asian Development Outlook, Asian Development Bank,
Manila.
Figure 12.4 Growth rates in selected Asian countries, 1986–2001
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persuasive. In some cases (for example, contemporary United States), this may
strengthen the case of domestic interest groups arguing for trade protection.
In the case of Viet Nam, it could be argued that the continued importance of
the state investment, and the measured pace of enterprise and financial reforms,
may have provided an element of countercyclical stability in a period of
international economic difficulty. However, the slowdown in the international
economy did not result in any lessening of the pace of reform. Indeed, the
slowing of the pace of foreign investment appears to have contributed to an
increasing focus on the importance of the domestic private sector.
SECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS: AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND
AGRICULTURAL GROWTH
The importance of agricultural growth
A central pillar of Viet Nam’s success in the late 1980s and 1990s was the
sustained high rate of agricultural growth. This was of crucial importance for a
number of reasons. Growth in agricultural exports made an important
contribution to export growth. In 1995, agricultural, forest and aquatic products
accounted for 46 per cent of total exports. Although that figure dropped to 33
per cent by 1999, over that period the increase in agricultural, forest and aquatic
exports of US$1,253 billion accounted for one-fifth of total export increase,
In the simplest statistical terms, given the relative importance of agriculture,
the achievement of high rates of overall growth would have been unlikely without
a buoyant agricultural sector. Buoyant agricultural growth has also generated
non-agricultural rural employment opportunities in services, input supply and
food processing industries.
Even more important, the successes in reducing poverty were only possible
with significant growth in rural incomes. Rice is not only the main product of
Vietnamese agriculture and the dominant food staple, but also provides the
basic income source for a large segment of the population of poorer farmers.
Data from the 1992–93 and 1997–98 Viet Nam Living Standards Surveys
indicate that four-fifths of households in the lowest income quintile were
occupied in agriculture, a proportion that has remained stable. For the highest
quintile of households, 34 per cent were engaged in agriculture in 1992–93,
a figure that dropped to 19 per cent in 1997–98. The 1992–93 survey also
indicated that almost three-fifths of the per capita income of people in the
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lowest expenditure quintile were generated by agricultural activities, compared
to less than one-fourth for the highest quintile.7 The reverse was true for income
generated through non-agricultural self-employment activities. These activities
accounted for 15 per cent and 52 per cent of total per capita income for the
lowest and highest quintiles, respectively. For all quintiles, the income from
wage labour activities was around 20 per cent.
Nutritional standards were low in the 1980s, and output increases of nearly
2 per cent per annum were necessary just to match population growth. The
growth in food production was therefore an essential condition for economic
and social progress for the mass of the population. The boost in rural incomes
meant that despite a widening gap between urban and rural incomes, which
could be expected to act to pull population from rural to urban areas, the push
factor encouraging people to leave the countryside was limited and migration
was as much from one rural area to another as from countryside to city. That
limited the pressure for heavy expenditures on urban development.
Figure 12.5 FDI inflows in selected Asian countries, 1986–2000
(per cent of GDP)
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Perhaps most important, the success of the agricultural sector relaxed the
pressures and anxieties of ensuring national food security. In the mid 1980s,
Viet Nam had been faced with the need to import substantial quantities of
food. Fluctuations in the rice harvest, at a time when the external financial
situation was precarious, had placed national food security in question, resulting
in incidents of widespread near-famine. The growth in rice output was therefore
a key component of Viet Nam’s economic success. In the 1980s, food shortages
resulted in widespread suffering and national food security was a leading
preoccupation. The shift from food shortages to being a leading grain exporter
was important both economically and politically.
Total rice production did not meet domestic demand up to 1988, necessitating
imports of 700,000 to 1,600,000 tonnes annually. From being a net importer
of rice, Viet Nam became self-sufficient and then a net exporter of rice. By
1992, staple food production was 24.2 million tonnes (paddy equivalent), of
which paddy was 21.6 million tonnes, while 1.95 million tonnes of rice were
exported. Food output continued to grow, and total grain production rose to
26.2 million tonnes paddy equivalent in 1994 and an estimated 27.4 million
tonnes in 1995. Rice exports were an estimated 2 million tonnes in 1994 and
1995. The growth in food production was sustained throughout the decade.
In 2000, despite floods in the southern and central regions and drought in the
north, food output reached 35.6 million tonnes (paddy equivalent), up 1.4
million tonnes from 1999, including 32.6 million tonnes of paddy.
Over the longer term the existence of a large exportable rice surplus provides
a cushion whereby the impact of fluctuations in production on domestic supply
can be limited.
Determinants of agricultural growth
The Vietnamese reform process began with reforms in the agricultural sector
in 1985. The process of change since then has involved continuous modification
to polices and institutional arrangements, which often involved the government
acting to accommodate spontaneous changes in grassroots activities. Given the
timing of the reforms and the subsequent acceleration in growth there can be
no question that the move to a more decentralised, market orientated system
of agricultural production was a decisive factor in promoting agricultural growth.
McCarty (2001) shows the impact of key policy changes on food grain output
(and the ratio of paddy to other cereals) since 1975.
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The basic unit for agricultural production in Viet Nam is the family farm.
There are some 10 million agricultural households. State farms are restricted
to about 4 per cent of Viet Nam’s agricultural land and concentrate on the
production of industrial crops, such as rubber, and food crops, such as sugar,
where there are considerable economies of scale in production.
Even during the period of tight state control of agriculture, the family holding
had remained at the base of the system, although subject to considerable control
from the cooperative. Following the reforms of the 1980s, the family farm
became even more important as the basic production unit. Cooperatives
continued to control access to land and water and the farmer bartered a portion
of the farm output with the cooperative for input and services supplied.
The role of the cooperative declined particularly rapidly in the south, but
in some areas (particularly in the north and centre of the country) the
cooperatives were able to retain a strong position as a supplier of inputs to
individual households. The household controlled production decisions and
Figure 12.6 Per capita food production in Viet Nam, 1975–88
Source: McCarty, A., 2001. Governance Institutions and Incentive Structures in Vietnam, paper
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Table 12.4 Average annual growth rates in paddy output and inputs,
1976–94
Period Output Labour Land Materials Capital TFPa
1976–80 0.4 0.4 -0.8 -1.1 2.2 0.6
1981–87 4.2 0.3 -1.2 3.3 1.7 3.3
1988–94 6.1 1.3 -0.5 5.6 10.6 3.1
Note: a TFP is total factor productivity calculated as Solow Residuals.
Source: Che, Nhu, 1997. The Effects of Internal and External Trade Liberalisation on Agriculture
Growth: a case study of Viet Nam, PhD Dissertation, The Australian National University,
Canberra.
the surplus left after meeting various obligations to the cooperatives and to
local authorities (which can be onerous). The private sector has become
increasingly involved in the marketing and transport of agricultural output. 8
Reforms affected all aspects of rural economic life. The development of the
household farming unit as the core of rural production determined the nature
of the rural economic system. The growth of the private trading and transport
system has resulted in a competitive, low cost and innovative rural trading
system in most parts of the country.
The land area used for paddy production increased through the extension
of multiple rice cropping. Although the wet season paddy area declined
marginally (4 per cent) between 1987–92, the area planted for the winter–
spring crop increased by 24 per cent, and the summer–autumn crop by 59
per cent, over the same period (World Bank 1994b). Che (1997) provided
estimates of factors contributing to increased rice output (Table 12.4).
After the initial gains achieved following the agricultural reforms and the
resulting increase in farmer incentives, many external observers were somewhat
pessimistic about the potential for continued output growth.9 Typical of
international opinion was the conclusion of the World Bank 1994 study of
agricultural marketing that
…in the absence of substantial new investments in irrigation and drainage, in the mid 1990s
yields are likely to peak at 3.4 tonnes per hectare, multiple cropping increases will slow, and
total production of paddy will level off at around 23 million tonnes. Even with new investments
(given the time required to complete systems), for the next years, production growth may
decelerate to average 1.9 per cent per annum over the decade (World Bank 1994a:23).
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However, it was not solely the ‘magic of the market’ that resulted in sustained
agricultural growth. No doubt the flexibility and improved incentives resulting
from market reforms was the most important force in the growth process, but
sustained growth in smallholder agriculture also required the support of effective
infrastructure and services, particularly in the provision of irrigation and
transport, the promotion of new crops and the supply of improved inputs.
An important component of success was that, alongside the market reforms,
the state organisations responsible for infrastructure have operated effectively,
and state-owned enterprises responsible for servicing the agricultural sector
have in many instances adjusted to the complexities of the new economic
environment. Although private firms are now playing an increasingly important
role in promoting innovation (for example, introduction of hybrid maize and
horticulture seeds), state organisations also played an important role in
promoting new crops and cultivation methods, for example, by introducing
such crops as cashew in the 1980s, promoting the massive development of
coffee in the Central Highlands and supporting the introduction of new varieties
of paddy. With the introduction of new varieties and improved cultivation
methods, yields have risen significantly.
The state was also important in maintaining and expanding infrastructure.
Important investments included rehabilitation of the storm protection system
and rehabilitation of the transport network. Investments in irrigation have
facilitated multiple cropping. The Vietnamese government has also repeatedly
demonstrated a high level of commitment and effectiveness in disaster
management—Viet Nam is subject to frequent climatic disasters, but often
manages relief efforts with only modest international support.
It is not entirely clear how the combination of state support, development
of private marketing and processing and household agriculture has worked. In
a general sense, the basis of success seems to be that market liberalisation has
been accompanied by a reasonable level of state capacity in providing the support
required by farmers. There is merit in criticisms that the system is sub-optimal,
there is plenty of evidence that many state organisations are not very efficient,
and no doubt that further reforms in state-owned and run rural delivery systems
are needed. The achievement of sustained agricultural growth nevertheless
suggests that a reasonable level of effectiveness was achieved. In particular,
continued output growth beyond the initial gains from market reform
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confounded the predictions of knowledgeable observers that growth was expected
to slow in the early 1990s.
During the reform period many state research and service institutions suffered
from financial distress, sometimes resulting in a diversion of energies from
their main task. The references in consulting reports—and in official government
and Party pronouncements—to the inefficiency of state enterprises are legion.
Nevertheless, the system has worked well enough, often through a mixture of
pragmatic response by state institutions in competition with each other,
accommodating newly emerging private firms, cooperating with foreign
businesses and, in some notable cases, demonstrating a continuing professional
commitment to research and advisory work.
One distinguishing characteristic of the system is the high degree to which
all organisations generate revenues from cash transactions, even government
departments funded by the state budget. This means that, even when the
state budget is unable to fund activities or pay reasonable salaries, agencies
often take initiative in seeking cash through the sale of their services. The
pervasive practice of boosting incomes through one form or another of fringe
payment is obviously open to abuse, but as a transitional mechanism it has
worked well enough in keeping many institutions in operation despite
stringencies in official budget allocations.
Thus Vietnamese agricultural growth has succeeded both as a result of market
reforms providing incentives to the farmer and through continued public
provision of infrastructure, including extensive efforts to rehabilitate irrigation
systems and improve the transport network, and a pragmatic and rather ad hoc
approach to the reform of the system of input provision and technical support.
One area in particular which requires better documentation is the process
whereby innovations in rural production are introduced. Observed performance
suggests that in the agriculture sector there has been a successful combination
of state-sponsored change and farmer response, but a more detailed analysis is
required.
In the longer term, sustained agricultural growth will require large
infrastructure investment, especially in water management and transport
infrastructure, the strengthening of research, extension and other agricultural
support services and encouragement of competition in the agricultural trading
system. And, as successful export growth has increased the integration of
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Box 12.1 The seed sub-sector
An example of the mixture of public service and private provision supporting agricultural growth
can be drawn from the seed sub-sector. Improvements in seed varieties and seed quality have
accounted for an estimated 15–20 per cent of the increases in crop yields. Before Doi Moi, the
seed sector was in principle tightly organised into four distinct administrative levels
• the central level (research, production of pre-basic seed—national seed companies)
• the provincial level (production of basic seed—provincial seed agencies)
• the district level (production of first generation certified seed by seed stations)
• the local level (multiplication of seeds by specialised brigades in the cooperatives).
Since the introduction of Doi Moi, the whole process of seed multiplication and distribution
has been liberalised de facto, so that all economic sectors, including state-owned enterprises,
private companies, farmers’ groups and farmer households participate actively. The resulting
system is somewhat chaotic but has distinctly positive characteristics. The industry now
comprises a large number of different agencies. At the base, the farm household has a choice as to
which seed will be used, while the cooperatives are no longer organised to produce seed in the
same way as under the pre-reform system.
Formal agencies include two state-owned national seed companies, one each in the North and
South, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Provincial Seed
Agencies (PSA) comprising Provincial Seed Companies (in the North and Central regions) and
Seed Centres (in the Southern region) owned by the provincial governments; a number of
government research and breeding institutions, responsible for research and development, which
also produce and sell seed directly to farmers and a few private companies, mainly based on
foreign direct investment, which produce and/or import and sell hybrid cereal seed and vegetable
seed to farmers.
Competition in the seed market has increased. A PSA typically faces competition for its open
pollinated varieties from seed companies in the neighbouring provinces, one or both of the
national seed companies, the agents of government research and breeding institutions,
cooperatives and farmers’ groups. In the market for vegetable and hybrid maize seed, there is
competition from other state-owned enterprises, private seed producing companies and
importers. In a number of cases, the PSA cooperates with private companies and serve as their
‘sales agents’, buying and selling hybrid and vegetable seed with an attractive margin. The formal
seed industry only supplies a small fraction of the open pollinated varieties used for paddy
production, but hybrid seed, mainly promoted in the North,10 is necessarily produced through
the formal system.
The market for hybrid grain seed is increasing rapidly, even in the formal sector the emerging
institutional structure seems quite complex. Almost all the higher level research, university and
breeding institutions, which might have been expected to specialise in the pre-basic and prior
levels of activity, engage in some activities supplying seed directly to the market. While this
provides the higher level research and breeding facilities with income to support their activities
and keeps them directly in touch with the needs of farmers, it is probably sub-optimal because
by-passing the intermediate stages results in pre-basic seed not being reproduced through the
seed production chain to extend the benefits of improved seed more widely.
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Vietnamese agriculture into international markets, fluctuations and downward
trends in export prices will have an impact in terms of changing product mixes,
increasing export quality, opening up new markets and introducing new crops.
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
As may be expected at this stage of Viet Nam’s development, the industrial
sector has grown much more rapidly than agriculture. Despite the high rate of
agricultural growth, agriculture’s share of total economic activity has been
declining over the last ten years. This is a typical feature of successful growth,
whereby somewhat paradoxically agricultural expansion helps sustain a high
rate of overall growth, which in turn results in a declining share of agriculture
in total production. Thus, although the great success in food production and
agricultural exports were key factors in Vietnam’s successful growth performance,
agriculture’s contribution (including forestry) to GDP fell to an estimated
25.4 per cent of GDP in 1999, down from 38.7 per cent in 1990. The high
rate of industrial growth achieved during the 1990s was another key factor
contributing to the overall growth achievement.
Industrial value added (GDP at constant prices) declined in the difficult
transitional year of 1989. The recovery was fast, however, and industry and
construction achieved 13 per cent growth in 1992 and subsequently sustained
growth at above 10 per cent per annum (except for 1998 and 1999, when,
under the impact of the East Asian crisis, industrial growth fell back to 8 per
cent per annum). Although the structure of GDP has shifted towards industry,
the proportion of the labour force working in industry and construction has
not increased, remaining in the range of 12–13 per cent of the labour force.
Developments in the industrial sector have been complex. The larger (mainly
national level) state enterprises continued to make substantial investments in
heavy industries, such as cement and steel, often as a joint partner with foreign
firms. Government rhetoric remained committed to the idea of a heavy
industrialisation strategy as being essential to development. Arguably this had
led to over-investment in some sectors (for example, over-investment in coal
and cement during the 1995–2000 Five-Year Plan) and output expansion in
some activities which may be difficult to sustain in the context of commitments
to open trade under the the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Common Effective
Preferential Trade scheme and the US–Viet Nam bilateral trade agreement.
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Table 12.5 Industrial output (VND billion)




1985 103.3 .. .. 109.9
1986 109.6 .. .. 106.1
1987 120.6 .. .. 110.0
1988 137.8 .. .. 114.3
1989 133.4 .. ..  96.8
1990 137.5 .. .. 103.1
Constant 1989 prices
1990 15,361 14,011 1,350 103.1
1991 17,437 15,471 1,966 110.4
1992 20,876 18,117 2,759 117.1
1993 23,547 20,412 3,135 112.7
1994 26,751 23,214 3,537 113.7
1995 30,431 26,584 3,847 114.5
Constant 1994 prices
1995 103,375 77,442 25,933 114.5
1996 118,097 86,535 31,562 114.2
1997 134,420 95,542 38,878 113.8
1998 151,223 102,865 48,358 112.5
1999 168,749 110,235 58,514 111.6
2000 198,326 125,910 71,285 117.5
2001 (prel.) 226,406 125,910 79,908 114.2
Note: a FDI output is output by ‘foreign invested firms’ which includes output by joint enterprises.
b Previous year=100.
Source: General Statistics Office, 2001. Statistical Yearbook 2001, Statistical Publishing House,
Hanoi; General Statistics Office, 2000. Statistical Data of Viet Nam Socio-Economy 1975–2000,
Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi.
An important part of state-owned industry is made up of light industry and
small and medium-sized enterprises. Some have decayed under pressure from
increased competition and reduced subsidisation, but a number were successful
in finding new export markets, particularly in cooperation with foreign investors.
Implementation of the state investment program contributed to the high
rate of industrial growth. While some state industrial investments resulted in
the production of goods that were able to compete in home and export markets,
it also resulted in a significant element of over-investment in some industries
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and pressures to protect inefficient domestic producers from low-cost imports
(for example, sugar).
There was also some foreign investment in excess capacity in classic import
substitution activities, such as vehicle assembly, but that was a small part of
the total investment in the industrial sector. There was no across-the-board
emphasis on import substitution of consumer goods behind tariff barriers.
The trend in protection has been downwards. A wide range of cheap imported
goods has been available in Vietnam, even in the early stages of the Doi Moi
process. Quite apart from adjustments to the tariff regime which have been
implemented under Doi Moi, the efficiency of Vietnamese smugglers places a
limit on the degree of protection that can be offered to domestic industry. For
many consumer goods it is difficult if not impossible to suppress smuggling,
because of the long borders and the proximity of low cost producers (most
notably China).
Industrial production therefore was under pressure to compete with imported
goods, and in many areas there was lively competition between domestic
producers even within the state-owned sector. In key areas of continuing public
monopoly, the picture has been more mixed. In telecommunications, for
example, great strides were made in the early 1990s in transforming the external
telecommunications system, which had been dependent on antiquated lines
of communication through Moscow. Considerable progress was also made in
increasing the coverage and density of the internal telecommunications system.
Despite the considerable technical improvements, however, international
services remained expensive by international comparative standards, with the
benefits of technical improvements only being slowly passed on to customers
through price reductions. High communications costs act as a brake on
Viet Nam’s ambitions to increase its participation in the information technology
market in the next stage of its development.
Likewise, although there have been large investments to ensure that power
provision has kept up with the demand generated by the rapid economic growth,
power rates have risen because of the need to generate substantial cash flows to
contribute to the investment costs of further expansion.11
Industry was also a focus of interest for expanding private foreign
investment.12 A Foreign Investment Law had been promulgated as early as
1987, opening up opportunities for foreign direct investment. A major part of
the foreign investment was through the vehicle of joint ventures with state-
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owned enterprises.13
Output from foreign-invested enterprises increased from negligible levels to
more than one-quarter of total industrial output by 1995, and continues to
grow more quickly than state sector ouput, accounting for 35.5 per cent of total
industrial production in 2000 (preliminary estimate). The first major foreign
investments were concentrated in the petroleum sector, so that in 1995 about
42 per cent of the output of foreign-invested enterprises was in the mining
(mostly oil) sector. The foreign sector still only accounted for about 17 per
cent of manufacturing output. By 2000, however, mining activities accounted
for only 32 per cent of ‘foreign-invested’ industrial output, while the foreign
sector had grown to account for 30 per cent of total manufacturing output.
An important impetus, particularly for regional investors (notably Singapore,
Taiwan, Korea and Malaysia), was to make use of Vietnam’s low-wage but
reasonably educated workforce, in a period in which the success of their
development efforts at home had resulted in increasing wage costs as labour
markets tightened and their workforces began to benefit from their growing
national incomes. This was particularly so in the boom years before the regional
financial crisis in 1997.
Over the 1995–2000 period, foreign-invested firms expanded exports from
US$440 million (1995) to US$3,320 million (2000 preliminary), or from
8 per cent to 23 per cent of total exports (32.5 per cent of the increase in total
exports came from foreign-invested firms). Thus foreign investment made a
significant contribution to the expansion of Vietnamese exports, but did not
play the major role. The major component of industrial and export growth
was the domestic sector.
To sustain its successful export performance, Viet Nam will have to go on
meeting competition from export platforms in the region and further afield.
In the short term, if there is a revival in the world economy and a resulting
acceleration in international trade, this should not present great difficulties.
But, over the longer run, if the Vietnamese labour force is to enjoy the rising
incomes which are the objective of development, then the same agility shown
in the past decade in adjusting to international market opportunities will have
to be applied to raising labour productivity and adjusting the product and
export mix to more sophisticated exports, capable of accommodating higher
income levels.
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NOTES
1 The extent to which administrative constraints were relaxed varied considerably throughout
the country depending on the actions of local level administrative authorities.
2 As mentioned in Chapter 7, the program included positive real interest rates, drastic exchange
rate adjustment and efforts to contain the state budget.
3 The term ‘Dutch disease’ was coined to describe the negative consequences of the North
Sea natural gas boom for the Netherlands economy. The dangers are that a mineral boom
can lead to an exchange rate that is overvalued in relation to the needs of other export
sectors and to a ‘soft’ government budget, with increases in public welfare spending
discouraging more productive economic activity.
4 For example, Kokko and Zejan (1996) argued that, ‘in spite of the impressive export growth
recorded during the first half of the 1990s, it is still appropriate to characterise Viet Nam’s
development strategy as import substitution’. Kokko et al. (2001) argued that ‘lagging
growth…was caused by weaknesses in the import substituting parts of the economy’. CIE
(1999) cautioned that ‘the problem at the moment is that the general thrust of policies is
to encourage inefficient import substitution’.
5 Rhys Jenkins (2002) argues that ‘[i]t is clearly not the case that import substitution was a
significant factor contributing to slow employment growth in Viet Nam in the second half
of the 1990s’.
6 Countries with smaller populations, like Malaysia and Singapore, will typically have a higher
ratio of trade turnover to GDP because their smaller scale means they are likely to have a
comparative advantage in a more limited range of products. Larger countries, like China,
the United States and Indonesia will typically have lower ratios of trade turnover to GDP.
7 Using the 1992–93 survey, a very basic measure of severe poverty was based on the income
level estimated to be necessary to sustain consumption of 2,100 calories per day (which
was estimated to be the case for incomes equivalent to VND 1.07 million per person per
year at 1992–93 prices to cover food and non-food consumption). The poverty line of
2,100 calories for total consumption expenditures, of which 65 per cent was food
expenditures, included rice consumption of 171.5 kilograms per person per year, or
263.8 kilograms of paddy (using a conversion factor of 1:0.65). Using that measure,
households with incomes below the poverty line (that is, subject to severe poverty) accounted
for 51 per cent of the population.
8 In describing a system subject to a continuing process of change, it is difficult to pinpoint
the precise nature of the system at any given point in time. This account therefore emphasises
the process of change over time without attempting a precise description of the speed and
extent of change at any one moment.
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9 In personal exchanges with senior agricultural advisers in the early 1990s, the view was
expressed that the gains from reform having been reaped, deceleration in growth could be
expected.
10 Hybrid rice seed is being introduced from China. The Vietnamese seed industry has begun
to develop its own capacity in the complex process of producing hybrid rice seed.
11 In relation to infrastructure investment, many Western commentators, aware of the risks of
over-design and excess capacity, and advisors have emphasised caution. Japanese
commentators, however, have tended to be much more ambitious in their estimates of
investment requirements. By and large, the Japanese advice has proved more appropriate,
as the pace of economic growth has been such that lower investment in infrastructure
would have resulted in constraints on industrial growth.
12 Initially the biggest concentration of foreign investment was in petroleum; there was also
substantial investment in real estate development, including hotels.
13 Which means that the statistical breakdown in earlier statistical series between state and
private industrial output (which shows growth in state industrial production outstripping
private production) has to be interpreted with some care. In the series now in use, output
by the so-called foreign invested sector includes the production of joint enterprises.
1VIET NAM’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
Rising rates of capital formation played an important role in Viet Nam’s growth
process in two important ways: an increase of capital formation was necessary
to accommodate the growth in output; and the inflow of foreign investment
was important in providing the basis for establishing a number of new exports.
This chapter examines the role and performance of investment via external
finance, both through foreign investment and assistance programs, and the
effects of investment in foreign technical cooperation
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13
CAPITAL FORMATION AND EXTERNAL
ASSISTANCE
THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT
The role of investment in the Vietnamese growth process may be interpreted
as follows. Increases in the rate of capital formation did not initiate the
acceleration in growth, and the high rates of growth achieved are not to be
explained by the rate of capital formation. Nevertheless, rising rates of capital
formation played an important role in the growth process in two important
ways.
Once the pace of growth accelerated, increased levels of capital formation
were necessary to accommodate the growth in output. For example, without
an expanded program of infrastructural investment, output growth would
eventually have been constrained by bottlenecks in the transport system, power
supply, and so forth.
The inflow of foreign investment was also important as a vehicle for the
transfer of technology to Viet Nam, in particular providing the basis for the
establishment of a number of new exports. It would be a mistake, however, to
interpret growth in the rate of capital formation as leading the overall growth
process, as is implied by ‘capital–output ratio’ type growth models, which
assume that an increase in the rate of capital formation will be sufficient to
raise the rate of output growth. Moreover, at the critical period for growth
acceleration, the factors that increased the productivity of capital were more
important than increases in capital formation in contributing to growth.
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INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
After 1992, there was an increase in recorded investment. The ratio of gross
capital formation to GDP is estimated to have risen from 15 per cent in 1991
to 25 per cent in 1993–95, continuing in the range of 25–27 per cent in
subsequent years (Table 13.1). While this represented a significant acceleration,
the investment rate remained well below the very high levels achieved by the
East Asian Tigers in their periods of high growth and, for reasons argued in the
previous section, does not in itself explain the output growth performance.
However, it should also be noted that, even by conventional definitions, official
series may underestimate capital formation. Given the rural structure of the
economy and the growing importance of household and small enterprise activity,
a significant amount of investment was probably not fully recorded.
In addition, aggregate investment figures miss important intangible capital
investments. Parente and Prescott (2000) develop a powerful argument that
conventional measures of investment greatly underestimate the level of capital
formation, even in economies with fairly complete statistical coverage. They
argue that the conventional measure of investment in terms of expenditures on
new structures and equipment and inventories is misleading, particularly in
underestimating the importance of intangible investments (for example, research
Table 13.1 Gross fixed capital formation, 1991–2001












Sources: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1996. Public Investment Program 1995–2000,
Ministry of Planning and Investment, Hanoi; and General Statistics Office, 2001. Statistical
Yearbook 2001, Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi.
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and development and software, the organisational capital of firms, investments
in individual human and social capital).1 They conclude that if such factors
are taken into account as a general rule ‘unmeasured investment is big and
could be as much as 50 per cent of GDP and is surely at least 30 per cent of
GDP’ (Parente and Prescott 2000:47). Increased competition and openness to
international information and technology flows can help accelerate growth in
such intangible investments (Rodrigo 2000).
This is particularly important in a changing international economic
environment where investments in information and know-how are becoming
increasingly more important relative to investments in fixed capital. Examples
include operations and maintenance (in Viet Nam many resources for the
operation and maintenance of public infrastructure are mobilised at a local
level and do not even appear in expenditure data). The average life of much
physical capital in Viet Nam can be very high because of investments in
maintenance and in adapting capital goods to local needs (the long life and
wide variety of uses made of small tractors in rural villages is a case in point).
It is estimated that investment during the period 1991–95 totalled
VND 206,000 billion, equivalent to US$16–17 billion, of which the state
sector accounted for VND 96,000 billion (46.6 per cent).
The sources of investment activity in the period 1995–2000 are shown in
Table 13.2. The figures suggest that foreign direct investment made a critical
contribution to the surge in investment activity in 1995–97, but was of
declining importance following the onset of the East Asian crisis. The period
of high rates of foreign direct investment was associated with the period of the
highest export growth.
When the relative contribution of foreign investment fell in 1998, state
investment accounted for the major share in investment activity. This expansion
of state investment is explained by the build up of official development
assistance, reflected in the item ‘credit’ under the state investment category.
By contrast, the figures for domestic non-state investment suggest that the
relative importance of the non-state sector is declining, a surprising finding
given the evident growth in importance of non-state economic activity followng
the Doi Moi reforms. There are a number of possible explanations.
One possibility is simply undercounting of non-state investment, particularly
by households and small enterprises.2 It is also likely that investment data
exaggerate the relative productive impact of public investment, as it is strongly
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weighted with highly capital-intensive projects. Investments in the private
sector have generated higher output and much more employment in proportion
to outlay than state sector investments. This, however, would not explain the
trend increase in the relative importance of recorded state investment.
Another factor may be the increasing importance of official development
assistance in the state investment budget. By and large, aided projects are
more expensive per unit of output than domestically financed activities, certainly
compared with those in the non-state sector, but even in relation to state
investments.
The data also reflect the reality that the government of Viet Nam throughout
the 1990s tended to be more sympathetic to foreign direct investment than to
domestic private investment and, until the implementation of the new enterprise
law in 2000, persisted with a regulatory regime which was not encouraging to
formal private business activity. The result was that much non-state activity
was implemented by unregistered firms and appeared statistically, if at all,
under the amorphous category of ‘household’ economic activity.
Table 13.2 Investment, by ownership, 1995–2001
(per cent of total investment)
 1995 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001a
State investment 42.0 49.1 49.4 55.5 58.7 57.5 58.1
Domestic non-state investment 27.6 24.9 22.6 23.7 24.0 23.8 23.6
Foreign direct investment 30.4 26.0 28.0 20.8 17.3 18.7 18.3
Note: a Preliminary estimate.
Source: General Statistical Office, 2001. Statistical Yearbook 2001, Statistical Publishing House,
Hanoi.
Table 13.3 Allocation of state investment, 1995–2001
(per cent of total investment)
 1995 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001a
State budget 44.6 45.6 44.0 40.4 41.3 41.3 42.5
Credit 19.9 19.9 19.3 23.7 28.3 32.1 32.2
Equity in state enterprises 12.2 14.8 16.8 17.7 17.4 16.9 17.9
Other 23.3 19.7 19.9 18.2 13.0 9.7 7.4
Note: a Preliminary estimate
Source: General Statistical Office, 2001. Statistical Yearbook 2001, Statistical Publishing House,
Hanoi.
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The investment strategy adopted by government in the Public Investment
Program 1995–2000 and in the 1995–2000 Five-Year Plan was to focus public
investment on economic and social infrastructure, particularly on critical
economic infrastructure needs, such as transport, electricity,
telecommunications, and water resources, and on investment in human capital
through education and health programs.
The government also committed public investment funds to such basic
industries such as cement, steel, mining and oil and gas processing, and provided
loan finance from state credits, funded from domestic and foreign sources, for
such activities. The main weakness in the government investment strategy was
over-investment in some of the basic industries (for example, cement and coal)
and some other state enterprise activities (for example, sugar refining). The
government committed resources to stimulate investment in other industries
by establishing industrial parks and by providing the infrastructural
requirements of focal economic zones.
While it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the investment data, they
are consistent with the view that a strong role for state investment was not
inimical to vigorous export led growth. This suggests that, at least in the
Vietnamese case, an active public investment program can support the
development of other sectors, rather than ‘crowd out’ their efforts.
Examination of the government investment program (not including
investment in state-owned enterprises) indicates that a great deal of emphasis
was put on investment in infrastructure—a rather traditional approach to
development. Generally, government investment reflected the established
doctrine that government investment priorities in supporting the growth process
should be to ensure the supply of those resources which have a strong ‘public
goods’ component, primarily infrastructure which cannot be readily funded by
commercial mechanisms. Segments of economic activity which should be treated
as public goods at this stage of Viet Nam’s development, such as roads, flood
control and major irrigation works, and water supply and sanitation (which
have an important public health element), placed great demands on the
government capital budget.
The priorities for public investment at the beginning of the 1990s were
fairly obvious. The major component was the rehabilitation of basic
infrastructure that had been damaged in the war years, a challenging task that
had only been partly dealt with in the difficult years following unification.3
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The flow of foreign direct investment following the opening up of the
economy was mobilised for a number of different reasons. One strong impetus
was regional investors seeking platforms for low cost labour-intensive exports.
Another element was the attraction of investment in the oil industry (the
major share of UK investment was made by British Petroleum in the oil
industry). Such investments were important in helping finance the export
boom.
Some of the investment to meet the needs of the domestic market was more
problematic (for example, the over-investment in property development4 and
vehicle assembly), and the downturn in foreign direct investment in 1998 not
only reflected the regional crisis, but also specific problems facing investors
supplying the domestic market who had made over-optimistic assessments of
the Vietnamese market.
Following the 1997 crisis, although government postponed a number of
public investments and reduced the level of public investment below levels
that had been planned, the relative importance of public investment in total
capital formation increased sharply. State investment grew from 48 per cent of
total investment in 1997 to an estimated 62 per cent in 2000. The expansion
of state investment was fuelled partly by the increased flows of official
development assistance, which fortuitously played a countercyclical role in
coming on stream just as regional foreign investment flows were falling sharply.
In relation to non-state domestic investment, more work is required to increase
understanding of the structure of the sector. Surveys undertaken on the private
sector suggest that the growth of the sector has been more vigorous than the
statistics suggest. Existing official data suggest that domestic non-state
investment has consistently accounted for one-fifth of total investment annually
over 1997–2000. The rapid registration of new enterprises under the new
enterprise law may increase the information available.
One macroeconomic weakness identified by some observers was the modest
domestic savings target set in the 1995–2000 Five-Year Plan. Although the
GDP data suggest that savings have risen significantly, the savings rate still
falls short of the very high rates achieved in other successful economies in the
region, and may be too low to sustain very high growth rates in output over
the longer term. As noted above, however, the data on private investment and
savings is inadequate, so that actual savings performance may have been better
than targets and available data indicate.
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This is suggested by the macroeconomic data for recent years. IMF data
indicate that gross national savings rose from 13.6 per cent of GDP in 1995 to
26.5 per cent of GDP by 1999.  This also reflected the declining relative
importance of foreign direct investment after 1997.
THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL FINANCE
Private foreign investment
In the period before 1994, the key foreign direct investment in Viet Nam was
in the oil and gas sector, with peak investment in 1993. In the period until
1996, the growth in crude oil exports was the leading component of total
export growth. The next two most important contributors to export growth in
the first half of the decade, rice and marine products, were not areas that
received much attention from foreign investors.
Figure 13.1 Savings ratios in selected Asian countries, 1986–2000
(per cent of GDP)
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In the second half of the decade, foreign investment became influential in a
range of new activities. It was important not only in providing finance, but in
introducing new ideas, processes, management skills and know-how, in
providing models that have been copied by domestic investors and in facilitating
access to export markets. Increased competition from foreign firms helped
generate innovation.
Foreign investment in industry made an important contribution in the
second half of the decade, when industrial exports took over the leading role in
export growth. The foreign role in the industrial sector was important not
only, or primarily, because of its financial contribution, but because of the
catalytic role it often played in joint ventures, typically with state enterprises,
in providing technology, designs and trademarks necessary for access to
international markets. In addition to the impact of capital equipment
introduced through foreign investment, the interaction with people with
different ideas, skills and work practices has influenced domestic productivity
(for example, transformation of service quality in many areas, such as domestic
banking services).
Table 13.4 Savings–investment balance, 1995–2000
(per cent of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Gross national savings 13.6 17.6 21.4 19.1 26.5 27.3
Gross capital formation 27.1 28.1 28.3 23.7 22.4 25.6
Savings–investment balance -13.5 -10.5 -6.9 -4.6 4.1 1.7
Note: These data are taken from an IMF source which gives a somewhat different picture about
the timing and magnitude of the change in national savings than presented in Vietnamese
national accounts. A recent publication by the General Statistics Office (2002a) includes a
detailed discussion of difference between government estimates and IMF figures, including a
reasoned case for the validity of the Vietnamese figures. In particular, the IMF has estimated
growth in the services sector at a somewhat lower rate than official estimates in recent years; the
Vietnamese volume argues that on the basis of available employment and productivity data their
own estimates are more plausible. Also, the IMF data show a sharper decline in capital formation
after 1997. Both sources show a substantial rise in gross national savings, although the timing and
magnitude of the changes varies between the two sources.
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2002. Vietnam: selected issues and statistical appendix, IMF
Country Report 02/5, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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Table 13.5 Foreign direct investment: disbursement by economic
sector, 1988–2000 (US$ million)
(a) 1988–95
1988–91     1992     1993     1994     1995
Industry    150     40    239    435    641
Oil and gas      68     62     369    304    353
Construction      39      6      43      35    113
Transport and communication      46     28      23      67      88
Real estate and tourism    143     51     106     157    458
Agriculture, forestry and fishing      54     11       27       30    107
Othera      70      97       62       20      21
Total    620    295    869 1,048 1,780
(b)  1995–2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Industry 801 1,141 1,326    922    835    910
Oil and gas 567    337    261    375    345    205
Construction 133    261    407    198    152    221
Transport and
communications 155     82    101      80    106      28
Real estate and tourism 433    421    488    471    340    299
Agriculture, forestry and
   fishing 130    113    234    124    192    208
Services 120      95     61      77      71      87
Total
Government estimates 2,341 2,490 2,878 2,246 2,041 1,959
IMF staff estimates 2.276 1,813 2,074    800    700    800
Note: a Includes banking and finance.
Data on foreign direct investment are somewhat inconsistent and unreliable. The two series, both
taken from IMF documents, show differing totals for overlapping years. For the series for 1995–
2000, there are substantial differences between official estimates from the Ministry of Planning
and Investment and IMF staff estimates, particularly for the years 1998–2000. The official series
is total reported disbursements less equity contribution by domestic partners and therefore
includes domestic borrowing by joint ventures. This gives an indication of the actual importance
of foreign enterprises, but exaggerates the external inflow. The IMF Staff estimates are based on
reported foreign equity inflows plus foreign borrowings by joint ventures, an appropriate measure
for balance of payments estimates.
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1998. Vietnam: selected issues and statistical annex,
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; International Monetary Fund, 2002. Vietnam:
selected issues and statistical appendix, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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What is striking about the Vietnamese experience with foreign investment
(in comparison, for example, with the history of foreign investment in Latin
America or Africa, but in line with regional experience) is the degree to which
it has helped promote new exporting activities, rather than producing import
substitutes for the domestic market. This is partly because of the importance
of investors from the region, whose main strategic interest is to produce for
exporting to world markets. Thus, one powerful stimulus to foreign direct
investment, particularly in the period 1990–97, was the conditions facing
successful neighbours. In the boom preceding the crash of 1997 in Asia, rising
labour costs meant that exporters of labour-intensive commodities in Taiwan,
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand were seeking out new locations for
their production. Viet Nam proved an attractive location, particularly in clothing
and footwear and more recently in electronic assembly.
The need to improve the environment for foreign investment has been a
continuing topic for dialogue between the government and the international
business and diplomatic community and has centred on such issues as dual
pricing policies (steadily being reduced), restrictions on rights to invest in
property and in areas of continued state monopoly. However, the investment
regime was sufficiently conducive to attract considerable foreign investment
between 1993 and 1997.5 Evidently, the attractions of low labour costs, a
relatively skilled and educable labour force and reasonable infrastructure
outweighed the disincentives of a sometimes cumbersome, often opaque and
restrictive regulatory environment.
Despite the rhetoric of international commentators, the downturn in
investment spending in 1998–99 can be largely explained by the impact of
the East Asian economic crisis, and the break in the Vietnamese property
boom, which had involved unsustainable speculative foreign investment in
property. In 1996, 58 per cent of FDI commitments were from regional investors
(in order of importance—Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand
and Malaysia). The financial crisis and investment downturns in those
economies explain most of the sharp decline in foreign direct investment in
Viet Nam from 1998 onwards.
Nevertheless, it is evident that the difficult regional investment climate
prevailing since the onset of the East Asian crisis increases the need to improve
conditions for investment in Viet Nam if Viet Nam is to compete successfully
for the diminished flows of investment funds.
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The impact of foreign investment was not all positive, particularly in relation
to investments in production for the domestic market. The market mechanism
did not prove very effective in coordinating real estate investment. Over-
investment in urban construction (particularly in relation to investment in
hotels) led to persistent overcapacity. The volatility of this sector might suggest
that the government should use its access to licensing information to provide
an indicative basis on which private investors could make more realistic
judgments of project viability. It is unlikely, however, that the bureaucracy
would show any better foresight in this regard than property speculators.
Another area in which investment mistakes were made which reproduced
the earlier experience of many other developing economies was in relation to
investment in vehicle assembly, where international firms wishing to gain a
foothold in the Vietnamese market created great overcapacity.
While under-the-table payments are not uncommon in domestic business,
the rapid growth in foreign direct assistance also increased domestic concerns
about the wealth acquired by some public officials associated with foreign-
invested projects, especially in the property sector.
Table 13.6 Manufacturing output by foreign-invested sector, total and
selected sub-sectors, 1995 and 2000 (1994 prices)





Food products and beverages 5,158 8,256
Textiles and wearing apparel 1,606 3,211
Leather and leather products 1,274 3,817
Chemicals and chemical products 742 3,148
Non-metallic mineral products 450 3,288
Basic metals 1,014 2,619
Office, accounting and computing machinery 1 5,058
Radio and communication equipment 948 3,840
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 1,884 6,827
Note: a Preliminary estimate.
Source: General Statistical Office, 2000. Statistical Yearbook 2000. Statistical Publishing House,
Hanoi.
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External assistance: official capital flows
The Vietnamese authorities have shown self-confidence in handling the aid
relationship, avoiding excessive aid dependence. Indeed, in the critical period
of growth acceleration (1989–93), the Vietnamese economy experienced a
sharp decline in official development assistance inflows as aid flows from the
former Soviet Union and East Europe effectively ceased in 1990. During the
first three years of the 1991–95 Five-Year Plan, Viet Nam received only limited
development assistance. Sources of assistance were limited to the few established
bilateral donors, with UN organisations and non-governmental organisations
providing mainly technical and humanitarian assistance.
The implementation of the Doi Moi policies was welcomed by the
international community, but aid commitments did not really grow significantly
until 1993 when the US embargo was lifted. Aid from the multilateral agencies
and from a number of development assistance community members resumed
in 1993. A new pattern of relations between Viet Nam and the international
donor community was established through the Donors’ Conference for Viet
Nam held in Paris in November 1993. The first Consultative Group Meeting
was held in Paris in November 1994. Official development assistance and foreign
direct investment inflows expanded significantly during 1994–95. Official
development assistance commitments of US$1.8 billion were made in 1993,
and annual commitments went on growing until 1996, when annual new
commitments were estimated to have peaked at over US$2.4 billion.
In the mid 1990s, Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
became the leading sources of external assistance. Between November 1994
and August 1995 donors signed agreements on programs and projects with
the total value of US$1,500 million, of which Japan accounted for 43 per
cent, the World Bank for 18 per cent, the Asian Development Bank for 17 per
cent and other donors for 22 per cent. A large number of bilateral donors and
the European Union also expanded their programs in Viet Nam.
Disbursement, however, built up only slowly.6 A great part of the initial growth
in disbursements came from structural adjustment lending, budget support,
and quick disbursing sector program loans such as the Structural Adjustment
Credit (SAC) provided by the World Bank and the Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Program (ESAP) run by the IMF, Japanese-funded commodity
aid projects, and an agricultural sector loan from the Asian Development Bank.
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Capital construction projects were concentrated in the sectors of energy,
transport, and water resources, which together accounted for more than 70
per cent of the total value of donor commitments by 1995.
While the aid total has built up, foreign aid has played a relatively minor
role in the Vietnamese development financing picture. Before 1998, private
investment flows were well in excess of aid disbursements, and, despite the
decline since 1998 FDI levels remain ahead of official development assistance
according to official government estimates (IMF estimates suggest that since
1998 ODA has exceeded private investment flows). Moreover, remittances
from Vietnamese people based overseas exceed flows of official development
assistance.7 Viet Nam has been able to avoid aid dependency because its exports
have grown more rapidly than its aid flows; aid flows remain around 12 per
cent of export earnings.
This does not mean that has not been effective because aid is at its most
productive when playing a supporting role in the development process. There
are no examples of successful development where aid has played the major
financing role.
In practice, the aid provided in the 1990s was quite successful because the
priorities were so clear. Decades of war and enforced economic isolation had
left a large backlog of requirements in terms of rehabilitating basic infrastructure
and investing in basic services. The government was realistic in its expectations
about the level of aid and sought to fund mainly public infrastructure, social
services and public support for rural development with the aid it did receive.
Thus, within the framework provided by the Five-Year Plan and the Public
Investment Plan, the government aimed to mobilise official development
assistance resources of US$7–8 billion over the period 1996–2000.  Support
was sought for the following main areas of the 1996–2000 Five-Year Plan
• infrastructure in the focal economic zones, industrial parks, and processing
zones.
• expansion of major airports and seaports
• expansion of the main road and rail networks
• investment in electrical power production
• rehabilitation and extension of the water supply system
• improvements to the irrigation system
• support for animal husbandry, development and protection of forests,
and key projects for ecosystem protection
217CAPITAL FORMATION AND EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
• development of the telecommunications system
• upgrading and equipping medical facilities, including upgrading the two
national health centres in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City
• upgrading and extending key education and training facilities.
It is difficult to make the case that financial assistance from the multilateral
financial institutions and development assistance community members was a
crucial factor in the initiation of successful growth in Viet Nam. Capital
assistance only built up after the end of the US embargo in 1993, and with
the usual lags between commitments and disbursements, it was only in 1997
that disbursements topped US$1 billion. As the acceleration in growth began
even before the renewal of aid from the multilateral financial institutions in
1993, the decisive improvement in economic growth performance cannot be
attributed to the subsequent expansion in aid flows. Indeed, given the initial
sluggish growth in disbursements and the normal gestation period between
the initiation of investment and productive results, little of the boom in growth
1992–97 can be explained by the expansion in aid from 1993 onwards.
Although it can be argued that donor finance lent support to the Doi Moi
process, that process was not initiated by donors and was not, at its crucial
early stages, influenced by aid conditionality. It was designed and led by the
Table 13.7 Annual ODA commitments and disbursements,
1993–2001 (US$million)











Notes: a Excluding US$0.5 billion budget support for economic reforms.
b Excluding US$0.7 billion support for economic reforms.
c Estimate.
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment
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national authorities. When multilateral financial institutions resumed their
programs in 1993, the reform process had already been carried far enough to
have real credibility. Difficult reforms had been carried through with minimal
external assistance, and the economy was already substantially market based.
The donor programs initiated following the lifting of the embargo in 1993
were important, however, in providing the support needed for Viet Nam to
reap the full benefits of the earlier reforms, as well as lending support to the
later stages of the reform process.
In particular, aid made a particularly useful contribution to the rehabilitation
and expansion of basic economic infrastructure, ensuring that infrastructure
bottlenecks have not acted as a constraint on growth. The emphasis on the
finance of investment in physical infrastructure meant that the profile of the
aid program in the 1990s was somewhat ‘old-fashioned’ in appearance, but
was probably not the worse for that.
With the development of the aid program, the aid agencies (notably the
multilateral financial institutions) have actively tried to introduce policy
conditionality, attached long lists of conditions to loan agreements.8 There is
an extensive literature debating the effectiveness of such assistance, and it
increasingly recognised that programs to support reform should not be seen as
just a matter of rapidly implementing a standardised set of optimal market-
based rules.9 Senior World Bank staff have recognised that
[o]n average market-oriented reforms worked, but not in a reliable fashion. Our reading of the
1990s is that the reform process too often neglected the institutional foundations necessary for
markets to be effective for poverty reduction. It is not enough to focus on ‘getting prices right’,
public action is needed to ‘get the markets right’ (Collier, Dollar and Stern 2000:2).
Stiglitz (1999) notes the importance of ‘knowing when you don’t know
what you are doing’. There is also often an implicit assumption that everything
is urgent, and that substantive change can be realised by a new regulation or
policy document.10 There is no evidence that policy-based lending has been
instrumental in accelerating the reform process in Vietnam. In practice, much
of the apparent conditionality is window-dressing by the staff of the agencies
to convince their own managements that they are ‘buying’ sufficient reforms
to justify the financing.11 The Vietnamese government will probably continue
to prove shrewd enough to avoid the consequences of dependency and the
erosion in national policymaking capacity that have occurred in many other
countries.
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As flows have grown, questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness
of the program, both on the donor and the Vietnamese side. At the National
Assembly meeting in November–December 1999, questions were raised about
the efficiency of foreign aid, and particularly its effectiveness in public
administration reform and infrastructure construction projects (for example,
roads, bridges, irrigation and rural water systems). Concerns were also expressed
about the cost of some projects (particularly distortions resulting from donor
practices such as tying procurement) and about the burden of debt arising
from the development assistance program.
A number of donors have also expressed reservations about the effectiveness
of capacity building activities. At the Seventh Consultative Group meeting in
December 1999 the need to avoid the ‘debt trap’ and heavy aid dependency
was raised, as was the need to give more attention to the efficient use of aid.
The quality of aid needs as much attention as the quantity. With the build
up of support, efforts of various donors have often overlapped.The government
has made considerable efforts to improve its aid management capacity in the
face of the fast increase in aid commitments, but it has limited capacity to
coordinate programs effectively, particularly in light of the shared interest of
donors and particular beneficiary agencies to push ‘their’ projects.
Concern is expressed on both the donor and the government side that the
identification and formulation of projects is too often ‘donor driven’, sometimes
resulting in weak ‘national ownership’ of projects and limited commitment,
concerns familiar in the donor world internationally. Despite this verbal
recognition of the problem, pressures remain on both sides to push projects
and to short-cut coordination.
One interesting feature of aid flows in the 1990s was the emphasis placed
on investment in infrastructure and program aid to support the reform process
and growth, and the relatively minor attention to poverty alleviation, which is
now becoming a focus of donor attention. Despite this, the record of poverty
reduction was exemplary during these years. This was because, under
Vietnamese conditions, the achievement of high growth rates had a big impact
on poverty. Now that donors are devoting a great deal more attention to poverty
alleviation, it will be interesting to see if there is any improvement in
performance in that regard. There is a danger that the channelling of investment
to areas which are poor because of their low economic potential may be less
effective in reducing poverty than a growth-oriented strategy.
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EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE: TECHNICAL COOPERATION
Technical assistance made a more valuable contribution to policy and
institutional development than capital assistance, particularly in the period
prior to the re-entry of the multilateral financial institutions in 1993. At that
stage, the UN system was particularly important as a source of useful advice to
the Vietnamese. Even the involvement of Bretton Woods institutions at that
time was mainly through UNDP support, with the Bretton Woods institutions
acting as executing agencies for UN projects. Indeed, one of the interesting
aspects of Vietnamese experience is the light it throws on the efficacy of technical
assistance and the redundancy of policy conditionality (at least in Viet Nam).
It is difficult to find tangible evidence that the effectiveness of external advice
has increased as institutions such as the World Bank have become active in
promoting their view of reform requirements through conditions attached to
structural adjustment and program loans.
In the years before the end of the US embargo, Viet Nam sought assistance
from the international community for training and for policy advice. Much of
this assistance was channelled through the UNDP and other UN agencies,
although the Swedish International Development Agency also played an active
role. It is widely recognised that training and advice offered in that period was
highly effective in aiding the Vietnamese in the development of their reform
policies.12 The Vietnamese government was able to select from the advice offered
based on their own priorities and understanding of the local reality. Moreover,
playing a purely advisory role, the various agencies avoided the arrogance that
sometimes accompanies the allocation of large amounts of financial assistance.
A recent evaluation of donor technical assistance to Viet Nam concluded
that
…the TC program in Viet Nam has been successful overall, particularly when compared to the
problems experienced with TC in many other countries. Areas of success include
strong human resource development (HRD) through many kinds of training, including on-the-
job training, short-term courses, training of trainers, and post-graduate training programs in
Viet Nam and abroad.
Policy advice supported changes in key areas, including: fiscal and banking reform, drafting laws
essential to the transitional economy, rationalising the regulations relating to key ministries
(MPI, MOJ, MOFI, National Assembly Office, the Judiciary Office, the Public Prosecutor
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Office etc.), assisting with development plans and the Public Investment Program, assisting in
regional and international integration, and public administration reform.
Assisting in many social aspects of development: including rural development linked to poverty
alleviation, environment and natural resource protection, gender issues, HIV control and drug
control, etc.
Assisting in a number of important surveys and statistical development (e.g. population census,
Living Standards Measurement Survey of household incomes, national income data, etc.), greatly
improving the availability of reliable information for planning and policymaking.
With the help of TC programs, many agencies at different levels—ministerial, provincial, sub-
provincial levels—have developed their capacity (e.g. through skill upgrading and organisational
strengthening) (Van Arkadie et al. 2000:5).
Although the contribution of technical assistance to Viet Nam development
is evident, the greatest contribution came in the early years of reform, when
flows were quite modest. The fast increase in technical aid in the 1990s was
not reflected by anything like a proportionate increase in impact—diminishing
returns set in and in some areas may have even reached negative returns at the
margin. Disbursements on technical aid grew from US$76.7 million
(12.9 per cent of total development assistance) in 1992 to US$209.4 million
(34.2 per cent of total development assistance) in 1995, falling to 24.4 per
cent in 1998, when US$287 million was disbursed for technical aid.
Disbursements reached a peak in 1997 of US$ 294.8 million, equal to 31.4
per cent of total development assistance in that year.
From the Vietnamese point of view, too much of the typical project budget
goes on costs for foreign experts (often seen as not more competent than local
experts) and too little on local costs and non-personnel items, while the practice
of some agencies leaves the selection of, and control over, consultants in donor
hands.
Donors and Vietnamese also express concerns regarding the sustainability
of projects over the longer term (that is the continued operation of facilities
and flow of benefits after the project is ‘completed’ and external funding ceases).
Expressions of concern about aspects of utilisation of development assistance
in Viet Nam are a healthy recognition of the risks of aid dependence. Viet
Nam could still benefit from being a late participant in the aid game by studying
the experience of other aid recipients.
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A recent report on technical cooperation concluded that weaknesses in the
aid system ‘need to be addressed with some urgency’ (Van Arkadie et al.
2000:17). However, there is a good deal of inertia in the international aid
system, and the Vietnamese experience demonstrates how quickly a pattern of
vested interests build up on both sides of the aid relationship (on the donor
side, among the aid bureaucracies, suppliers, consulting firms and individual
consultants, on the recipient side among the beneficiary agencies and officials
who reap project benefits).
NOTES
1 Human capital refers to investments in individuals, whereas social capital refers to investments
in business organisations, institutions (political, financial, market and industrial relations)
and the social environment.
2 This is not special to Viet Nam, as it is often the case that national accounts data greatly
underestimate the own account investment by farm households and in rural housing. This
sort of activity has been of great importance to Viet Nam’s development in the past 15
years. The figures included for ‘non-state investment’ in the official data is apparently a
rough estimate, as there is no comprehensive survey of such investments.
3 In practice, government has been ready to seek out private funding for public services
where they are commercially viable (for example, telecommunications) and has sought to
expand private funding through such innovations as build-operate-transfer schemes (for
example, in the power sector). Where some degree of cost recovery is possible through user
charges, the government has been quite willing to introduce such charges. Large government
investments are necessary, however, to prevent infrastructure becoming a bottle-neck that
constrains growth in other sectors.
4 Somewhat ironically, in light of advice the Vietnamese received suggesting that it was likely
that private investors would not make the same sort of investment errors as state enterprises,
the inflow of foreign investment before the 1997 regional crisis included heavy over-
investment in the hotel sector greatly in excess of any plausible market growth, resulting in
persistent over-capacity in hotel space, leading to strong downward pressure on prices. At
least the costs were borne by the investors (and their workers) and not the state.
5 The timing of the downturn in foreign investment can either be located in 1996, when
approvals for new investment proposals peaked, or in 1997, when expenditures on foreign
investments peaked.
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6 The report of the Government of Viet Nam at the Consultative Group Meeting organised
in 1994 indicated the main reasons for delays in the disbursement of projects funded by
development assistance. Bottlenecks occurred in project preparation, administrative
procedures for the consideration and approval of projects; and issues of compensation and
resettlement.
7 A news item in Hanoi on 26 December recorded that ‘[r]emittances by overseas Vietnamese
are expected to reach US$2 billion in 2001, US$300 million more than 2000, according
to the State Bank of Viet Nam. Some 60 per cent of remittances were channelled through
banks. General Director of the Eastern Asia Bank in Viet Nam, Tran Phuong Binh, said
that remittances channelled through his bank were expected to reach US$260 million in
2001, a year-on-year increase of 50 per cent. It is estimated that there are more than
2.5 million overseas Vietnamese, mostly in the United States, France, Australia and Canada.
8 Dollar and Svensson (1998) concluded that multiple tranches—and a large number of
other design variables—play no role in effectiveness.
9 Recent internal critiques of policy-based lending include Paul Collier (1998, 1999, 2000),
Dollar and Svensson (1998) and Asian Development Bank (2001).
10 Stiglitz, in reference to transition economies, noted that it is easy to ‘make the facile
recommendation that everything is important and everything should be done at once.
But real choices are always necessary given the real limitations of any government’s time,
focus and resources’ (1999:19).
11 Such problems are recognised by the multilateral financial institutions. A World Bank report
written by Paul Collier  refers to the ‘fig leaf ’ theory that policy change is costly and that
aid finances upfront adjustment costs (Collier 2000; see also Asian Development Bank
2001).
12 Dollar, who was in that period lead economist for the World Bank and played an active role
in advisory work and in participating in policy workshops, was also lead author of a World
Bank study of aid effectiveness, Assessing Aid (World Bank 1998c). The book includes a
case study of experience in Viet Nam. The study records the successes of the Doi Moi
process in promoting growth and in poverty alleviation, but notes that in the important
reform period, 1989–93, Viet Nam was receiving only a small amount of aid. In that
period, ideas were more important than money. One key role of external agencies was to
help the Vietnamese access relevant regional and international experiences with economic
policy.
1VIET NAM’S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
As well as the ‘growing out of poverty’ and ‘liberalisation as a poverty reduction
strategy’, the initial conditions inherited from the pre-reform period were
important determinants of the general poverty alleviation program.
This chapter indicates that the performance of the Vietnamese economy –
in the past decade – in relation to alleviation of poverty has been exemplary,
although the alleviation of poverty happened despite the lack of an explicit
poverty alleviation strategy or program.  In terms of growth and poverty
alleviation, market reforms were a key input into the acceleration of agricultural
growth, much of it based on the household farm, which has been a critical
factor in reducing rural poverty.
However, while poverty has been reduced, the rate of income improvements
among the poor is slower than the average rate. The challenge is how to prevent
such inequalities from being consolidated and from becoming the basis of an
entrenched class society.
Keywords:
ethnic groups, food poverty line, Living Standards Measurement Surveys
(LSMS), poverty line, poverty reduction, social development, welfare
Viet Nam: a transition tiger?
Poverty alleviation
Abstract for chapter 14
Published by ANU E Press, 2003




The performance of the Vietnamese economy in relation to alleviation of poverty
in the past decade has been exemplary. This is of considerable interest in the
context of the international concern for poverty alleviation throughout the
developing world. Donor agencies now place a high priority on poverty
reduction, and poverty reduction programs have been enthusiastically adopted
in many countries. However, the commitment to poverty alleviation as a goal
has not yet been matched by plausible programs or very much success in most
of the countries that have adopted poverty reduction as a key policy goal. The
Vietnamese success in the 1990s is therefore of more general interest.
Understanding the reasons for past success may also be of importance for
future policy in Vietnam. Through 2002, the Vietnamese government
continued formulating a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy that was
likely to influence the allocation of substantial national and donor resources.
The nature of the past achievement might provide some insights into the
viability of the new strategy.
However, the lessons are not obvious. One set of issues relates to the balance
to be struck between growth and poverty alleviation. The Vietnamese poverty
reduction achievement was not the result of focused efforts to reduce poverty.
The significant alleviation of poverty during the 1990s happened despite (or
perhaps because of ) the lack of an explicit poverty alleviation strategy or program.
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Poverty alleviation came as a result of the successful pursuit of growth in the
context of an economic and social structure that was conducive to the spread
of the benefits of growth. Will the new emphasis on focused interventions to
tackle poverty improve the link between growth and poverty alleviation, or
will it reduce the growth performance by emphasising low productivity
investments, and in so doing reduce the rate of poverty alleviation?
One difficulty in interpreting the record is that even if there was some success
in achieving growth plus poverty alleviation during the 1990s, it may not be
replicable in the future. Although the growth of the Vietnamese economy
lifted large numbers of people out of poverty, the reduction in poverty was
accompanied by a tendency towards increased inequality between the better-
off and the poor and between urban and rural areas. Is increasing inequality a
necessary facet of fast market-based growth? Will the tendency to increasing
inequality reduce the tendency for the benefits of growth to be diffused, so
that future growth could be less rewarding to the poor (and justify the new
emphasis on focused poverty reduction programs)?
The discussion in this chapter cannot provide definitive answers to these
questions. But examination of the record can provide some pointers to the
policy issues that need to be considered in formulating future poverty eradication
programs.
POVERTY ALLEVIATION PERFORMANCE
Definitive evidence is now available on the impact of the high rates of growth
on the income of the poor in Vietnam.1 Before looking at the detailed evidence
it might be useful to note how poverty has been defined in the Vietnamese
literature. The basic data in use to analyse trends in poverty are those derived
from the Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) conducted in
1992/93 and 1997/98.2 The results of the 1997/98 LSMS provide a solid
basis for judging what happened to absolute poverty and income distribution
over the 1992–98 period. This covers the period of dramatic acceleration in
Vietnamese growth.
The government also uses the concepts of ‘poor areas and poor communes’
to identify the places where the percentage of poor households is much higher
and living standards are much lower than the national average level, areas
typically characterised by unfavourable natural conditions (poor land, frequent
natural disasters) and underdeveloped infrastructure.
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In interpreting the LSMS data, the government of Vietnam has used two
poverty lines.3 ‘Poverty’ is defined in terms of incomes below the minimum
level required to cover basic needs for food, clothes, residence, health care,
education, travel and communications. A lower level is defined as a ‘hunger’
line (or food poverty), in order to distinguish what is described as the ‘very
poor’ population from the ‘poor’ population.
‘Hunger’, or food poverty, is defined as a situation in which incomes are
below the minimum level required to provide food to eat, enough clothes to
wear and enough income to sustain their lives. This lower ‘hunger’ line is
intended to identify the proportion of population that lacks food for several
months in a year and who typically have to borrow to survive and lack repayment
capacity.
The food poverty line is set at an average of 2,100 kilocalories per person
per day, in line with the definition used by most international organisations
and developing countries. People whose expenditures are not sufficient to attain
this level are considered poor in terms of food.4
To define the total poverty line, the cost of minimum necessary non-food
items is added to the minimum food expenditures.5 The 1993 expenditure-
based total poverty line was VND1,160,000 and the 1998 line was
VND1,789,700.
Based on these poverty lines, the Vietnamese General Statistics Office and
the World Bank estimated that the total poverty incidence in Vietnam in 1993
and 1998 was 58 per cent and 37 per cent respectively, while that of food
poverty was 25 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. The data were extrapolated
by the government to estimate levels for the year 2000 as 32 per cent and 13
per cent respectively.
The evidence provided by the LSMS data is clear. Whatever poverty line is
used, poverty decreased substantially between 1992/93 and 1997/98. Poverty
declined more rapidly in urban areas than in rural areas. Urban poverty fell
from 25 per cent to 9 per cent whereas rural poverty rates dropped from 66
per cent to 46 per cent. Rural poverty therefore remains a critical challenge.
The regional pattern of poverty reduction was quite varied. Poverty levels
declined in all seven economic regions, but not at the same pace. The largest
decline in overall poverty was in the Red River delta, where poverty dropped
from 63 per cent to 29 per cent. In 1992–93, this area had ranked fourth out
of the seven regions in terms of the extent of poverty, but by 1997–98 it had
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moved to second in the rankings (the only region with less poverty was the
Southeast, which includes Ho Chi Minh City). The Southeast, already the
least poor region in 1992/93, enjoyed a further significant reduction from
33 per cent to 8 per cent. Central Coast and the Mekong delta had only
moderate declines in overall poverty. The poor performance of the Mekong
delta probably reflected the impact of Typhoon Linda, which struck the area
in November 1997.
Analysis of the distribution of poverty across ethnic groups reveals that the
Chinese, who constitute 2 per cent of the population, and are in general better
off than the majority Kinh, who constitute 84 per cent of the population. All
the other ethnic groups (mostly located in remote and mountainous areas) are
much worse off than the Kinh. The incidence of poverty among the Kinh
dropped from 55 per cent to 32 per cent from 1992/93 to 1997/98. For all
other groups taken together (not including the Chinese), the incidence of
poverty was 75.2 per cent in 1997/98, some improvement over 1992/93,
when the poverty rate for this group was 86.4 per cent. The survey found
poverty levels increasing for some minority groups.
Data on the regional incidence of poverty need to be interpreted with some
care. The three regions which have the highest poverty incidence are the
Northern and Central Uplands regions (which have a concentration of ethnic
minorities), and the North Central Coast, which suffers from an inhospitable
environment. As a result, these areas are the focus of government and donor
poverty alleviation efforts. It should also be noted, however, that in 1997/98
over one-third of all poor people were residing in the Red River and Mekong
deltas.
Some general comments to illustrate the options in tackling poverty
alleviation can be drawn from this.
• Remote and mountainous areas (particularly the Northern Uplands,6
which contains 28 per cent of the poor), where ethnic minorities are
concentrated, experience difficult economic conditions because of physical
isolation and mountainous terrain. Within these areas, a distinction can
be made between those areas that would have economic potential if binding
infrastructural constraints could be relaxed (for example, through the
improvement in communications opening up access to national markets)
and new income possibilities could be developed (for example, high-value
tree crops) and those areas with a very poor natural resource base, where
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Table 14.1 Food poverty and overall poverty headcounts in Viet Nam,
1993 and 1998 (per cent)
Food poverty Overall poverty
1993 1998 1993 1998
All Vietnam 24.9 15.0 58.1 37.4
Urban 7.9 2.3 25.1 9.0
Rural 29.1 18.3 66.4 44.9
Region
Northern Uplands .. .. 78.6 58.6
Red River delta .. .. 62.9 28.7
North Central .. .. 74.5 48.0
Central Coast .. .. 49.6 35.2
Central Highlands .. .. 70.0 52.2
Southeast .. .. 32.7 7.6
Mekong River .. .. 47.1 36.9
Source: Food poverty figures are from World Bank, 1999. Vietnam Development Report 2000:
Vietnam attacking poverty, Joint Report of the Government–Donor–NGO Working Group,
Hanoi. Overall poverty figures are from Glewwe et al., 2000. Who Gained from Vietnam’s Boom in
the 1990s: the analysis of poverty and inequality trends, World Bank, Washington, DC.
straightforward infrastructure improvement investment may not be very
productive in increasing household incomes. It is in these areas that the
complex issues related to the development of ethnic minorities must be
addressed.
• Many Central Coast areas have poor soils and a negative climate which
hold back agricultural development (that is, some disaster management
is required to reduce economic risks). Nonetheless, these areas have
reasonable access to markets and a well-educated population that could
benefit from exploitation of niche markets in agriculture (for example,
pepper) and from the promotion of non-agricultural employment
opportunities.
• The Red River delta still has many poor people, even though large numbers
of others have been lifted out of poverty by fast economic growth. Land
scarcity is one critical factor limiting household livelihood options. In
the Red River delta, household livelihoods are likely to be improved by
further growth in productivity through sophisticated innovations in the
229POVERTY ALLEVIATION
already highly intensive agricultural systems and from the expansion in
off-farm employment opportunities (for example, further development
of successful rural and small-town industries).
• The Mekong delta has undergone a less rapid reduction in poverty than
the Red River delta despite high agricultural potential. The success of
some Mekong households in moving out of poverty has been significantly
offset by the incidence of households falling into poverty between the
two surveys (see Justino and Litchfield 2002). In the Mekong, there is
potential for agricultural expansion both at the extensive margin and from
more intensive land use, but difficult issues of environmental and natural
disaster (particularly flood) management need to be overcome if large
and sustainable increases in household income are to be achieved.
The importance of this distinction between poverty in regions which are
‘backward’ and poverty in the more ‘highly developed’ areas is two-fold. First,
it would be a mistake to see poverty reduction as mainly a matter of dealing
with backward areas. Second, this distinction has implications for policy
approaches in different areas. Poverty which results from residence in a poor
area will demand a different approach than that appropriate for poverty that
results from households failing to participate in the benefits of growth in areas
with a high growth performance.
The government, in introducing its poverty eradication strategy in early
2002, noted that living standards improved greatly during the 1990s and that
social indicators confirmed a broad improvement in standards of welfare. For
example, the under-five child mortality rate and the maternal mortality rate
halved between 1990 and 2000. The proportion of the rural population with
access to safe water doubled. The net level of enrolment in primary education
increased to 95 per cent. Life expectancy rose from 64 in 1990 to 68 in 2000.
By 2000, 88 per cent of communes had access to electricity and 95 per cent
of communes were accessible by vehicle. Viet Nam’s Human Development
Index (HDI) and social service accessibility showed continuing improvement,
indicating that Viet Nam’s social development was well ahead of what was
typical of countries with similar income levels. In 1999, Viet Nam was ranked
167 in the world in terms of per capita GDP, but 101 in terms of its Human
Development Index.
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GROWTH AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION
The Vietnamese record of high growth combined with poverty alleviation can
be interpreted in many ways, each of which suggest a different approach to
poverty reduction.
One possible interpretation is that promoting growth is an effective poverty
alleviation strategy. Certainly, during the 1990s the main emphases of
Vietnamese policy were economic growth and ‘modernisation’. Continuing
concern was expressed for the plight of poor people, particularly in mountainous
and backward areas, but the main thrust of government investment and
incentives was the development of the three growth poles, in the north, centre
and south of the country. Growth was achieved, and the evidence set out above
demonstrated that substantial segments of the population were lifted out of
extreme poverty.
This view is certainly partly correct, and hardly surprising in the sense that,
in a country with pervasive poverty of the kind prevalent in Viet Nam in the
1980s, economic growth must be a necessary pre-condition to widespread
poverty reduction, and at that stage of growth it does not make sense to divert
resources from high growth potential investments to low potential investments
on distributional grounds. This suggests that, at very low levels of average
income, poverty alleviation should be about the development of productive
capacity, rather than redistributive welfare measures. Despite the substantial
growth gains during the 1990s Vietnam remains a poor country, with an average
income per capita of around US$400. Given the success of growth in lowering
poverty in the 1990s, it is possible that the move to a focused poverty alleviation
program may be premature.
At Vietnam’s level of development in the 1980s, raising the income levels of
a significant segment of the poor was not feasible without high rates of growth
in national income. In an economy which was so poor that the average income
was not much above the poverty line and more than half the households were
classified as poor, there was little scope for poverty alleviation through
redistribution, so that economic growth was a necessary condition for poverty
alleviation.
However, the composition of aggregate growth will influence the impact on
poverty. In the case of Vietnam, the high growth performance included high
rates of agricultural growth, resulting in growing rural incomes. Although rural
incomes grew much more slowly than urban incomes, large segments of the
231POVERTY ALLEVIATION
rural population enjoyed increases in absolute income, and a significant portion
of the rural population was raised out of poverty as the benefits of growth were
spread beyond the urban growth poles. An emphasis on rural development
was consistent with both high growth and poverty alleviation.
The distribution of benefits within the rural economy is also important in
determining the poverty impact of growth. In Viet Nam, there was a significant
diffusion of the benefits of growth because of the egalitarian social relations in
rural areas. Viet Nam does not suffer from the kind of semi-feudal landlord–
Table 14.2 Poverty gap and poverty severity level headcounts for Viet













Education of the household head
No schooling 69.9 57.3
Primary 58.2 42.1
Low secondary 63.8 38.1
Upper secondary 45.9 24.9
Technical/vocational 47.7 19.2
University 13.4 4.5
Occupation of the household head




Other/no work 59.0 26.3
Sex of the household head
Male 61.0 39.8
Female 48.3 28.2
Source: Glewwe et al., 2000. Who Gained from Vietnam’s Boom in the 1990s: the analysis of poverty
and inequality trends, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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tenant relations which has checked the spread of the benefits of growth in
other parts of the world (for example, in the Indian sub-continent).
Another possible interpretation of the ‘growth and poverty reduction’ record
is that market liberalisation is supportive of fast poverty alleviation. Again, in
this period it was part of the truth in Viet Nam. Market reforms were a key
input into the acceleration of agricultural growth, much of it based on the
household farm, which has been a critical factor in reducing rural poverty.
Moreover, the fast growth of the small and medium-sized enterprise in the
liberalised urban economy generated widespread income opportunities and
underpinned the fast growth of urban incomes, despite declines in public
sector employment.
Against this view, it should also be noted that some aspects of the market-
led growth strategy may create difficulties for poverty alleviation in the future.
Some indicators suggest that some aspects of wellbeing among the poorest
sections of the population are being eroded, for example as a result of reduced
access to some public services. Moreover, despite the improvements in rural
incomes, the absolute gap between urban and rural incomes is widening
persistently and substantially. Although economic growth has contributed to
a great reduction in poverty, there has also been an increase in inequality as
measured by the gaps between the top and bottom income levels (for example,
the top and bottom quintiles) and between town and country.7
The government’s own analysis notes that the income of the poor has grown
at a lower rate than that of the middle-income group, who in turn have
experienced lower growth than the high-income group. The gap between the
richest and poorest quintiles is widening (from 7.3 times in 1996 to 8.9 times
in 1999). Between the two living standard surveys (from 1993 to 1998), the
richest 10 per cent of the population increased their spending by 53.3 per
cent compared to a 23.3 per cent spending increase by the poorest 10 per
cent. So, although poverty has been reduced, the rate of income improvement
among the poor is slower than the average rate. Also, the gap in living standards
between urban and rural areas remains very large and is growing.
Some increase in income and wealth inequality is a virtually inevitable result
of fast growth at the current level of development. The challenge is how to
prevent such inequalities from being consolidated generation to generation—
that is, from becoming the basis for an entrenched class society. To do this,
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conscious and specific efforts will be required to ensure that access to public
services is available to the poor, so that there is a reasonable degree of equality
of opportunity. At the moment, there are some tendencies pushing the economy
in the opposite direction.8
Both the ‘growing out of poverty’ and ‘liberalisation as a poverty reduction
strategy’ have to be tempered by the argument, developed in various places in
this volume, that the initial conditions inherited from the pre-reform period
were important determinants of the inclusive character of the Vietnamese
performance. The sustained commitment to investment in human capital, the
lack of great inequalities in the access to rural assets and modest differentials in
employment incomes were particularly important.
NOTES
1 World Bank research staff undertook a detailed statistical analysis of the results of the 1998
LSMS and of the lessons to be learnt regarding the changes between 1992 and 1998 (see
Glewwe et al. 2000).
2 The surveys covered 4,800 and 6,000 households respectively.
3 In addition to these poverty lines based on LSMS data on poverty, the Ministry of Labour,
Invalids and Social Affairs developed a national poverty line to identify who are the poor,
with specific numbers and addresses in order to develop a list of poor households at the
hamlet and commune levels and to identify poor communes eligible for support from the
National Target Poverty Reduction Programme. In 1997, Vietnam set a poverty line under
the national programme (the old poverty line) to apply to poverty measurement in the
1996–2000 period as follows—hungry households: households with average per capita
monthly income in rice equivalence of less than 13 kilograms or less than VND 45,000 (in
1997 prices, applied to all regions); poor households: criteria set for different areas/regions.
For rural mountainous and island areas, less than 15 kilograms per person per month
(equivalent to VND 55,000). For rural plain and midland areas, less than 20 kilograms per
person per month (equivalent to VND 70,000). For urban areas, less than 25 kilograms
per person per month (equivalent to VND90,000); poor communes: communes with
poverty incidence of 40 per cent and above and lack of infrastructure (roads, schools,
clinics, electricity and water for livelihood needs, small irrigation works and markets). A
new poverty line was published in 2001 to be applied to poverty measurement in the
2001–05 period. The new poverty line was set at VND80,000 per month for people in
island areas and rural mountainous areas (or VND960,000 per year), VND100,000 per
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month for people in rural plain areas (or VND1,200,000 per year) and VND150,000 per
month for people in urban areas (or VND1,800,000 per year). Localities estimate poor
households as a percentage of total households based on these poverty criteria. Provinces
and cities are allowed to apply higher poverty standards than the stipulated levels.
4 When the 1992/93 survey was conducted, the calculation of minimum expenditures
needed to buy the food basket to provide the minimum calorie intake was made using
January 1993 prices. The result was VND749,000, which was defined as the food poverty
line (US$65 at 1993 exchange rates). In the 1997/98 survey, the food poverty line was
calculated by multiplying the amount of goods in the food basket that was used to calculate
the 1992/93 food poverty line by January 1998 prices. The resulting poverty line for
1997/98 was set at VND1,286,000 (equivalent to US$123).
5 This was done by observing the non-food expenditures of those households whose food
expenditures just allowed them to purchase the 2,100 calorie food basket.
6 The Central Highlands also had more than 50 per cent poor, but it is sparsely populated,
so only accounts for 5 per cent of the total poor.
7 The social consequences of an increase in inequality may be influenced by the degree of
mobility between income groups. A given degree of inequality may in some sense be more
acceptable if there is great household mobility. In a paper analysing economic mobility on
the basis of the survey data, Glewwe and Nguyen (2002:19) conclude that, although a
simple analysis of the data suggests a high degree of mobility, when adjustments are made
for measurement error, a much lower degree of mobility is suggested, implying that
‘Vietnam’s worries about increasing inequality cannot be dismissed by pointing to high
economic mobility’.
8 See Van de Walle (1998) which highlights the problems of unequal gains from growth
and the erosion of social safety nets.
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is below the poverty line. An analysis of the poverty problem has identified a
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exclusion from the benefits of economic growth.
This chapter looks at poverty within rural and urban conditions. Many
poor live in areas that have few natural resources and with harsh natural
conditions in mountainous, remote and isolated areas where the population is
subjected to effects of natural disasters. The poverty rate is lower in urban
areas, but there is inequality still in the distribution of the benefits of growth.
Poverty is linked to a lack of access to social service provision.
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CAUSES OF CONTINUING POVERTY
PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY AND CONTINUING
VULNERABILITY
The Vietnamese government estimated that almost one-third of the population
is still receiving an income below the poverty line, highlighting the critical
challenge posed by remaining poverty in Vietnam.
In one sense, as in all developing countries, it is not difficult to explain
widespread poverty—it reflects the low level of average income. Despite a period
of successful growth, Vietnam’s average income is still low and the income of a
large segment of the population lies just above the poverty line. Even a small
adjustment in the position of the line or a modest decline in household income
would put many more households below the poverty line. With low average
incomes, changes in definition and small changes in average incomes can have
a great effect on the numbers identified as poor. For example, the definitions
chosen in the surveys conducted by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social
Affairs identify a much smaller proportion of the population as being poor
than the norms applied in analysing the Living Standards Measurement Study
(LSMS) (11 per cent in 2000 as compared to just under one-third using the
LSMS analysis and definitions).
As economic growth continues, and average incomes rise, it will become of
increasing interest to analyse why some groups are falling behind, benefiting
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little from the general increase in prosperity. The government’s analysis of the
poverty problem has identified a number of factors that are associated with
continuing poverty and relative exclusion from the benefits of economic growth.
POVERTY AND RURAL CONDITIONS
The government places a good deal of emphasis on the many poor who live in
areas that have very few natural resources and harsh natural conditions such as
mountainous, remote and isolated areas. Also, the poor are often subject to the
effects of natural disasters. Over 90 per cent of the poor live in rural areas and
most of their income comes from agriculture. Agricultural income is unstable
and vulnerable to climatic uncertainty and natural shocks. The income level of
many rural households is close enough to the poverty line that natural calamities
can easily push them back into poverty. The Mekong River delta region and
the Central region are particularly subject to climatic uncertainty (typhoons,
floods). This means that, while many families escape from poverty each year,
that progress is offset to a significant extent by families falling back into poverty.
Differentials in the development of infrastructure also cause widening income
gaps because inability to access to markets holds back the development of
many poor areas.
Although Vietnam does not have a highly skewed land distribution, rural
groups with relatively poor access to land or who have access to land of a poor
quality or geographic location, find it difficult to achieve food security and
invest in productivity improvements. Poor people also have limited access to
various sources of credit despite the government’s attempts to raise credit access
and availability through the expansion of formal credit to agricultural areas.
URBAN POVERTY
The poverty rate is lower in urban areas, but within urban areas there has been
a great deal of inequality in the distribution of the benefits of growth, with
those working in the state and foreign-invested sectors doing better than for
those working in the domestic non-state sector. Many of those who were made
redundant as a result of state enterprise restructuring and other reductions in
public employment have suffered a loss of income. Incomes are low in the
growing urban informal sector, where the labour force is swollen by the influx
of unregistered migrants from rural areas. Many migrants usually do not secure
permanent registration and have no stable jobs; consequently their income is
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unstable and they are unable to gain access to basic public social services (health
care, education) and may also be excluded from social surveys used for poverty
targeting.
POVERTY AND ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION
One reason why the benefits of economic growth have been diffused is the
broad spread of education and literacy. While education cannot ensure increases
in income, illiteracy and lack of basic education can exclude the uneducated
from economic opportunities.
While there was some deterioration in some aspects of education provision1
the overall educational profile remained strong for a country with Viet Nam’s
income level. Programs to abolish illiteracy and to promote universal primary
education contributed to the achievement of an adult literacy rate to
93 per cent by 1995, and an increase in the share of children of primary
school age attending school from 75 per cent in 1991 to 99.9 per cent in
1997, with 55 per cent of the secondary level age group also attending school
(UNDP 2001). Viet Nam’s literacy and school attendance rates are on a par
with economies that have per capita income levels ten times higher.
Not only have the number of pupils and students attending school increased,
but there has also been some qualitative improvement, with repetition and
drop-out rates and the number of three-shift classes declining. Vocational schools
and classes have expanded.
There has been considerable progress in most aspects of education, but
some aspects of the change in the delivery of education deserve careful
monitoring, particularly in relation to the identification of poverty and gender
issues. Almost daily reporting in the press suggests that the lack of funds to
meet school fees and other costs is reducing access by the poor to education.
Increased schooling costs could have a negative impact on girls’ access to
higher education. The gender imbalance is already worse at the higher levels of
the educational system. This may reflect prejudice but may also reflect a rational
response to investment in human capital in the face of a job market which,
while not subject to extreme imbalance, tends to provide more lucrative job
opportunities to men. This imbalance could be reinforced if the government
proceeds vigorously with plans for the ‘socialisation’ of social service provision.2
Poverty is associated with poor access to education both as cause and effect.
Low educational attainment limits access to jobs and higher household incomes
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which are key to greater access to education. The results of the LSMS
demonstrated the strong correlation between poverty and education, with the
poverty rate declining as the level of education rises. Low educational attainment
among parents also affects the economic prospects for the next generation,
influencing decisions about education, child delivery and child rearing.
Large family size is also both a cause and the effect of poverty. In 1998, the
average number of children per woman in the poorest quintile was 3.5 compared
to 2.1 in the richest quintile. As a result, the dependency level among the
poorest quintile was 0.95 compared to 0.37 among the richest quintile.
Poor health is also a factor pushing families into poverty, because of both
the loss of income and the medical costs. Preventative health has improved
through programs to expand immunisation, eradicate polio and also blindness
caused by Vitamin A deficiency (dry eye blindness), increase malaria protection,
prevent goitre, increase the proportion of the population with access to clean
water, and improve access to health services in rural areas. The health insurance
system has been expanded and partial cost recovery in hospitals has contributed
to the financial viability of health centre operations.
However, despite remarkable improvements in health standards over the
past decade, health inequality has widened. The 1998 Household LSMS found
that the annual average number of sick days of the poorest quintile is 3.07,
compared to about 2.4 for the richest quintile. Over the period 1993–97, the
sickness status of the richest quintile was reduced by 30 per cent while that of
the poor remained unchanged.
NOTES
1 For example, the erosion of the communal resource base at the village level, as a result of the
reduction in the role of the cooperatives in rural production, resulted in a reduction in the
provision of pre-school facilities at the early stages of the reform process.
2 The government has adopted this somewhat strange choice of terminology to describe
proposals to increase user charges for social services.
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POVERTY, LOCATION AND INTERNAL
MIGRATION
POVERTY AND LOCATION
As noted previously, one long-term poverty issue concerns what is to be done
with the upland, remote and isolated areas and ethnic minority areas where
many of the poor are concentrated.1 In some cases, limited development may
be largely a matter of physical isolation, which will be reduced as the transport
system is strengthened. But some areas have inherently harsh natural conditions,
with a high propensity to natural disaster and a poor natural resource base.
This is especially important for ethnic minorities, the majority of whom live
in remote and isolated areas. Ethnic minority communities make up around
29 per cent of the poor even though they form only about 14 per cent of the
total national population.
Current approaches to poverty alleviation place a good deal of emphasis on
targeting poor areas. Such an approach has the obvious merit of providing a
straightforward way of targeting the poor. If poverty results from an
infrastructural constraint (for example, poor transport access) that can readily
be relaxed through a focused investment program, poverty may be reduced by
enhancing productivity, contributing both a reduction in poverty and growth
in output. This, however, will not work in all instances. Where natural
conditions are not propitious to growth, there may be little or no productive
return from investment. In that case, geographically focused investment will
neither increase output nor have a lasting effect on poverty reduction.
239
240 VIET NAM: A TRANSITION TIGER?
From the perspective of economic history, one response to persistent poverty
in regions with basically poor conditions for productive investment has been
migration. Historically, migration in Viet Nam has been a response to poverty.2
Considerable migration continues in modern Vietnam, both from the
countryside to the urban centres and from one rural area to another. A critical
resource allocation choice may be whether to tackle the problems of the poor
in situ, or to provide more economic opportunities in the areas where investment
is most productive, and encourage the poor to move to take them up.3
This suggests a potential flaw in emphasising poverty alleviation through
area-focused programs. Accelerated growth in an area may be associated with a
reduction in the proportion of poor without necessarily benefiting the target
group. Thus, high growth in the Central Highlands has been associated with
an influx of people seeking to benefit for example from the fast growth in tree
crop production. This may result in an increase in the proportion of better-off
households without necessarily reducing the poverty of the initial residents.
In the long run, reductions in poverty will involve both increases in rural
income and the movement of population from the countryside to urban areas.
Rural–urban shift can allow migrants to benefit from the better income
opportunities in urban areas and improve rural incomes by tightening rural
labour markets. An overview of the factors influencing poverty therefore needs
to consider the potential rural–urban population movement. The discussion
in the remaining parts of this chapter addresses that issue.
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ON RURAL–URBAN TRANSITION4
Viet Nam is experiencing urbanisation, but there has been a good deal of
uncertainty regarding the rapidity of this process.
In the mid 1990s, the government assumed that the pace of urbanisation
would accelerate and had projected urban growth at 5 per cent for the period
1995–2000 and at 5.5 per cent for 2000–10. The Urban Strategy Team
reporting at that time took the government projections as representing an
‘high growth scenario’, and also used as ‘lower growth scenario’ based on
extrapolation of apparent existing trends, projecting 2.5 per cent per annum
growth between 1993 and 2000 and 4.0 per cent per annum for 2000–10.
The difference between these two scenarios was not trivial. The lower projection
forecast an increase in urban population as a proportion of the total population
to 29 per cent in 2000 and 35 per cent in 2010, whereas the government
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projection was of 34 per cent and 48 per cent respectively. That is, the different
projections established a range for the urban population of between 35 and 47
million people.
Differences of this magnitude reflect more than a statistical quirk; they suggest
that there is a basic lack of certainty and agreement regarding the expected
speed of the rural–urban transition in Viet Nam, based upon whether
expectations are derived from the apparently slow pace of transition in recent
years, or from the likely impact of the accelerated growth. The differences may
be moot, however, because the recorded rate of urbanisation has so far apparently
been significantly lower than predicted by either of the projections. The 1999
Census recorded the urban population as still being only 23.6 per cent of the
total (compared to 19.4 per cent in 1989).
The available evidence has been confusing regarding to the momentum of
urbanisation, ranging from official data in the mid 1990s that suggested that
there was very little movement to the cities to unofficial estimates that as
many as 700,000 people were migrating to urban areas each year.
A difficulty was raised when a number of rural communes were reclassified
as urban in 1997, causing the official urban population to jump 9 per cent.
Furthermore, the Viet Nam Urban Sector Strategy Study (Ministry of
Construction 1995) noted that the Vietnamese definition of urban residence
did not conform to international practice because rural areas within cities and
municipalities were excluded from the urban totals. The study team estimated
that, using the more inclusive definition, about 8 per cent more of the population
resided in urban areas than suggested by official estimates at that time.
Another difficulty arises from unauthorised urban migration. The Urban
Sector Strategy Study (Ministry of Construction 1995:53) estimated that there
were almost 200,000 unregistered immigrants in Ho Chi Minh City in the
period 1986–94 (however, some of these would have become registered by the
end of that period). Unregistered migration of that magnitude would have
resulted in annual urban growth rates greater than 3 per cent (as compared
with official estimates around 2 per cent). Apart from the issue of bureaucratic
definitions of residence, there is always an element of ambiguity about migration
in the urbanisation process. There will always be temporary migrants seeking
employment, many of whom will eventually become residents.
Critical aspects of the urbanisation expected to take place in Viet Nam over
the coming generation are already inherent in existing trends. The likely rate
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of urban growth will be around 2.5–3.0 per cent per annum, based on
interpretation of the various somewhat conflicting data, implying that the
urban population will double in 25–30 years.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN GROWTH POLES
Urbanisation will inevitably lead to the concentration of industry and many
services in a few areas. Government has accepted this likelihood by emphasising
the development of three focal economic zones where infrastructure and other
facilities are being developed on a priority basis to attract both domestic and
foreign investment.
The two key urban growth poles which have emerged are around Ho Chi
Minh City and the corridor to Vung Tau in the Southeast region, and around
Hanoi and the Hanoi–Hai Phong corridor in the Red River region.
Ho Chi Minh City and its neighbouring area is already the major centre for
commercial and industrial development and is set to become one of the strategic
urban growth poles of Southeast Asia. Not only is this virtually inevitable,
given existing trends, but is also desirable—a dynamic and fast growing
commercial centre will make a crucial contribution to the growth of the economy
of Viet Nam. As the main focal point for commercial links with the rest of
Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, the character and pace of its
development will be strongly influenced by foreign investment.
The growth of Ho Chi Minh City is fed by the in-migration of large numbers
of Vietnamese and also of foreign business people and professionals. Vietnamese
migration into the city has a bi-modal character: the city attracts unskilled
workers with only basic education, but acts as a magnet for the highly educated,
who can take advantage of the most sophisticated job opportunities that the
development of the city generates (Centre for Population and Human Resources
Studies, 1995).
The development of Ho Chi Minh City to become a metropolis of more
than five million people has necessitated substantial investment in infrastructure.
Its international role demands a high level of services and a cosmopolitan urban
environment. The government will have to steer between two dangers—that
underinvestment in infrastructure chokes off the desired commercial
development of the area and the danger that the demands of a fast growing
and (relatively) high income urban area monopolise scarce resources, holding
back the development of other areas. Ho Chi Minh City will have income
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levels, and will therefore demand service levels, out of line with conditions in
the rest of the country. This suggests the need for careful programming of
urban infrastructure and the search for imaginative solutions to potential
problems before they arise (for example, transport modes to minimise urban
congestion, land and credit policies which encourage household investment in
low cost housing).
Since the mid 1990s, there has been an acceleration in urban growth in the
northern ‘focal zone’ (Hanoi–Hai Phong), with industrial growth rates
overtaking those of the southern zone.5 Investment is drawn to Hanoi because
of its facilities as the national capital. The trends now suggest that Viet Nam
will have two large metropolitan growth poles. The pace of change in Ho Chi
Minh City and Hanoi is already dramatically changing the character of the
urban environment. Highrise development, funded by foreign investment,
sprawling-small scale construction by the domestic private sector, and booming
spending on motorised transport, have already changed the face of Vietnamese
cities. The future path of urban development may be being chosen already,
which means that some options may be closing without being given proper
consideration (for example, in relation to transport modes).
There is less evidence of an integrated pole developing around the Quang
Nam–Da Nang–Quang Ngai focal area in the central part of the country. In
1999, the population of Da Nang city, the fourth largest city in Viet Nam,
was only 540,000. The share of manufacturing in GDP in this area is only
slightly lower than in the Red River delta and irrigation in the region is the
second highest in the country. Yet yields per capita in agriculture and per
capita GDP are lower than the national average.
The emerging Vietnamese industrial economy can therefore be viewed as
consisting of three regional sub-economies. The south has a well integrated,
dynamic and rapidly growing economy. The Hanoi–Hai Phong corridor is
now consolidating as the centre of a potentially powerful core–periphery
economy in the north. The three regions along the central spine of the country
have not yet been drawn into a core–periphery relationship with the focal
economic area around Da Nang.
The first period of accelerated growth benefited the Southeast more than
the other regions, particularly as most of the initial foreign investment was
directed there. As growth has accelerated, the Hanoi–Hai Phong corridor has
increasingly benefited.
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A number of second and third-level towns are developing as significant urban
centres (for example, Hue, Can Tho, Bien Hoa, and Nha Trang, all towns of
more than 200,000 population) and serve as centres to stimulate rural
development in their hinterlands. This de-concentration of urban development
is a positive factor in supporting the geographical diffusion of the benefits of
growth.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RURAL–URBAN TRANSITION—
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
The nature of the future rural–urban transition could be crucial for the future
pattern of income distribution and for poverty alleviation. A rural–urban shift
can be associated with high growth but can also be associated with economic
stagnation. While data on recent rates of urbanisation suggest that the rate of
urbanisation is still quite modest, sustained economic growth will shift the
centre of gravity of the economy from rural, agricultural activities to urban
industry and services. As a consequence, the population will likely be attracted
into urban areas by higher income opportunities.
Rural economic stagnation can also promote a rural–urban shift as
deteriorating rural conditions push people to move to the cities. The desirable
rate of urbanisation depends on the interplay of two concerns. On the one
hand, the expansion of urban infrastructure is expensive, suggesting that a low
pace of urbanisation would be more manageable. On the other hand, a low
rate of growth of urban employment is likely to result in a widening of the gap
between urban and rural incomes.
A healthy pattern of urbanisation is more likely to emerge from movements
resulting from the attractions (pull factors) of expanding urban livelihood
opportunities than from rural stagnation (pushing people out of rural areas).
So far, the government of Viet Nam has avoided extreme urban bias.
Available evidence indicates that, while there are significant differences
between rural and urban areas in the delivery of social services, the basic
education and health outcomes do not vary dramatically. Thus, the literacy
rate for people 10 years old and over in rural and urban areas is about 85 per
cent and 94 per cent respectively. Similarly, indicators of morbidity show that
39 per cent of the population reported sick in the previous 12 months in rural
areas as compared to 33 per cent in urban areas.
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The incentive to migrate to urban areas could be moderated if social services
are maintained at reasonable levels in rural areas and income opportunities in
rural non-agricultural activities are expanded.
Nevertheless, although healthy development requires attention to rural
development, it is also the case that urbanisation will be an inevitable outcome
of economic growth, and expanding urban employment will play a key role in
long-term poverty reduction. High rates of growth in the industrial and service
sectors will be associated with increases both in the numbers employed in
those activities and with increasing labour productivity. For a given increase in
urban GDP, if the balance is struck more in the direction of increasing
employment levels rather than raising average urban incomes, the widening in
the gap between levels of urban and rural productivity (and incomes) can be
restrained. That is, high rates of growth in urban population are not only an
unavoidable side product of industrialisation, but are in one respect a desirable
consequence.
The international experience of urbanisation has varied. The phenomenon
of rapid urbanisation has been associated with successful development, but in
many developing countries it has also been associated with economic stagnation
and negative social consequences. Even where rapid urbanisation has been
associated with national economic success, the poor social outcomes in terms
of the condition of the urban poor and the stress of middle-class urban life are
still apparent in some developing economies.
In a number of countries, the allocation of resources to support over-
concentrated patterns of urban growth has been associated with rural stagnation,
with the lack of economic opportunities in the countryside pushing the rural
population to migrate to the cities, where many are recruited to an urban
underclass. Investment rushes to an urban core, followed by a rush of migrants
in search of better jobs, while the peripheral areas are left to stagnate. The
incidence of poverty in the periphery is then matched by festering and crammed
shanty towns in the ill-prepared urban cores. Crime, stress, pollution, congestion
and overloaded transport and communication systems come to dominate the
life of the city, while the vast majority eke out a living in the informal sector.
The result has been unmanageable urban environments and increasing rural
and urban poverty. Also, the resulting imbalances in urban and rural
development have in many instances generated constraints on growth, which
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at the extreme have resulted in a vicious circle of high rates of urban population
growth associated with low rates of economic growth.
In a more positive scenario, urban growth contributes to the development
of the rural periphery through the expanding market for rural products, the
spread of improved infrastructure and social services, and the withdrawal of
surplus labour from rural areas, all of which lead to rising prosperity in the
rural hinterland.
While high economic growth will result inevitably in urbanisation, the
consequences of that transition will vary, depending on whether urban growth
is combined with continued improvements in rural incomes, or whether it is
associated with rural stagnation. Rural stagnation not only creates problems
for rural areas, but makes urban development more difficult to manage, as the
rural poor are forced into the cities as a survival strategy. A more virtuous
scenario is one where accelerated urban growth is linked to expansion in rural
economic opportunities.
So far, development in Viet Nam has achieved a reasonably virtuous
urbanisation pattern because rural households have enjoyed increasing income
levels notwithstanding the widening gap between urban and rural incomes.
Certain features of Viet Nam suggest that the prospects of the virtuous process
of rural–urban transition continuing are reasonable.
• With its long coastline and two areas of dense population (the Red River
delta and the Mekong delta), the underlying geography (and history)
does not provide the conditions which would give rise to one growth
pole, resulting in a single megalopolis (such as Mexico City or Manila).
• The two highest potential agricultural areas (the Red River and Mekong
deltas) are adjacent to the two leading urban growth poles (Hanoi–Hai
Phong and Ho Chi Minh City) creating good possibilities for linkages
between urban and rural development.
• While the growth in the industrial and service industries has been much
higher than that of agriculture, the growth of the agricultural sector has
been lively—in some areas high enough to generate labour scarcities and
local wages higher than unskilled wages in the major urban areas.
• Although the evidence is not conclusive, data suggest that an explosion
in the urban growth rate has not yet happened.
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• In some parts of country, there has been a lively growth in rural industry,
and the potential for further development of rural non-agricultural
activities is high.
PATTERNS OF MIGRATION
Migration patterns revealed in the 1992–93 VLSS and the Census of 1999
indicate some acceleration of urbanisation in Viet Nam. Data from the VLSS
indicated that most rural migration (75 per cent) was to other rural areas,
with 25 per cent of rural migrants moving to urban areas and 40 per cent of
urban migrants moving to other urban areas. Data from the 1999 census show
a substantial increase in these figures with 42 per cent of rural migrants now
moving to urban areas and 72 per cent of urban migrants moving to other
urban areas. However, migration to rural areas remains important. The Central
Highlands has continued to attract a large amount of rural in-migration as has
the Red River delta and Southeast area. Ho Chi Minh City and the Vung Tau
corridor has seen the highest level of in-migration taking 43 per cent of migrants
according to 1999 Census, and Hanoi has increased its in-migration, now
taking 12 per cent. Despite these obvious urban core areas pulling migrants
from surrounding areas as well as from further afield, the Central Highlands
has continued to be an important destination for migrants, accounting for 25
per cent of in-migration between 1994 and 1999 (compared to 44 per cent
between 1984–89).
In the Southeastern region the share of manufacturing in GDP was already
as high at 25 per cent in the mid 1990s. It was only half that or less in all
other regions except the Red River delta, where it was around 14 per cent. Per
capita GDP in the Southeast was about double the national average at
VND5,275 in 1994. Every other region was below the national average.
Moreover, GDP was growing at 11 per cent in this region as compared to 7 per
cent or less in most other regions.6 The fairly high population density of the
region is mainly a reflection of the concentration of population in Ho Chi
Minh City and along the corridor to Vung Tau. An economic growth pole is
clearly emerging along this corridor, its periphery lying in the Southeast region
itself and the adjoining provinces of the Mekong Delta region. The latter is
one of the country’s most dynamic agricultural regions, with paddy yields of
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over 3 tonnes per hectare and the highest per capita value of agricultural output
in the country. The return to land is also reflected in the rental value of land,
which is also the highest in the country.7 In the mid 1990s the region grew at
an annual rate of 6–7 per cent, and had the highest GDP per capita after the
Southeast and the Red River Delta.
The Red River delta is the second largest region after the Mekong delta in
terms of population, with over 14 million people. It has the second highest
manufacturing share of GDP after the Southeast at 14 per cent and has received
large in-migrations from the Northern Mountain region as well as the North
Central Coast region. The region’s population density is the highest in the
country (1,142 per square kilometre), about three times that of the Southeast
and the Mekong Delta. Ninety per cent of the region’s cropped area is irrigated,
the highest proportion in the country and more than double that of the Mekong
delta. Paddy yield at 3.8 tons per hectare is the highest in the country.8 Per
capita GDP is higher than in the Mekong Delta and the growth rate is second
only to that of the Southeast. However, the Red River delta region also has one
of the largest concentrations of people in poverty in the country because of the
high density of population. In this region, more than anywhere else, labour
needs to be drawn into non-agricultural activities in order to reduce the intense
pressure of population on land.
As noted earlier, the response of a number of donors and the government to
the dangers of unequal development has been to focus special attention to the
poorest groups and poorest districts. The government has placed particular
emphasis on the needs of ‘mountainous and remote areas’, as the poorest and
most problematic. The World Bank Poverty Assessment and Strategy projections
of regional incidence of poverty under alternative growth scenarios suggest
that poverty is likely to be particularly intractable in the Northern Uplands
and North Central regions (World Bank 1995b).
Poverty alleviation should be about tackling the problems of poor people
rather than poor areas—in the development of all countries, part of the poverty
problem is resolved by the poor in areas of limited potential moving to high
growth areas. In this regard, although policy should aim to manage the rural–
urban transition to avoid rural stagnation pushing the migration rate to
undesirable levels, there will be high levels of rural–urban and rural–rural
migration.9
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Although a ‘poverty alleviation strategy’ should involve attention to the
poorest regions, that concentration should be tempered by the facts that
resources are limited and the poor are many and are to be found in all regions.
Although the VLSS and the World Bank correctly identified the Northern
Uplands and North Central regions as having particularly high poverty
problems, with 58.6 per cent and 48.0 per cent below the poverty line
respectively, the absolute numbers of poor in the two densely populated deltas
was also large. Choices must be made regarding which poor are targeted in the
first instance. Given the scarce resources at Viet Nam’s disposal, it might make
good sense to alleviate poverty, at least in part, by supporting growth in areas
where there are concentrations of poor people but which have a reasonable
medium-term growth potential. It would be highly desirable to focus on those
low income groups that, with some help, could raise their own incomes
rapidly—thus achieving both growth and poverty alleviation. This may include
encouraging the potential for highly dynamic small-scale development among
those who are not so poor and in provinces which have already demonstrated
growth potential.
Thus a possible regional focus for an accelerated rural development strategy
which would both support high growth and achieve a reasonably wide diffusion
of benefits in the specific circumstances of Viet Nam would be to target the
‘middle sectors’—the viable and growing small business sector, rural areas which
have already demonstrated good development potential and areas which can
be provided with reasonable access to the main growth centres with relative
ease (that is, a strategy to promote linkages between the three focal development
zones and their immediate hinterlands).
Judgment will be required about the existing or potential comparative
advantage of the three focal economic zones and their hinterlands, both for the
home market as well as for exports. The characteristics of the three zones vary
in relation to existing economic activities, land–labour ratios and their natural
resource base. Analysis of potential constraints that might limit the realisation
of the potential comparative advantage can provide insights into the required
government interventions. It should also be noted, however, that the detailed
characteristics of a dynamic process of small-scale industrial growth are
inherently difficult to predict because they depend on local-level responses to
market opportunities.
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The government has committed itself to the development of a third economic
zone in Quang Nam–Da Nang–Quang Ngai. This strategy seeks to develop
the central coast, so that the development of the country is not focused entirely
on the two more highly developed areas to the north and south of the country.
But the development of this zone is problematic because it does not extrapolate
established patterns of urban growth. Although Da Nang is the fourth-largest
city in Viet Nam, it has less than a half million urban population and has not
yet attracted foreign investors in numbers that would suggest that it about to
become a key centre. Quang Ngai has a population of just over 100,000 and is
not even among Viet Nam’s top 40 towns.
Public investment will have to play a far more prominent role in the central
regions and the Quang Nam–Da Nang–Quang Ngai focal area than it has
elsewhere. Though the area is yet to pick up the momentum of growth, it has
longer-term economic possibilities because of its strategic location. Highway
No.1, connecting the northern and southern parts of the country, is being
restored and a bold scheme has been proposed under the Greater Mekong
sub-regional initiative to build a transnational highway from the eastern
seaboard of this area, through Laos, to Bangkok and beyond. To complete the
link, the region will also have to be provided with an improved deep water
port. Once these projects are implemented, the focal economic area located at
the crossing of these two major transport corridors would re-emerge as a great
commercial hub, as it used to be in the distant past. It could then draw all the
contiguous regions into its periphery, providing them with convenient outlets
not only to the national market but also to the rest of the world.
NOTES
1 Van de Walle and Gunewardena (2000) examine this in some detail.
2 Hardy (2000:27) discusses the phenomenon of ‘two white hands people’ (dan hai ban tay
trang) or the movement of poor landless peasants within Vietnam looking for work and
eventually settling.
3 Post-war population redistribution programs had questionable outcomes but surely
established a vanguard that was the basis for future cash crop expansion and diversification
and established the infrastructure allowing future migration.
4 Parts of this section are based on Van Arkadie and Mundle (1996).
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5 In 1994 Hanoi overtook Ho Chi Minh City as the favoured location for foreign investment,
as measured by the total value of newly licensed projects in that year (although Ho Chi
Minh City remained the clear leader in terms of the accumulated total of licensed projects).
6 The reported growth rate for the Central Highlands is 8 per cent in the VLSS. However,
the reported paddy yield of 4.2 tonnes for this region is clearly inaccurate and distorts
other derivative estimates for this region.
7 This is barring the reported rental value of almost VND 6,000 for the Central Coastal
region. This is completely out of line with the rental data for the rest of the country and is
probably incorrect.
8 This excludes the reported yield for the Central Highlands, which is probably inaccurate.
9 The Central Highlands region has enjoyed a particularly high rate of growth of rural GDP
compared to the national average (11.34 per cent in 1993 compared to 4.60 per cent for
the Red River delta and 7.5 per cent for Viet Nam overall. See World Bank 1995b:Table
2.1). Economic growth in the Central Highlands has been associated with movement into
the region. Continued growth at that rate would not only reduce the poverty of those
currently resident in the Central Highlands, but would also sustain further in-migration
from other rural areas.
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This chapter wraps up the authors’ objectives in writing this book, which are
to provide a comprehensive review of developments in the economy and the
evolution of economic policy since the mid 1980s. A more ambitious objective
is to interpret and explain some key factors during Vietnamese economic
growth, and to assess any implications for development planning elsewhere.
The text examines the role of the state, agricultural development, investment
in human capital, poverty alleviation, enterprise and industry policy, the role
of private foreign investment, the reform processes, and the role of foreign
assistance. It closes with the question: “What might have been done to achieve
higher and/or more equitable growth?” The authors answer with the statement
that while much remains to be done, Viet Nam has, in its own way, been
remarkably successful in implementing Doi Moi to move the economy to a
high growth path and to reduce poverty dramatically.
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17
ACHIEVEMENTS OF DOI MOI AND
FUTURE CHALLENGES
One objective in writing this book was to provide a comprehensive review of
developments in the economy and the evolution of economic policy since the
mid 1980s. Hopefully, the preceding chapters have described salient features
of economic change in Viet Nam, helped illustrate the complexities of the
economic policymaking process and highlighted some of the ambiguities in
explaining Viet Nam’s performance. It is hoped that, at a minimum, this
information will be useful to some readers in making their own assessment of
Viet Nam’s performance and the major factors affecting it.
A more ambitious objective was to interpret and explain some key factors
driving Vietnamese economic growth, and to assess any implications for
development planning elsewhere. At the beginning of this book, a warning
was offered about the care needed in drawing lessons from national experience
for more general application. Certainly, this account has identified a number
of characteristics of Viet Nam which were quite special to the country, including
its specific history, geographical location and natural resource endowment.
Moreover, the acceleration of Vietnamese growth happened when the East
Asian economic boom was at its height and the world economy was in an
upswing. Nevertheless, there are a number of aspects of the Vietnamese




THE ROLE OF THE STATE
The Vietnamese experience offers some evidence regarding the role of the state
in development. The lessons are not simple and are certainly subject to
alternative interpretations.
It was possible to view the Vietnamese state as being a ‘weak state’ in terms
of its economic management capability, as has been argued by some
commentators (for example, Fforde and de Vylder (1996), who identified the
state as weak because of failures to implement stated policy intentions effectively
during the pre-reform period). An alternative approach sees the measured nature,
continuity and national ownership of the policymaking process as characteristics
of a strong state. The differences in interpretation partly reflect the gap that
often exists between the definition of objectives and policies at the national
level and the pragmatic accommodation of the decentralised decisions of
individual actors in the economy, even when these are in apparent conflict
with stated policies. The arguments developed in this volume posit that this
pragmatic willingness to accept change resulting from decentralised initiatives
is indicative of the strength of the state.
The Vietnamese experience suggests the need for a balanced view about the
appropriate role of government intervention in the economy. Viet Nam has
combined a willingness to shift vigorously towards using market policy
instruments and maintaining a fairly orthodox macroeconomic stance, while
maintaining an active role for the state, particularly in investing in infrastructure
and human resource development, and in providing strong planning and policy
guidance regarding medium-term growth and equity goals.
In that broad sense, Viet Nam can be seen as yet another variation on the
East Asian model of the developmental state. The approach has been both
flexible in the use of market instruments and pragmatic about the requirements
for active state intervention to develop infrastructure and market institutions
and influence the allocation of resources to realise national social and economic
development goals.
This study has not been about political goals or the merits of alternative
political institutions. In recent years, however, issues of ‘good governance’ have
played an important part in the development literature and the thinking of
donors. Insofar as the governance agenda is about asserting a particular set of
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political values and Western political institutions, it lies outside the economic
policy issues that are the focus of this study. A particular view of governance is
currently being promoted which sees good governance not only as a set of
desirable political values but also as an appropriate means of achieving economic
development with equity (UK Department of International Development
2001). What light does the Vietnamese experience throw on the relationship
between political institutions and growth with equity?
Viet Nam certainly does not conform to the model which is implicit (and
sometimes explicit) in the donor literature on governance. It is a one-party
state, there are definite limits on the role of autonomous institutions
representative of what is called ‘civil society’ in the governance literature, and
the system is perceived to be fairly corrupt. Yet Viet Nam has benefited from
the continuity of political institutions, which has provided a stable environment
and has enabled the Vietnamese authorities to make decisive macroeconomic
policy decisions at times when there were strong economic reasons for action.
The particular Vietnamese method of policymaking provided the basis for a
pragmatic and gradual (‘step-by-step’ to use the Vietnamese term) process of
institutional change. The continuity and stability of political institutions was
underpinned by a complex consensus-building process that sometimes has
resulted in a slow and opaque decision making process, which has had its
frustrations, but which has also helped ensure ownership of the reform process
by national institutions and facilitated profound institutional changes with
minimal open conflict or tension. Despite the one-party system, the government
eventually responded to domestic pressures to introduce reforms because of
grassroots pressure for action to address the country’s economic crisis in the
mid 1980s and has in recent years been sensitive to local discontent.
Many external observers have trouble reconciling the fact that such far-
reaching change and economic development has occurred under the aegis of
an avowedly one-party Marxist-Leninist state. The successful implementation
of Doi Moi suggests that implementation of political liberalisation is not a
necessary initial condition for successful economic reform or the acceleration
of economic growth and poverty alleviation.1 Indeed, the counter-historical
hypothesis might be that if abrupt political change had been attempted
alongside the economic changes, growth could have been more difficult to
achieve, as it could have led to instability, less coherent economic policies and
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uncertainties that would have increased investment risk and made it more
difficult to protect property rights.
Of course the fact that Viet Nam has achieved a relatively strong development
performance with a one-party system in no way suggests that a one-party
political system is either a necessary or sufficient condition for successful
development. Successful East Asian economies have achieved growth and poverty
alleviation under various regimes, including various forms of multi-party system,
and with varying degrees of authoritarian leadership. Under a one-party system,
Viet Nam has experienced both economic stagnation relative to other East
Asian economies (1976–88) and a period of relatively strong economic
performance in the 1990s. Despite the one-party system, the government
eventually acted decisively (in the late 1980s) to confront a mounting economic
crisis and is responsive to the needs of the mass of the people. However, the
nature of the domestic political processes that resulted in this change remains
poorly understood.2
What the study does suggest is that relative stability in social and political
institutions can be particularly important in generating investor confidence,
entrepreneurial activity, and thus competition, in a situation where the formal
legal and institutional framework for business and commercial activity remains
weak. Moreover, such stability may facilitate a successful pragmatic process of
innovation and shield the economy from reckless experiments in launching
untried solutions. In practice, the stable system may provide a good foundation
for the subsequent development of effective market institutions.
The conclusion therefore is that, although it is the normal stuff of politics
to espouse one or another set of political values as desirable and to promote
particular political institutions that reflect those values, it is questionable that
any particular political model can be justified as a vehicle for economic growth.
The reality is that terms such as ‘one-party’ and ‘multi-party’ each encompass
a wide range of factors and institutions important to economic actors. In some
respects, the way the Vietnamese state operated in practice is not particularly
consistent with what observers might expect of a Marxist-Leninist state. The
state has managed to combine a degree of authority and legitimacy for national
institutions with considerable autonomy in practice at the local level (both in
local government and in state-owned business). On the other hand, the state
continues to exercise tight control over direct criticism of the political system
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and stifles the work of national intellectuals and authors who offer alternative
political views.
One by-product of the nature of the Vietnamese government system is that
the policy process has remained under strong domestic control, with strong
national ownership. At the most critical periods of reform in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, access to external financial assistance was negligible. This
meant that any external advice was largely judged on its merits rather than
being accepted primarily as a means of unlocking donor coffers.3 The national
ownership of policy was unequivocal. When conditionality attached to large
transfers of official development assistance emerged as a factor in the
policymaking process, there is little evidence to suggest that this was effective
in accelerating reform.
Political stability and orderly (albeit bureaucratic)4 administration provided
an adequately predictable context for economic decision making, despite the
limited development of a formal legal system. Nevertheless, as the non-state
sector expands and the economy grows in size and complexity the economic
returns from more formal market institutions, including a transparent legal
system, will also increase.
Through much of the reform period, the design of the business regulatory
environment was not conducive to—and often discouraged—domestic private
sector development. However, in practice, the system accommodated growth
in small-scale private sector activity. No doubt the regulatory system imposed
hidden costs on private business, both in the pecuniary sense of the ‘envelopes’
to be passed to officials and in terms of the time involved in handling
bureaucratic processes. Furthermore, ambiguities regarding legal rights and
obligations and in official attitudes towards private wealth left successful business
people vulnerable, and encouraged secrecy and strategic alliances with state
officials in conducting business. Nevertheless, the growth of the non-state sector
has been lively. The extent of informal business activity was evidenced by the
rapid registration of businesses when procedures were simplified, and costs
reduced, under the new enterprise law.
One difficulty in drawing lessons from the Vietnamese experience is that it
demonstrates that the informal characteristics of the institutions and
understanding of the economic ‘rules of the game’ are quite as important as
the formal institutions. At early stages of transition and development, having
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a reasonably predictable political environment and social stability may be more
important than adopting a formal legal framework of the kind that underpins
market economies in more developed countries. This has non-trivial implications
for policy advisors, and for the design of programs to support institutional and
policy reform in transition and developing economies.
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
The Vietnamese experience confirms the importance of agricultural
transformation as a component of successful growth in a low-income country
with a predominantly rural population. This is, of course, not an original or
surprising conclusion. But there are also lessons to be learnt about how
transformation is to be achieved.
While a comprehensive analysis of the sources of agricultural growth in Viet
Nam has not yet been made, salient characteristics included
• a fairly egalitarian system of land-holding which ensured access to land
for rural households
• that the use of market instruments to coordinate and provide incentives
to farm households, beginning with reforms in the early 1980s, stimulated
growth. Efficient, functioning markets are especially important as an
economic coordinating mechanism for small-holder agriculture
• that increasingly competitive commodity markets were supported by
effective public provision of basic infrastructure (notably water and transport)
• that progress in human development has facilitated the transfer of ideas
and improved technology, and has underpinned strong productivity
growth
• that continued functioning of organisations responsible for research,
extension and distribution of inputs (by a mix of private and public
enterprise, the latter despite financial stress) has facilitated productivity
growth. While the support system is sub-optimal, it has been sufficiently
effective to help facilitate the transfer of new technology
• that opening up domestic and international markets has greatly expanded
choices, increased value added per worker, and thus increased income
• fluid population movement can be conducive to both growth and poverty
alleviation—for example, encouraging migration and investment to open
up new areas for tree-crop production.
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INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL
A strong commitment was made to investment in human capital in the period
before reform as well as during the reform period. This included a massive
commitment to basic education which resulted in very high levels of literacy
in rural as well as urban areas, and for women as well as men. Viet Nam, as a
consequence, is a society with widespread adult literacy.
A good deal of effort was also devoted to technical and professional training,
including technical training outside Viet Nam, as well as development of
national technical training capacity. Viet Nam was successful initially in
developing and utilising capabilities in intermediate technology, constructing
buildings and other physical facilities and producing goods for the domestic
market cheaply and of appropriate standard for a low income market, while
more recently it has begun to adapt its technology to the more demanding
standards required for export markets.
There has also been a strong commitment to basic health care, including
children’s health, which resulted in much better statistics for mortality and
life expectancy than are usually found in a country with such a low per capita
income level.
Broad-based investment in human capital paid off in terms of the receptivity
to technical change and the economic opportunities emerging in the reform
period.5 Relatively strong education and health services have also contributed
to the speedy demographic transition.
POVERTY ALLEVIATION
The successful Vietnamese performance over the past decade in alleviating
poverty is capable of alternative interpretations, which can lend support to
varying approaches to poverty reduction strategies.
One possible interpretation is that promoting growth is an effective poverty
alleviation strategy. In a country with pervasive poverty, of the kind prevalent
in Viet Nam in the 1980s, economic growth is a necessary condition for
widespread poverty reduction, and at that stage of growth it did not make
sense to divert resources from high growth potential investments to low potential
investments on distributional grounds. To be sustainable, poverty alleviation
should be about the development of productive capacity, rather than
redistributive welfare measures.
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Market liberalisation, because it promoted high growth, also supported rapid
poverty alleviation. In particular, market reforms were a key input into the
acceleration of agricultural growth, much of it based on the household farm, a
critical factor in reducing rural poverty, while the fast growth of small and
medium-sized enterprise generated widespread income opportunities.
However, some aspects of the market-led growth strategy may create
difficulties for poverty alleviation in the future. Despite the improvements in
rural incomes, the absolute gap between urban and rural incomes is widening
persistently and substantially.
It must also be recognised that poverty alleviation in the 1990s was not
simply the result of reforms. The liberalisation measures took effect in an
economy with important features inherited from the pre-reform period which
spread the benefits of growth, in particular the sustained commitment to
investment in human capital, the lack of great inequalities in the access to
assets (especially land) and modest differentials in employment incomes.
ENTERPRISE AND INDUSTRY POLICY
It is in the area of enterprise policy that the Vietnamese authorities have been
most persistently criticised, notably in relation to the slow pace at which changes
in ownership of state-owned enterprise have been introduced, the rather negative
regulatory environment facing private domestic business and the cautious
approach to providing incentives to foreign investors. And yet Viet Nam has
achieved high growth, including rapid expansion in the private domestic sector
and in private foreign investment.
One response of critics to this evidence of successful growth despite the
slowness of enterprise reform is that growth would have been even faster with
more conducive policies and that, in the current harsh international business
climate, failure to reform more vigorously will hold up future development.
An alternative, and not particularly transferable, explanation is that, if the
‘animal spirits’ of business enterprise are sufficiently lively, the policy
environment may not be of primary importance (aggressive entrepreneurs,
public and private, domestic and foreign, may be able to get round unhelpful
regulations). This is unhelpful to the economic policymaker because the supply
of entrepreneurship is largely exogenous. It does suggest, however, the need for
careful evaluation of underlying entrepreneurial capacities and investment
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opportunities when judging the potential efficacy of policies—there are surely
countries that have implemented ‘open door’ policies only to discover the lack
of applicants to enter.
By contrast, this study has also argued that Vietnamese policy towards the
private sector has often been more accommodating in practice than in rhetoric
(reversing a more normal situation). The accommodation of an emerging
national private sector had a positive impact which is likely to become
increasingly important.
In relation to state enterprises, interpretation is more controversial. While
price and trading reforms, abolition of direct subsidies, and other reforms have
fairly rapidly exposed state enterprises to much greater competition, ownership
reform has been slow, with consolidation rather than privatisation. Slow
movement in this area has been a particular focus of criticism from within the
donor community. Nonetheless, slow state enterprise reform has not proved to
be the drag on growth predicted by external commentators. While it is not
difficult to come across horror stories of inefficiency, and of large monopoly
rents (for example, in telecommunications), there are also many examples of
successful joint ventures and of productive contributions made by the sector.
It may be that the competitive environment faced by many state enterprises
stimulated improved performance, while a degree of decentralisation permitted
innovation by state enterprise managers. This would suggest that a competitive
environment may be a more important factor in determining performance
than the nature of ownership—an outcome more consistent with the
Lange–Lerner model of combining decentralised public ownership with efficient
allocation, than with Kornai’s view that a soft budget constraint, and its adverse
consequences for efficiency, is the virtually inevitable outcome of widespread
public ownership (for example, Kornai 1980).
THE ROLE OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Private foreign direct investment played a useful role mainly in two ways.
Foreign investment, particularly from other economies in the region, was
important in promoting the fast growth in labour-intensive industrial exports.
Foreign investment was also important in providing know-how and finance for
the fast growth in energy exports.
The impact of foreign investment in real estate development was more
ambiguous in that it stimulated a property boom which led to severe excess
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capacity in some areas (notably hotels). Investment in import substitution
industries also led to high-cost excess capacity in some industries (for example,
car assembly) but this was not severe enough to undermine overall industrial
performance.
The slow pace of financial reform and the limited development of financial
and equity markets has meant that foreign portfolio investment has been
insignificant. While that may have limited access to external funding, it also
shielded the economy from speculative flows and limited the impact of the
East Asian financial crisis.
REFORM PROCESSES AND PRESSURES FOR REFORM
Grassroots pressure to improve economic opportunities and increase living
standards has been important in driving the reform process. After the euphoria
of national reunification, the credibility of the government and the Party
increasingly depended on improving living conditions. Periods of deteriorating
external conditions increased pressure for change at both the grassroots and
top level policymaking.
While much of the reform process remains opaque, several more visible
features provide some lessons about the management of a reform process. First,
most public policy decisions are only made after broad consensus is reached
on policy directions within the system. The initiation of major policy and
institutional change requires sustained effort in consensus building. This process,
often time consuming, has to be nationally led. Opportunities for external input
into these processes are mostly limited either to presentation of international
experiences or to assistance in analysing the potential impacts of policy options.
Second, many formal regulatory changes are in effect formalising what is
already happening in practice in some parts of the country. Other reform
efforts were initially implemented on a pilot basis. In effect, ‘learning by doing’
has been an important feature of reform efforts. For example, the private sector
began to emerge and small-scale private trading was widespread before it was
formally legalised. Land-use rights were widely used as collateral for informal
credit before such practices were sanctioned by formal legal provisions. More
recently, domestic business associations have emerged even though the decree
on their operations is still being drafted. Many of the smaller state-owned
enterprises have responded rapidly to changing market circumstance, but not
always in accordance with state regulations on corporate governance. Indeed,
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state-owned assets have at times been used for personal benefit. Where policy
reforms have clearly been top-down (for example, the bankruptcy and state
enterprise laws, and equitisation), implementation is often problematic. At
the same time, the backing of Party and government leaders has been important
in removing formal institutional barriers to business development.
While entrepreneurs emerged from a broad cross-section of society, contacts
with the state apparatus are particularly valuable in periods of regulatory and
institutional ambiguity. Many government and Party officials have family and
friends engaged in business. Thus, officials were often personally aware of the
bureaucratic and administrative constraints faced by entrepreneurs. This has
facilitated and encouraged recent moves to more formal consultations between
the state and the business community to reduce barriers to business growth.
Finally, unlike in some less developed economies, national policymakers in
Viet Nam have rarely relied directly on external advisors in policy formulation.
At times, changes promoted by donors and external advisors are adopted, but
the process by which this policy change has occurred is difficult to identify or
define. Few external advisors would claim to understand fully the policymaking
process or to even know who the key players are in the process of developing
policy.
In the contemporary setting, it is interesting to speculate whether difficulties
in the international economy will be taken as a spur to intensified reform or as
a call for greater caution. It could be argued that fast reform is needed in an
increasingly competitive environment to attract limited international
investment. But it could also be argued that further and more aggressive
liberalisation might leave the economy excessively exposed to the consequences
of international economic instability (as a corollary to the argument that the
slow pace of financial sector reform insulated the economy from some of the
worst impacts of the post-1997 East Asian downturn). Regardless, there is
little doubt that the government sees continuing trade development and inflows
of foreign direct investment as important for the achievement of the rapid
increases in productivity, production and incomes needed to further reduce
poverty and to reduce income gaps with other East Asian economies.
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Foreign official development assistance played little role in the acceleration of
growth. In fact, the period in which reform was initiated with particular vigour
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and the acceleration in growth began was characterised by sharp declines in
external assistance, as support from the CMEA countries collapsed but had
not yet been replaced by flows from members of the development assistance
community. Indeed, the sharp growth in foreign assistance flows coincided
with a slackening of the growth rate (although a causal relationship is not be
to inferred—it was also contemporaneous with the onset of the East Asian
economic crisis).
A plausible case can be made that ideas provided by way of technical assistance
activities provided a useful input into the reform process. However, such inputs
were primarily of a technical advisory nature. There was little direct input in
drafting policy, and such assistance was not associated with aid conditionality
and therefore did not erode national ownership of policies.
There is no evidence that the contemporary attempt to introduce pervasive
conditionality,6 particularly by the Bretton Woods institutions, is accelerating
or improving the reform process. Vietnamese institutions appear to have been
strong enough, and accountable enough to their domestic constituents, to
withstand any undue outside influence over national policymaking processes.
WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE TO ACHIEVE HIGHER AND/
OR MORE EQUITABLE GROWTH?
It trying to explain and interpret Vietnamese policy, we may give the impression
that Viet Nam followed a near-optimal strategy. In reality this is never the
case—it is always possible to identify areas where there was and is room for
policy improvement however much success has been achieved.
Obviously, serious mistakes were made in the 1970s and 1980s. Doi Moi
and stabilisation reforms could have come sooner.
Once the country moved along the path to reform, probably the key thing
they could have been done better was to more quickly and more thoroughly to
remove barriers that hinder the development of the domestic private sector. An
earlier focus on removing the regulatory, administrative and other barriers to
domestic private sector investment would have increased the contribution of
the private sector to growth and employment, as is evidenced by the response
in the last two years to the belated improvement in business legislation. If
there had been more focus on exploiting the potential of indigenous
entrepreneurship, a considerable Vietnamese resource, rather than concentrating
attention on foreign direct investment, growth probably would have been faster
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and more equitable because more non-farm employment would have been
created. The issue is not one of an ‘either/or’ choice between domestic and
foreign investment, but rather a more balanced approach throughout the 1990s
and more of an effort to encourage joint foreign investor/domestic private
initiatives. For example, income tax regimes that were heavily biased against
national tax payers discouraged the development of local talent (especially by
foreign investors).
On the other hand, the interpretation developed in this volume suggests that
it is difficult to judge what impact accelerated ownership change in state enterprises
would have had on growth. Greater effort to reduce monopoly power would
have been helpful, both by encouraging competition within the state sector and
opening up to competition from private domestic and foreign business. Maybe
donors could have focused more on helping domestic agencies develop capacity
to undertake substantive analysis of the distributional and efficiency consequences
of some key national and provincial monopolies (for example, in agricultural
processing and trade), and of continuing barriers to private sector development.
Apparently there was some initial deterioration in the social sector (education
and health) during Doi Moi, both because of funding constraints and the
unintended consequences of some institutional changes (for example, the
deterioration of service delivery by rural cooperatives). Also, the move to
implement user charges may have consequences in skewing access to social
facilities in favour of the better off. Borje Lljunggren, a Swedish former
ambassador who has followed developments in Viet Nam during the reform
process, has challenged the Vietnamese authorities to make a greater effort to
translate their stated commitment to socialism into a more systematic concern
for maintaining equitable access to public services (Lljunggren 2001).
Continued attempts to control information flows also increase the costs of
acquiring knowledge, market access and technology, and from a significant
constraint on the development of knowledge-based industries and information
technology.7
An area which will require increasing attention is the management of public
funds. During the period of great financial stringency, the sheer scarcity of
resources constrained budgetary waste. With the fast build-up of foreign aid,
there is a grave risk of deterioration in resource use—not surprising given the
tendency of donors to push the flow of aid with only limited access to local
budgetary processes and information. On the Vietnamese side, the access to
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‘free’ resources encourages a relaxation in budgetary discipline. In this regard,
the strong questioning of the waste of aid funds in the National Assembly was
a welcome development. Donors could help if they could establish a better
connection between their own practices in project and program funding and
their rhetoric about the need for improved public sector management.
One area where there is a widespread perception, both by the government
leadership and outside observers, that progress has been much too slow is in
relation to public administration reform. In parts of this study some of the
virtues of the existing system, which may not be immediately apparent, have
been identified. These include the real, if not always transparent, efforts to
build consensus and the degree of flexibility in the system that results from
the autonomous behaviour of many parts of the system.
However, the poor coordination within government (horizontally between
departments and ministries, and vertically between national, provincial and
local government) has also been noted. Difficulties arise when creative autonomy
and flexibility phases into chaotic indiscipline and lack of coordination. As the
economy gets more sophisticated and public management tasks more complex,
a greater coherence will be required of government institutions.
Likewise, there has been no serious effort to raise the salary scales of public
servants in line with growing income levels in the private sector, making it
difficult to check the spread of corruption.
With the state still playing a leading role in the economy, ineffective public
administration and poor public spending decisions could slow economic growth.
While much remains to be done, Viet Nam has, in its own way,  been
remarkably successful in implementing Doi Moi to move the economy to a
high growth path and to reduce poverty dramatically.
NOTES
1 This is consistent with international empirical studies. Sen argues that, based on empirical
studies, the hypothesis that there is no relationship between political freedom and economic
performance ‘is hard to reject’. However, Sen argues that ‘developing a democratic system is
an essential component of the process of development’ (1999:150). Interestingly, the need
to improve democratic processes (especially grassroots democracy) is a recurring theme in
the development strategy approved by the Vietnamese National Assembly. At the end of
the July–August 2002 session of the National Assembly, the Chairman called on Vietnamese
‘to uphold national unity, strength self-reliance to successfully implement the
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industrialisation and modernisation process for a powerful country with wealthy people
and an equal, democratic, and civilised society’.
2 Sen (1999) stresses the interconnections between political freedoms and the understanding
and fulfilment of economic needs. He notes that ‘political freedoms can have a major role
in providing incentives and information in the solution of acute economic needs’
(1999:147). While there were few political freedoms in Viet Nam in 1986, the state did
respond to domestic concerns about economic needs.
3 Without large financial incentives, there was also greater incentive for external policy advisors
to prepare arguments for policy reform carefully. In the absence of financial incentives,
national policymakers were only likely to implement reforms if they were convinced of the
benefits.
4 The Sixth Party Plenum (Ninth Congress) in August 2002 called for ‘accelerated
administrative reform to abolish intermediary agencies that are usually found to be beset
with red-tape and complicated procedures’ and the separation of state administrative
functions from business operations.
5 Castello and Domenech (2002) argue that both the level and the distribution of education
is important for economic growth. They find that greater equality in human capital
development is associated with higher investment rates and income growth.
6 The World Bank IDA Poverty Reduction Support Credit of US$250 million, agreed in
2001, includes a policy matrix with over fifty policy actions to be implemented over the
coming three years. Given the success of the Vietnamese without such support and policy
conditionality, this sort of comprehensive donor guidance might seem gratuitous, if not
arrogant. The explanation seems to lie in the internal process of the World Bank, where the
management seems to require the purchase of a policy matrix commensurate with the size
of a credit.
7 At a conference on information technology in September 2002, Nguyen Khoa Diem
(Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee and Politburo member) stressed
the importance of the internet for social and economic development but complained that
‘Internet and e-newspaper development remains slower than other regional countries and
has not met the demand for national development and the needs of the people…Viet
Nam’s e-newspapers are not very informative and are not very attractive to readers while
Internet costs remain so high’.
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and fishing construction Services
1985 177 47 32 38
1986 599 228 173 198
1987 2,870 1,164 814 892
1988 15,420 7,139 3,695 4,586
1989 28,093 11,818 6,444 9,831
1990 41,955 16,252 9,513 16,190
1991 76,707 31,058 18,252 27,397
1992 110,532 37,513 30,135 42,884
1993 140,258 41,895 40,535 57,828
1994 178,534 48,985 51,540 78,026
1995 228,892 62,219 65,820 100,853
1996 272,036 75,514 80,876 115,646
1997 313,623 80,826 100,595 132,202
1998 361,017 93,073 117,299 150,645
1999 399,942 101,723 137,959 160,260
2000 441,646 108,356 162,220 171,070
2001 (prel.) 484,493 114,412 183,291 186,790




268 VIET NAM: A TRANSITION TIGER?





and fishing construction Services
At constant 1989 prices
1985 23,875 10,455 5,231 8,189
1986 24,431 10,705 5,769 7,957
1987 25,321 10,649 6,297 8,375
1988 26,835 11,069 6,630 9,136
1989 28,093 11,818 6,444 9,831
1990 29,526 12,003 6,629 10,894
1991 31,286 12,264 7,228 11,794
1992 33,991 13,132 8,242 12,617
1993 36,735 13,634 9,324 13,777
1994 39,982 14,169 10,631 15,182
At constant 1994 prices
1994 178,534 48,968 51,540 78,026
1995 195,567 51,319 58,550 85,698
1996 213,833 53,577 67,016 93,240
1997 231,264 55,895 75,474 99,895
1998 244,596 57,866 81,764 104,966
1999 256,272 60,895 88,047 107,330
2000 273,656 63,717 96,913 113,036
2001 (prel.) 292,376 65,497 106,914 119,965
Source: General Statistics Office
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1985 100 100 100 100
1986 102.33 102.39 110.28  97.17
1987 103.64  99.48 109.15 105.25
1988 105.98 103.94 105.29 109.09
1989 104.69 106.77  97.19 107.61
1990 105.09 101.00 102.27 110.19
1991 105.81 102.18 107.71 107.38
1992 108.06 106.88 112.79 107.58
1993 108.08 103.28 112.62 108.64
1994 108.83 103.37 113.39 109.56
1995 109.54 104.80 113.60 109.83
1996 109.34 104.40 114.46 108.80
1997 108.15 104.33 112.62 107.14
1998 105.76 103.53 108.33 105.08
1999 104.77 105.23 107.68 102.25
2000 106.79 104.63 110.07 105.32
2001 (prel.) 106.84 102.79 110.32 106.13
Source: General Statistics Office.
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December 2000  99.4
December 2001 100.8
Source: General Statistics Office.
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Table A1.5 Total values of exports and imports, 1990–2001
(US$ million)
Total Exports Imports
1990 5,156.4 2,404.0 2,752.5
1991 4,425.2 2,087.1 2,338.1
1992 5,121.4 2,580.7 2,540.7
1993 6,909.2 2,985.2 3,924.0
1994 9,880.1 4,054.3 5,825.8
1995 13,604.3 5,448.9 8,155.4
1996 18,399.5 7,255.9 11,143.6
1997 20,777.3 9,185.0 11,592.3
1998 20,859.9 9,360.3 11,499.6
1999 23,283.5 11,541.4 11,742.1
2000 30,119.2 14,482.7 15,636.5
2001 (prel.) 31,189.0 15,027.0 16,162.0
Index (Previous year = 100)
1990 114.3 123.5 107.3
1991  85.8  86.8  84.9
1992 115.7 123.7 108.7
1993 134.9 115.7 154.4
1994 143.0 135.8 148.5
1995 137.7 134.4 140.0
1996 135.2 133.2 136.6
1997 112.9 126.6 104.0
1998 100.4 101.9  99.2
1999 111.6 123.3 102.1
2000 129.4 125.5 133.2
2001 (prel.) 103.6 103.8 103.4
Source: General Statistics Office.
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